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In this thesis, I propose and defend a theory according to which committing oneself 
to knowing the proposition expressed counts as an assertion of that proposition. A 
consequence of this view is the knowledge account of assertion, according to which 
one asserts that p correctly only if one knows that p. In support of this approach, I 
offer a strategy of identifying an assertion’s “normative consequences”, types of act 
that normally take place as a result of one’s making an assertion incorrectly. I outline 
two such phenomena: retraction and disavowal of knowledge. In continuation, I put 
the theory to test and critically examine four sets of objections against it, arguing that 
it can convincingly defuse them. Finally, I discuss two related issues: I maintain that 
by performing “aesthetic assertions” one also normally performs a non-assertoric 
speech act of recommendation, and argue for the possibility of “non-linguistic 




First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors, Manuel García-Carpintero and 
Sven Rosenkranz. Over the years, I benefited enormously from the close cooperation 
with them. They were guiding my work from the very first day and my presumptuous 
defense of the belief norm of assertion––“one could have expected you would change 
your mind”, Manolo told me––to the view I present here. I learned a lot from many 
rewarding discussions we had and I remain inspired by their approach to philosophy.      
A number of people have influenced my thinking about assertion in one way or 
another. Among them is John Searle, with whom I had a chance to discuss the topic 
during my stay at Berkeley in Fall 2014. It was there that I became convinced the 
commitment view is on the right track and tried to craft it to its present shape. I have 
also profited from the mentorship of John MacFarlane, and conversations with Stephen 
Finlay, Janet Levin, Scott Soames, and Ralph Wedgwood during a short visit to the 
University of Southern California, which left a lasting impression on me.       
I am indebted to Andy Egan, my supervisor at Rutgers University in Spring 2012, for 
his time and valuable comments. Many thanks to Rodrigo Borges, who was giving a 
course on assertion at the time, for many exchanges we had back in New Brunswick and 
to Matt Benton, who read one of the early papers. Thony Gillies instructed me about 
indicative conditionals, although in the end I did not pursue this line of research in more 
vi
detail. During this time, I was also visiting the philosophy department at Princeton 
University and attending classes by John Hawthorne, who helped me articulate some 
ideas.        
  The nicest experience was back “home” at LOGOS, with colleagues and friends who 
passed here during these years and participated in GRG, Seminars, MA and PhD courses, 
and a number of “informal reading groups” we tried out. Neri Marsili has read and 
commented on several chapters and papers, some of which at our “Normative Accounts 
of Assertion” meetings with Greg Gaszczyk. Reading groups on MacFarlane’s Assessment 
Sensitivity and Wittgenstein’s Investigations were very enjoyable and I am especially 
thankful to Stefan Reining for his cooperation on a co-authored paper on Wittgenstein’s 
view on assertion. Many thanks to Javier González de Prado Salas, with whom I wrote a 
paper on semantics and pragmatics of aesthetic attributions, parts of which are included 
here as Chapter 7.     
I would also like to express my gratitude to Peter Pagin and Jennifer Lackey for 
instructive discussions. Many thanks to Marc Artiga, Delia Belleri, Hanoch Ben-Yami, 
Samuele Chilovi, Sophia Dandelet, Aurélien Darbellay, Laura Delgado, Nick French, 
Patrick Greenough, José Gusmão, Tyler Haddow, John Horden, Marta Jorba, Dan 
López de Sa, Manolo Martinez, Giovanni Merlo, Carlos Moya, Sergi Oms, Giulia 
Pravato, Lucía Prieto, David Rey, Gonçalo Santos, Carlota Serrahima, Alex Skiles, 
Robert Stainton, Ljuba Stevanovic, and Dan Zeman. And to anyone I might have 
forgotten to include.        
 Thanks to my friends who were not already included in these pages. And above all, 
thanks to my family for all their encouragement and support. My youngest cousins still 
think I am about to become a scientist. This is dedicated to all of them. 
This work was sponsored by a grant from the DGI project FFI2010–16049, “The 
Nature of Assertion: Consequences for Relativism and Fictionalism”, awarded by the 
Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (MICINN). My research was also funded by 
the Spanish Ministry of Economy, with two research travel grants (“Estancia Breve”), for 
4 months visits to Rutgers University in 2012 and UC Berkeley in 2014. In addition, the 
vii	  
membership in the project “About Ourselves” was highly appreciated and beneficial. The 
finance from these projects and institutions allowed me to present most of the work 
done in this dissertation at various workshops and conferences in: Azores, Barcelona, 
Berkeley, Braga, Buenos Aires, Fribourg, Lisbon, Madrid, Salzburg, and Valencia. I am 




1. Introduction  3
2. Two Accounts of “Correct Assertion”  11
3. On Constitutive Rules and Commitment  47
4. Asserting as Commitment to Knowing  75
5. The Role of the Audience  123
6. Conversational Challenges  159
7. Aesthetic Assertions  181
8. Non-Linguistic Assertions  211
9. Conclusion  231
x
xi	  
Detailed Table of Contents 
Abstract  iii 
Acknowledgments  iv 
Part I. Groundwork  1 
Chapter 1. Introduction  3 
Chapter 2. Two Accounts of “Correct Assertion”  11 
2.1 The reasonableness theory  13  
2.1.1 Normative consequences  14  
2.1.1.1 “Liability to criticism”  18   
2.1.2 The meaning of “correct assertion”  20   
2.1.3 Factivity condition  21   
2.2 The objectivity theory  23   
2.2.1 Normative consequences  25   
2.2.1.1 Retraction  26 
2.2.2 The meaning of “correct assertion”  28   
2.2.3 Factivity condition  29   
2.2.4 A case for objectivism: strict liability  31 
2.3 Three problems for the objectivist  32 
a. The guidance problem  32
b. Validity of our assessments  34
c. Accounting for the social norm  35
2.4 Secondary correctness  36 
2.4.1 The reasonabilist’s argument against the secondary correctness  37 
2.4.1.1 The redundancy claim  38   
2.4.1.2 Lackey’s argument from the game analogy  38  
2.4.1.3 Kvanvig’s objection  40  
2.5 Normativity of assertion and two notions of “should”  41  
2.6 Final remarks  42  
2.7 Appendix: the list of normative accounts  43  
xii
Chapter 3. On Constitutive Rules and Commitment  47 
3.1 Constitutive rules  47   
3.1.1 The performance condition  48  
3.1.2 Williamson’s account of constitutive rules  49 
3.1.3 The orthodox view  54    
3.1.4 Problems for the orthodox view  57  
a. Two types of regulative rules  58
b. Change of regulative rules and identity of acts  59
c. Breaking regulative rules  60
3.1.5 Problems for Williamson’s theory: success Y-terms  61  
3.1.6 The “counts-as” rules and assertion  64    
3.2 Commitment  65    
3.2.1 Searle’s account of commitment  66    
3.2.1.1 “Degrees of commitment”  66  
3.2.2 An alternative conception of commitment  70    
3.3 Final remarks  70    
Part II. A Theory of Assertion  73 
Chapter 4. Asserting as Commitment to Knowing  75 
4.1 Contrasting cases  80 
a. On-stage & non-literal assertions  81
b. Indirect assertions  82
c. Presupposition  83
4.1.1 Objections  84    
4.2 Commitment as a social act  85 
a. Logical incompatibility  87
b. Irrelevance of indirect assertion models  88
c. The inferential integration test  90
4.3 The twin argument  92    
4.3.1 The retraction data  94 
a. Is retraction replaceable?  95
b. Inference across contexts  96
c. Pragmatic blindness  98
4.3.2 Retraction as a normative consequence  99   
4.3.2.1 MacFarlane’s rule of retraction  99   
4.4 The argument from imprecise assertions  102  
4.5 The argument from gettiered assertions  105  
xiii
4.5.1 Disavowing knowledge  107    
4.6 The argument from presupposition  110      
4.6.1 Challenging the presuppositions  113      
4.6.2 von Fintel’s objection  114      
4.6.3 Distinguishing assertion from presupposition  116  
4.6.4 Final remarks  121     
Chapter 5.  The Role of the Audience  123  
5.1 Existentially known assertions  125    
5.1.1 “Telling the time”  128     
5.1.1.1 Asserting meta-linguistic content  129    
5.1.1.2 The proffering strategy  130     
5.1.2 “Pointing without seeing”  132    
5.1.3 Two strategies for saving the knowledge account  133  
5.2 Selfless assertions  135      
5.2.1 Two responses to Lackey’s argument  137    
5.2.1.1 Montminy  139    
5.2.1.2 Turri  140      
5.2.2 Lackey’s treatment of Moorean absurdity  143     
5.2.3 In defense of the knowledge account  146     
5.2.3.1 “Creationist teacher”  148    
5.2.3.2 “Distraught doctor”  151      
5.2.3.3 “Racist juror”  152    
5.2.4 Final remarks  156     
Chapter 6. Conversational Challenges  159 
6.1 The K-challenge  162 
6.1.1 Lackey’s argument  163 
6.1.2 Lackey’s reasonableness norm and the B-challenge  165 
6.1.3 Schieber’s argument  167 
6.1.3.1 “The rain scenario”  167  
6.1.3.2 “The Obama scenario”  169  
6.2 The C-challenge  170  
6.2.1 Two cases  172 
6.2.2 Unger’s argument  173 
6.2.3 Turri’s argument  174  
6.2.4 Egan’ argument  175  
6.2.5 Final remarks  176  
xiv	  
Part III. Further Issues  179 
Chapter 7. Aesthetic Assertions  181 
7.1 Taste predicates: a brief survey  183  
7.1.1 Aesthetic predicates  185  
7.2 The objection from testimony  187  
7.3 Naïve contextualism  190  
7.3.1 Two problems for naïve contextualism  191 
7.3.1.1 Normativity  192 
7.3.1.2 Disagreement  193  
7.4 Recanati’s analysis  194  
7.4.1 Dilemma for Recanati’s view  195  
7.5 Beauty attributions as double-speech acts  198 
7.5.1 Recommendation  199  
a. Motivation  200
b. The correctness conditions  201
c. The relation to assertion  203
d. Accepting the recommendation  204
e. The scope of recommendation  205
f. Recommending a lost object  206
g. The correctness conditions, revisited  207
7.5.2 Normativity and disagreement  207 
7.5.2.1 Kölbel’s argument from disagreement  208 
7.5.2.2 Ways of disagreeing  209  
7.6 Final remarks  210 
Chapter 8. Non-linguistic Assertions  211 
8.1 One-Off Grice  214  
8.2 Argument from the singularity of content  216 
a. “Several variant messages”  217
b. Conjecture only  219
c. Indication  223
8.3 Argument from deniability  225 
8.4 Positive considerations  226  
8.5 Final remarks  228  
Chapter 9. Conclusion  231 






“Assertion” picks out a robust, commonplace phenomenon, performed in one’s 
reporting that a cat is on the mat or describing Cadaques as being beautiful. As a first 
approximation, the speaker is thereby claiming something to hold (Pagin 2014) or 
to be true (Wright 1992).    
 Although the feature of truth-aptness proved to be useful in distinguishing 
assertion from other speech acts,1 it may have also clouded some of its other central 
properties. For example, in the early writings of J. L. Austin (1961), assertion was 
classified as a constative and contrasted with performatives such as betting or 
baptizing. This rendition left out a key feature of asserting, that of being an act in a 
full-fledged sense. What helped Austin to revoke the distinction in his later writings 
and regard assertion as an act, was the observation that assertions can be 
“infelicitous” in the ways parallel to those in which performatives can be. To 
introduce Austin’s thought and, more generally, the significance of viewing 
1 More generally, truth-aptness can serve to describe a whole class of assertives, including 
acts other than assertion such as guessing, conjecturing or swearing. Discussion on 
assertives can be found in: Schiffer (1972), Searle (1979), Bach & Harnish (1979), and 
Alston (2000) among others.    
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assertion as an act, it may be useful to think of assertion as a form of “perceptual 
experience by proxy”.2     
First, as both perceptual experience and assertion present things as being a 
certain way, they can be veridical or true, respectively. The simile, thus, manages to 
capture the trait of truth-aptness. Secondly, it also helpfully illustrates two further 
aspects of assertion, namely the representational and the normative one. To see this, 
let us assume that by offering a “perceptual experience by proxy”, the agent is 
recognized as doing so and hence is seen as performing an act whose features and 
purpose are well-known to her linguistic community. By asserting that a cat is on the 
mat, the hearer is likely to form the matching belief as if she observed it with her 
own eyes (Dummett 1973, Millikan 2004). The asserted content would thus 
amount to a representational device, while the agent would represent herself as 
being related to the representational content. In so doing, the speaker plausibly 
undertakes a certain responsibility towards her audience (Jary 2008:105), which 
leads us to the normative aspect of the act.   
In introducing the normative aspect, it might be useful to start off by 
considering an act of promising, as it is more uncontroversially held to be 
normative. For instance, we can agree that uttering “I promise I will help you out 
but I don’t intend to do so” is infelicitous or somehow wrong; as such, the infelicity 
signals the existence of certain requirements (such as honesty) which arguably need to 
be fulfilled when making a promise. A task for the normative theorist of assertion is 
to see whether similar such requirements exist when it comes to assertion––i.e., 
2 I use “perceptual experience” in place of Jary’s “perception” (2010) given that the latter 
term is factive, unlike assertion. Note also that the “perception by proxy” view, defended 
in Dummett (1973), McDowell (1980), and Millikan (2004), develops further claims, 
which I am not endorsing. Accordingly, my point here is merely to show how the very 
metaphor can prove useful in presenting the normative approach to assertion.  
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whether one can similarly fall short of being “in a position to assert” (a phrase which, 
interestingly, dates as early as to Plato’s The Republic3).   
As Searle and Vanderveken (1985) pointed out, the kind of infelicity to which 
promises might give rise is indeed common to assertion, and in fact to most 
illocutionary acts.4 Roughly put, there is an expectation that one believes what one 
asserts. Accordingly, if one were to assert that it is raining but I don’t believe that it is 
raining, one would clearly perform an infelicitous act––the speaker would admit her 
lack of belief in the content and offer the content to others in the same breath.5  
Similarly, even if one doesn’t utter a Moorean sentence but it is discovered one 
didn’t believe the asserted content, or have adequate evidence for it, the same 
problem arises. By using our metaphor, one puts forward the content as a veridical 
perceptual experience without being in a position to ensure that it really is true. In 
such a case, the hearer seems to have some right to reproach the speaker for offering 
such an assertion: they performed an act for which they lacked authorization, so to 
say. The subsequent criticism wears normativity on its sleeve: “you shouldn’t have 
asserted that”. Such criticism is widespread in linguistic practice: when learning the 
“assertion game”, we master the conditions under which such criticism is called for, 
just as we learn any other aspect of asserting. It is because the appropriateness of 
such criticism in situations of this kind is integral to assertoric practice that the very 
act of assertion has a normative dimension.  
A further aspect of assertoric practice, and another point of interest for the 
normative theorist, are so-called “conversational challenges”, most notably centered 
3 “Haven't you realized that our soul is immortal and never destroyed?” He looked at me 
with wonder and said: “No, by god, I haven't. Are you really in a position to assert that? I’d 
be wrong not to, I said, and so would you, for it isn’t difficult” (Plato, Republic 608d, italics 
added). A further point of interest can be found earlier in The Republic: “Perhaps we 
shouldn’t assert this dogmatically, Glaucon. What we can assert is what we were saying just 
now” (416b, italics added). 
4 Searle called it the sincerity condition and explained it in terms of the psychological state 
which the illocutionary act is meant to express.  
5 Cf. Green and Williams’ introduction and survey of explanations of Moorean sentences.  
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on the notions of knowledge and certainty––e.g., “How do you know that?”, “Are 
you certain about that?” and so on. It is noteworthy not only that we can respond to 
assertions by such challenges appropriately or naturally, but also that it wouldn’t 
make any sense so to respond to most other speech acts.6 (A person venturing a 
guess, if challenged, could reject the question by retorting: “I never said I knew”.) It 
should be clear that such challenges are normative in character: for, if it turns out that 
the speaker cannot answer a challenge and offer a satisfactory reply to it, she will be 
criticized. (Further, this also has consequences for the contents asserted, and not 
only for the asserter: such contents will not be accepted in the conversational score, 
acted upon, etc.)  The normative character of these challenges––which could be 
seen as demands just as well––points out to the normative character of assertion.     
Plausibly, then, assertion should not be viewed as “a normatively neutral act 
type”, to use Cappelen’s useful term (2011), although it remains to be seen whether 
we have further evidence in support of normative accounts and can substantiate in 
more detail the points sketched in this introduction. It also needs to be explained 
what the norms governing the act of assertion are.   
Challenges and criticism are conceptually tied to the conditions of correctness: 
we challenge the correctness of an act and criticize an act when it is shown to be 
incorrect. And, as a normative kind, assertions are either correct or incorrect. But 
how do we decide what the scope of such “correctness” is? What does it mean to say 
that an assertion is correct? This is a fundamental question that I try to answer in 
Chapter 2, outlining two competing accounts of “correct assertion”. On the view I 
label reasonabilist, the speaker’s immunity to criticism is deemed both necessary and 
sufficient for the correctness of her assertion. On the opposing, objectivist 
approach, the requirements for correctness go beyond speaker’s being free of 
criticism. This much makes the latter approach controversial as the doubts have 
been raised more than once as to what further normative aspect there could be. In 
6 The only exception that I am aware of is that of presupposition, as I will discuss at length 
in Chapter 4.  
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defense of objectivism, I introduce the notion of “normative consequence”, a type of 
act typically occurring as a result of one’s making an assertion incorrectly. In 
particular, I focus on those consequences which give us reason to think that 
assertions that cause them were faulty precisely because such consequences 
eventuated. As I will argue, the speaker’s liability to criticism is only one such 
normative consequence. In addition, we can identify at least two other––retraction 
in the light of recognized falsity and disavowal of knowledge. As one of the key 
distinctions between reasonabilists and objectivists is that the former opt for a non-
factive and latter for a factive norm, I will argue that the appropriateness of 
retractions and disavowals favors the objectivist approach.  
In Chapter 3, I analyze the concepts of constitutive rule and of commitment, in 
terms of which the objectivists construe their accounts of assertion. I first contrast 
two frameworks of constitutive rules, offered in the works by John Searle and 
Timothy Williamson, respectively, arguing that they are both susceptible to a 
number of problems, and suggest how these shortcomings should be resolved. I 
then go on to challenge Searle’s conception of commitment, focusing on its defect 
to define assertion, a task Searle seems to have undertaken and which a normative 
theory of assertion should strive to fulfill anyhow.   
All this serves to set the stage for the hybrid view of assertion that I aim to 
defend. Instead of choosing between capturing assertion in terms of commitment (as 
most notably did Peirce, Searle, and Brandom) or in terms of constitutive rules, I 
propose a hybrid view that characterizes assertion in terms of both these concepts. I 
undertake this task in Chapter 4, where I defend assertion as a commitment to 
knowing the proposition expressed (CK for short), and propose that an assertion 
counts as correct if and only if one knows the proposition asserted (the knowledge 
account of assertion). In the rest of Part II of the dissertation, I go on to defend such 
a view, examining four sets of objections against it. First, I discuss arguments (i) 
against commitment views in general which, due to the fact CK has not been 




(2004) argument. I then move on to objections (ii) against the knowledge account of 
assertion (henceforth KA). Three of these arguments are of special importance––
with regard to Lackey’s “twin argument” and the objection from gettiered 
assertions, I try to show that KA is well-equipped to handle these kinds of cases, by 
appealing to the framework of “normative consequences” mentioned above; 
however, the argument from presupposition, offered by García-Carpintero (MS1), 
motivates a departure from KA in my view. In reply, I avoid KA by reverting to 
CK––instead of individuating assertion as an act subject to KA, I define asserting as 
a commitment to knowing the proposition expressed.   
In Chapter 5, I turn to two arguments (iii) against speaker-centered norms, such 
as KA, offered by Pelling (2013a) and Lackey (2007, 2008), respectively, meant to 
show that these accounts unjustifiably rule out the role of the audience. Although I 
find these arguments faulty, and KA in a good position to resolve them, I also note 
that CK does make an implicit reference to the audience, insofar as the illocutionary 
commitment is undertaken vis–à–vis our interlocutors.  
In the sixth chapter, and the last chapter of Part II, I discuss conversational 
challenges, a type of linguistic data mentioned above, and evaluate objections (iv) 
against the thesis that KA and CK can accommodate conversational challenges better 
than their rivals. As I will try to show, they indeed manage to do so better than the 
competing views.   
The third and the last part of the dissertation explores some broader issues 
related to assertion, even though CK is still invoked as the default view. Thus, 
Chapter 7 examines a class of “aesthetic assertions”, taking as a paradigmatic example 
attributions of the form “x is beautiful”. In making this statement, I submit, one 
asserts correctly only if one knows that relative to one’s own aesthetic standards, x is 
indeed beautiful. However, the resulting naïve contextualism can hardly account for 
the desiderata of normativity and disagreement. In turn, I will suggest, one doesn’t 
merely report, in attributing beauty or other aesthetic property, but is also 
recommending that the audience comes to accept such a judgment.  
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Finally, Chapter 8 examines the possibility of non-linguistic assertions. By 
arguing that a proposition can be expressed by a gesture performed in appropriate 
contexts, I will maintain that we can assert non-linguistically, by committing 
ourselves to knowing such a proposition.  
2 
Two Accounts of “Correct Assertion” 
A normative account of assertion is an instance of a rule schema: “it is correct to 
assert that p only if C obtains”.7 In search of the correctness condition C, theorists 
have relied for the most part on interpreting a set of linguistic intuitions, taken from 
ordinary practice, hypothetical scenarios and thought experiments. As it turns out, 
since Williamson’s seminal 1996 paper, which revived the interest in the 
normativity of assertion, there have been as many as twenty different accounts8 
about the nature of this condition.       
Such a large number of competing theories is likely to invite skepticism about 
the role assigned to our intuitions, suggesting a change of heuristic. A more radical 
7 For the sake of simplicity, I don’t take here into account somewhat more complex views, 
such as that of Searle, which invoke a cluster or rules, rather than only an instance of the 
mentioned schema.    
8 Different taxonomies might be possible and could yield a different number of accounts. 
For more details, see the appendix at the end of this chapter.   
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response would be to abandon the normative approach to assertion altogether.9 I do 
not find such worries justified, however. For, in this case, the disagreement “omnium 
contra omnes” reflects to a considerable extent epistemological subtleties surrounding 
certain choices of the norm, and introduces more external, epistemological issues to 
the debate. It thereby remains largely hidden from view that theorists actually often 
agree in their intuitions and about the questions that lie at the foundations of the 
normativity of assertion as such. It is by pointing to these kinds of intuition that one 
may seek to answer the initial skepticism and argue that the normative approach is 
more promising than it may initially seem.    
A fundamental question we should ask ourselves is what it means to say that an 
assertion is correct. Attempts to solve this problem have assumed a surprisingly minor 
role in the literature, if any at all. In this chapter, I set out to show that there are 
two and only two types of intuition concerning the meaning of “correct assertion”––
corresponding to the reasonabilist and objectivist approach to the normativity of 
assertion, respectively.    
The importance of the question what it means to say that an assertion is correct 
derives from the fact the term “correct” appears in the rule schema mentioned 
above, “it is correct to assert that p only if C obtains”. However, as the rule schema 
can be phrased differently so can be our central question. For one thing, a number 
of theorists have used other evaluative adjectives interchangeably with “correct”, 
such as “accurate”, “appropriate”, “authorized”, “(epistemically) proper”, “licensed”, 
“non-defective”,10 “properly positioned”, and “warranted”. In the rest of the thesis, I 
9 Although a number of authors opt for such a position, including Boghossian (2003) and 
Sosa (2009), among others, it was Pagin’s “Problems with norms of assertion” (2015) 
which directly prompted the writing of this chapter.   
10 Some philosophers, such as Searle (1969), use the notion of “defective” to refer to the 
phenomenon of uninformative assertion. As such, the notion is used in a wider sense since, 
as I will argue later, an uninformative assertion is not eo ipso an incorrect one. In the recent 
contemporary literature, the term is given a more restrictive meaning in Williamson 
(2009:342), Maitra and Weatherson (2010:102) and others.   
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will stick to the pair “correct”/“incorrect”, although nothing hinges on this choice.11  
Further, the rule schema can dispense with adjectives altogether and take the form 
of the prescriptive “one should assert that p only if C obtains”.12 In this case, the 
relevant question would become what does it mean to say that an assertion should only be 
made under condition C”.    
A general point behind insisting on spelling out such varieties is to stress that 
whichever option we go for, we will find only two fundamentally distinct ways of 
thinking about them, reasonabilist and objectivist. The main idea of this chapter, 
thus, is to show that there are two senses in which an assertion may be said to be 
correct. Arguably, the twenty accounts referred to above will fit either one of the 
two camps, suggesting that there is a principled divide, affecting the core of the 
debate.   
2.1 The Reasonableness Theory 
I start by presenting what I shall call the reasonabilist13 view, interpreting Lackey’s 
(2007)  “Norms of Assertion” as the representative of this approach. To answer the 
fundamental question, (i) what it is for an assertion to be correct, I will start by 
11 If it is of any interest, the term “correctness” already appears in Midgley’s (1958) 
pioneering work on the game analogy, and also ties the present topic to the debate in the 
normativity of meaning where the same term is used (e.g., Kripke’s 1982). Unlike some 
authors (Barker, 2004: 8) I do not wish to use the syntagm “correct assertion” to describe 
successfully made assertions––in my usage, “successful” is redundant as applied to 
“assertion”: “successful assertion” just means “assertion”.     
12 Strictly speaking, the form “one should Φ only if C” follows from “it is correct to Φ only 
if C” only by adding an additional premiss that “one should Φ only if it is correct to Φ”, but 
this is uncontroversial. I postpone discussion of “should” until section 2.5.  
13 To quote Austin, “this is rather an ugly word, and a new word, but there seems to be no 
word already in existence to do the job” (1961/1970: 235).   
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asking (ii) what are the normative consequences of violating the norm of assertion, a 
term of art I sketched in the Introduction and which I will expand on shortly. The 
question (ii) is mostly related to the evidence we can use in answering the first 
question. By the same token, this will bring us closer to answering (iii) whether the 
norm of assertion is a factive concept.   
Once we have answered (i)–(iii), it may also be sufficiently clear how to think 
about (iv) the status of the “secondary correctness” of assertion, another term of art 
I will talk about later in this chapter. For the most part, I will intend to show that 
the difference between the reasonabilist and the objectivist can be found in their 
answers to question (i), and that this answer has repercussions for the remaining 
three questions.   
2.1.1 Normative Consequences 
The possibility of asserting incorrectly suggests that the correctness conditions are 
not necessary for asserting itself: one can manage to assert without doing so 
correctly. In fact, normative theories often proceed by examining cases of incorrect 
assertions. It may be said that once we have a complete grasp of what incorrectness 
consists in, we will understand what the norm of assertion is. As Lackey writes:  
[W]hen theorizing about norms of assertion, we are often trying to figure out 
what the norms themselves are. Because of this, it is fairly common14 for those 
working on this topic to take our intuitions regarding whether we feel that 
asserters are subject to criticism as evidence for concluding that a norm of 
14 Being one of the first proponents of what I call “the reasonableness theory”, it is unclear 
to whom Lackey refers when she observes “fairly common” features for “those working on 
the topic”. Her claim could be read more appropriately as what should be the case.  
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assertion has been violated. Thus, if an asserter seems appropriately subject to 
criticism qua asserter, then this is taken to be a good reason to conclude that a 
norm of assertion has been violated (Lackey, 2007: 595; original emphasis).  
This passage contains the main idea behind what I will call “the reasonableness 
theory”. Before moving on, however, it may be useful to dwell briefly on the 
strategy of normative accounts of assertion which Lackey mentions.     
One of the landmarks of normative approaches to assertion is the so–called game 
analogy,15 the claim that the rule of assertion bears resemblance to the rules of 
games. While the main point of the analogy is to shed light on the concept of 
constitutive rule,16 I would like to stress the importance of a further analogue––
normative consequence. To introduce the term, think of the following effects: once a 
chess player touches one of her figures, she is required to play with it; once a 
basketball player commits five personal fouls, she is forbidden from playing the game; 
once a tennis player hits a net post, she loses a point; once a soccer player (other than 
a goalkeeper) touches the football with a hand in the penalty area, the opposing 
soccer team is awarded a penalty kick. Of course, these are only few examples of the 
great variety of normative consequences we find within games. And, just as we can 
understand a certain game only after learning each one of its normative 
consequences, the same should follow for the assertoric practice, too.      
In the quoted passage above, Lackey recognizes this point: if assertion is 
governed by rules, there should likewise be normative consequences of breaking 
these rules. Lackey goes on to specify one such normative consequence: the speaker’s 
15 As mentioned above, the analogy is introduced in the philosophy of language by Midgley 
(1958), and is applied for the first time in the speech act theory by Searle (1969). Further 
developments are made in Lewis (1979), and the interest in it revived by Williamson 
(1996). For criticism, see Maitra and Weatherson (2010) and Maitra (2011) among others. 
16 I analyze the concept in Chapter 3. Most accounts in the literature (pace Stone 2007, 
Levin 2008, Carter and Gordon 2011) posit a single constitutive norm of assertion. For the 
sake of simplicity, I will proceed with the same assumption, before offering arguments for 
it. 
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liability to criticism (henceforth SLC). The claim that SLC is a normative consequence 
strikes as a rather uncontroversial normative claim––it contends that if an agent is 
subject to criticism17 for her assertion, then she has thereby violated the assertoric 
rule. It is easy to agree that the absence of SLC is a necessary condition for the 
correctness of assertion: if the speaker is subject to criticism when asserting p, then 
p is asserted incorrectly18. For the sake of convenience, I will rephrase SLC in terms 
of reasonableness and say that if the speaker is liable to criticism for making an 
assertion, her assertion is unreasonable, and otherwise reasonable.        
In spite of being somewhat cumbersome, the term “reasonableness” was chosen 
here for several reasons. First, it appears to be more neutral than other terms in the 
ballpark such as “permissibility”  and “blamelessness”. For, unlike with the latter two 
concepts, reasonabilists and objectivists may agree about the criteria of 
“reasonableness”, and this allows us to explain the similarity between the two 
approaches with more ease.    
Secondly, as non-objectivist accounts come in many flavors, we need a heading 
under which we can subsume all of them. And while “reasonabilism” is not the only 
term that can be employed, it appears to be broad enough to serve the purpose.  
Thirdly, as I will discuss at length in section 2.4, the term is all-important in 
characterizing the “secondary correctness”, a concept of some importance for 
properly understanding what correctness is. As we will see, the objectivists invoke 
precisely the notion of reasonableness in order to cash out secondary correctness.  
We should think of the notion of reasonable assertion as relative to the evidence 
available to the speaker and as judged by the relevant linguistic community. As this 
17 As I clarify in section 2.1.1.1, the relevant notion of criticism pertains solely to the act of 
asserting, rather than to external considerations such as those of morality, politeness, and 
others. 
18 Note, however, that this doesn’t follow if we put forward truth as the norm of assertion. 
On this approach, an assertion can be correct even if the speaker is liable to criticism in the 
relevant sense. In order to explain the speaker’s liability to criticism, the proponent of this 
account will appeal to “secondary correctness”, as I will discuss in section 2.4.   
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characterization leaves the notions of relevant community and relevant evidence 
unspecified, let us consider the following scenario so as to pin down how these 
notions should be understood:     
On a December morning, Amy looks out the window and sees the snow-like 
flakes. At this time of year, it is usually snowing in her town, and so she 
asserts to her family that it is snowing. Unbeknownst to her, however, the 
film crew on the top of her building is spraying the artificial snow.19    
It is highly intuitive, I think, to accept that Amy is not liable to criticism and that her 
assertion is reasonable. In accordance with this, the relevant evidence would be the 
one available to Amy, as her act is deemed reasonable precisely in the light of this 
evidence. Consequently, a larger body of evidence, such as the one available to the 
movie crew, should count as irrelevant when evaluating the reasonableness of 
Amy’s assertion. In turn, the relevant body of evidence is not automatically the 
most extensive one.20      
As far as the scope of the relevant community is concerned, we can submit that 
if anyone competent were to assess Amy’s assertion, they would not criticize her for 
making it. In other words, a relevant judge will appraise Amy as having done what 
was in her epistemic powers, and as such as having acted reasonably.  
Returning to Lackey’s passage, I would like to dwell on its more controversial 
part, the claim that SLC is the only normative consequence of incorrect assertion.21  
19 Adapted from Williamson (1996: 509).   
20 I wish to submit that, had Amy made the same assertion in front of the movie crew, or if 
some of its members have eavesdropped, her assertion would still be reasonable. In such 
circumstances, the salient body of evidence would not shift to the most extensive one, 
either. In other words, Amy’s assertion would be reasonable relative to this enlarged body 
of evidence, too.  
21 See also Lackey (2008: 137).  
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Observe that this much would give us the sufficient condition for the correctness of 
assertion: if the speaker is not liable to criticism when asserting p then p is asserted 
correctly. Hill and Schechter (2007), Stone (2007:100), and Levin (2008: 368–9), 
among others, endorse this claim.22 In Levin’s example, when the speaker tells her 
son he will do well on the test next day, it is in virtue of the fact that she is not “to be 
criticized for making this assertion” that her assertion is correct (2008:368). For 
these authors, no further consideration matters for the sufficiency conditions. In 
effect, this is the reasonableness theory: the view that reasonableness is both a 
necessary and a sufficient condition for correctness of assertion.    
2.1.1.1 “Liability to Criticism” 
To understand reasonableness and flesh out the concept Lackey uses for it––the lack 
of the speaker’s liability to criticism––there are three points to be made.      
First of all, it is irrelevant for the reasonabilist whether the agent is being 
actually criticized for the statement she made or not. The very fact that one is 
reproached for asserting does not license the inference to the normative conclusion 
that the agent has thereby violated the norm of assertion: a criticism could be made 
on insufficient grounds, or might be instead erroneously missing. What we are 
interested, instead, is the modal property of the speaker being liable or subject to 
criticism. Such a liability is typically accompanied by a feeling of resentment against 
the speaker (Weiner, 2005: 231-2; Lackey 2008:137).    
Secondly, assertion is a multifaceted act and is subject to various rules of 
etiquette, prudence, ethics, and relevance, among others. Although by violating 
22 More generally, Kvanvig (2009:141) treats the possibility that “the norm is violated and 
yet we do not view the assertion as deserving of criticism” as detrimental to any normative 
account of assertion.   
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either one of these rules one would make oneself liable to some kind of criticism, the 
type of criticism we are after is of a different kind. For instance, think of an impolite 
assertion – the fault cannot lie with the assertion itself, but rather with the way it 
was made. Thus, the rules of etiquette do not govern assertion per se, but 
conversation generally speaking.    
In contrast, making a statement while lacking any evidence for its content will 
deserve a reproach in the intended sense and pertain solely to the act of asserting. 
Thus, as a first approximation, the rule of assertion is related to the body of 
evidence against which the act is being made. At this point, however, I cannot make 
these conditions any more precise as this would imply opting for one reasonabilist 
approach rather than another. But I take it that the idea is sufficiently clear.     
Thirdly, as remarked above, we need to put a finger on the criterion of relevant 
“linguistic community”, the concept we invoked to describe the assessment of 
assertion with respect to its reasonableness. The scope of the “relevant linguistic 
community” is up for grabs, but it roughly corresponds to a kind of “mastery” one 
has in playing the assertion game: e.g., one needs to know when an assertion should 
be accepted and when its speaker should be challenged; when the answer to the 
challenge should be rendered satisfactory and when one should require a withdrawal 
or hedging of the statement; and so on.        
It should be noted that even though the “relevant linguistic community” includes 
the speaker, it is wrong to infer that the speaker’s judgment must be authoritative in 
assessing the correctness of assertion. This point is sometimes lost sight of. When 
presenting Lackey’s account, Pelling maintains that an assertion will be evaluated as 
correct so long as it is “made on what the asserter himself or herself recognizes to be 
strong evidence” (Pelling, 2013b: 3786). But this condition is obviously too weak. 
We can imagine a scenario where the speaker’s judgment is impaired and fails to 
comply with the standards of rationality of her audience. We could not deem his 
assertion authoritative on the pain of losing the fine distinction Wittgenstein draws 
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in his Investigations between one’s belief that one follows the rule and one’s actual 
following the rule (§ 202).  It is thus mistaken to allow for the speaker’s judgment 
as to whether her evidence marks her assertion reasonable to be sufficient across the 
board.    
Lackey is indeed more nuanced in her writings. As she specifies, “in order for it 
to be reasonable for a subject to believe that p in the sense required by the 
reasonableness norm, there needs to be epistemic support available to the subject 
that makes it in the actual world, as a matter of objective fact, likely that it is true 
that p” (Lackey, 2007: 610; italics added). Her insisting on “a matter of objective 
fact” seems to oblige one to take into consideration a bigger picture, instead of 
focusing solely on the speaker. In consequence, in order to understand the import of 
“reasonable” we should consult the standards of the community.       
Observe, however, that the fact that we should take into consideration the 
whole community does not entail that there will be no situations in which only the 
speaker will be authoritative, and the rest of the community would not. It is quite 
probable, for instance, that before circulating the manuscript with the outline of his 
revolutionary ideas, Copernicus was the only one who comprehended that the Earth 
revolves around the Sun. This would, in turn, establish his epistemic position as the 
standard for evaluating the heliocentric claims. These cases are rare, however, but 
illuminating as they show that while the speaker’s opinion diverged from that of the 
community, it is the speaker who should be considered as authoritative. 
2.1.2 The Meaning of “Correct Assertion” 
Having specified the reasonabilist’s set of normative consequences––which consists 
only of the speaker’s liability to criticism––the reasonabilist can now specify what it 
means to say that an assertion is correct. Roughly, an assertion is correct if and only 
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if it is reasonable relative to the evidence available to the speaker and as judged by the 
relevant linguistic community. Or more succinctly, an assertion is correct if and 
only if it is reasonable.  
2.1.3 Factivity Conditions 
Given that the reasonableness of assertion is both necessary and sufficient condition 
for its correctness, it should straightforwardly follow that the norm of assertion, on 
this approach, cannot be a factive notion.      
A general way to make this point would be to say that we are bound to have 
cases––such as the one of the snow scenario, described earlier––in which the 
speaker earnestly asserts a false proposition, despite having what seems to be 
perfectly good evidence. Since such an act is indeed reasonable, and given that on 
the present view correctness of assertions requires nothing more than their 
reasonableness, it follows that these assertions are correct, even though their 
content is false. In conclusion, the reasonabilist norm of assertion cannot be factive.  
Perhaps it might be urged that certain unreasonable assertions seem to favor 
factive over non-factive norms. It is, for instance, unreasonable to assert that “it is 
raining, but I don’t know that it is raining”, because one is liable to criticism for 
offering a clearly defective statement. Isn’t the speaker’s denial of knowledge the 
key consideration in ruling such statements as unreasonable? On one approach to 
Moorean sentences,23 when asserting the first conjunct, “it is raining”, the speaker 
represents herself as knowing that it is raining; yet, the second conjunct directly 
contradicts such a condition, by explicitly stating that the agent lacks the relevant 
23 Unger (1975) and DeRose (2002) put forward this kind of explanation. For a useful 
introduction and survey of other approaches, see Green & Williams (2007).  
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knowledge; hence, the assertion is unreasonable as its content contradicts the 
condition the speaker represents herself as satisfying by asserting what she does.      
So-called lottery propositions seem to pull in the same direction.24 Imagine that 
I bought a ticket in a big lottery (with chances of winning as small as that of one in a 
million). Before the results are even being announced, my friend tells me that my 
ticket did not win, lacking of any inside information. We have an unshaken intuition 
that her assertion is unreasonable. Again, one may think this supports certain factive 
norms, such as knowledge or safety. For, as the argument goes, even if the content 
turns out to be true there is still “something wrong” with making such a flat-out 
assertion unless the asserter is in possession of some new information. Again, the 
factive norms could be used to account for the unreasonableness of such actions.      
 In reply, I don’t think these objections go very deep. The reason why it is 
incorrect to assert “p but I don’t know that p”, the reasonabilist may urge, is simply 
because one cannot justify such a claim. As regards the lottery propositions, the 
worry can be resisted by biting the bullet and insisting that these assertions are after 
all reasonable.25 Accordingly, our intuitions need to be supported by data from 
linguistic practice, plausibly that of normative consequences.   
Finally, although the reasonabilists agree that the relevant norm is internal, and 
can be followed more or less infallibly,26 they may well part ways when it comes to 
specifying the nature of such a non-factive norm. As I tried to argue, they will 
consist in different ways of cashing out what it is for an assertion to be reasonable: 
24 See Williamson (1996; 2000) and Hawthorne (2004). In contrast, Hill and Schechter 
(2007) advocate the contrary view on which we can know the lottery proposition.      
25 Lackey (2007), Whiting (2013).  
26 The qualifier is added to accommodate for the cases discussed above when the speaker 
may misjudge the force of her evidence.    
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Douven’s (2006) rational belief, Lackey’s reasonableness27 (2007, 2008), Hill and 
Schechter’s (2007) justified belief, or Kvanvig’s (2009, 2011) justification.28
To summarize, the reasonabilist holds that: (i) an assertion is correct if and only 
if it is reasonable relative to the evidence available to the speaker and as judged by 
the relevant linguistic community; (ii) the only normative consequence of violating 
the norm of assertion is the speaker’s liability to criticism; and (iii) the norm of 
assertion is bound to be a non-factive notion. As mentioned, we will discuss their 
view on (iv) the concept of secondary correctness later on, in section 2. 4.  
2.2 The Objectivity Theory 
In the remainder of the chapter, I will present and motivate the alternative to the 
reasonabilist approach; we may call it the objectivity theory and its proponents 
objectivists.       
      In contrast to the reasonableness view, I will not focus on any work in particular 
when presenting objectivism, as I find the discussion of the objectivist’s conception 
of normative consequences and their account of “correct assertion” insufficiently 
developed in the literature.29 In developing the objectivist view, I will present the 
27 The norm Lackey adopts is somewhat more complex: it is not merely that it is correct to 
assert that p only if it is reasonable for one to believe that p – in addition, “if one asserted 
that p, one would do that at least in part because it is reasonable for one to believe that p” 
(ibid, 608). 
28 Alternatively, we can say that most reasonabilists adopt the norm of justification, while 
disagreeing as to how justification should be fleshed out. Then again, as I was insisting, 
“justification” could be understood as a way of cashing out reasonableness of an act.  
29 MacFarlane (2014) addresses some points of interest I turn to discussing later. However, 
he takes a different stance on two phenomena I later describe as normative consequences: 
the retraction, for which he develops a different rule (see section 4.3.2) and the disavowal 
which he doesn’t consider as a normative consequence.    
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answers to the same questions as I did with the reasonabilists: (i) what it is for an 
assertion to be correct; (ii) what are the normative consequences of violating the 
norm of assertion; and (iii) is the norm bound to be a factive concept or not?    
  As mentioned at the outset, the reasonabilists and objectivists are in the business 
of elaborating two different kinds of intuitions. Our task here is to see which of 
these two kinds of intuition, if any, can be better supported. A suspicion I had about 
reasonabilism was that it overemphasizes the role of SLC when it proclaims its 
absence to be both the necessary and sufficient condition for correct assertions. 
Interestingly, no argument in support of this claim was given (at least not to my 
knowledge) and it is surprising that reasonabilists do not seem to even consider the 
possibility that reasonableness might not be the sufficient condition.    
That seems to be a weak point. As SLC is the most noticeable example of 
normative consequences in general, it is not unlikely that a more subtle 
consequence might have simply escaped the reasonabilist’s eye. That 
notwithstanding, Lackey seems to be willing to settle on this result merely by 
appealing to intuitions, as the following passage testifies:   
 [T]here are cases in which a speaker asserts that p in the absence of knowing 
that p without being subject to criticism in any relevant sense, thereby showing 
that knowledge cannot be what is required for proper assertion (Lackey, 2007: 
595). 
This argumentative void, related to the possibility of there being further normative 
consequences is probably the weakest point of the reasonabilist account. For, 
granted that SLC is one such normative consequence, the reasonabilist still owes us 
an argument why it is the only such consequence. Mere intuition would not do.  
Leaving this aside for the moment, the objectivist takes “correctness” to be more 
demanding than her reasonabilist rival does. For, while the objectivist judges an 
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unreasonable assertion to be incorrect, she also adds a further layer: the agent’s act 
can be reasonable and still fail to be correct. On this approach, we can break the 
norm despite manifesting the highest sensitivity to normative considerations and 
without being liable to criticism.  
2.2.1 Normative Consequences 
As mentioned, the objectivist departs from the reasonabilist’s view by denying that 
reasonableness is the sufficient condition for correct assertions. To illustrate this, 
going back to the snow scenario, the objectivist will agree that Amy acts reasonably 
but will still deny that she made a correct assertion. In so doing, the objectivist will 
resort to a lingering intuition that it is “somehow bad” to assert the false 
(Williamson, 1996: 496), 30  regardless of the intuitions we share about 
reasonableness.     
Unfortunately, the reasonabilist is not sharing the latter intuition. In order for 
objectivists to avoid reaching an impasse with the reasonabilists, and talking past 
each other while explaining two different sets of intuitions, the objectivist can try to 
offer something in support of her intuitions. The objectivist should not pause at 
Williamson’s insistence that certain assertions are “somehow bad” (Williamson, 
2009: 345) nor at noticing that many people in fact share this kind of intuition 
(Turri, 2010a: 3). For, as we have seen, the reasonabilists report having a different 
type of intuition. This is why we need further support to the claim that “false 
assertions are automatically improper” (ibid: 3). To obtain it, we will look at our 
linguistic behavior hoping to gather the data beyond our armchair intuitions. It 
might be that these data would need to be backed up by some further intuitions, but 
it would still allow us to weigh the strength of the two competing views.   
30 Williamson (2005:109) applies the same intuition to the case of belief. 
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2.2.1.1 Retraction 
Just as the reasonabilist found the support for her intuitions about SLC in features of 
assertoric practice, so should the objectivist base her argument on such features. In 
order to support the claim that false assertions31 are indeed incorrect, let us consider 
a somewhat extended snow scenario. Thus far, we have granted that Amy’s act is 
reasonable, in the sense that it is not liable to criticism. As argued, the standards of 
reasonability should not be set any higher: it would be too demanding to require 
from the speaker to rule out every possible relevant alternative before making an 
assertion. For all we know, this might distort our linguistic practice, pushing us 
either into pairing each asserted proposition with a suitable evidential or not 
asserting at all.        
Fortunately, the objectivist doesn’t need to go this far in order to flesh out 
Williamson’s intuition that there is “something wrong” with Amy’s assertion. It 
suffices to observe that if Amy were to find out that it was not snowing, she would 
retract her previous assertion in normal conditions.    
Given that the retraction is a different speech act, with norms of its own,32 the 
qualifier “normal conditions” is in place as it would be wrong to insist that retraction 
must occur whenever an assertion is found to be false. This would deem one speech 
act, retraction, constitutive of another speech act, assertion, a result we may find 
questionable. It is thus important to fine-tune the role of retraction for our 
31 Given the act/content ambiguity of the term “assertion”, MacFarlane (2005) argued that 
as long as we refer to assertion as an act, we cannot attribute truth or falsity to it (ibid: 
322), but instead propriety or impropriety (or some of its synonyms, applicable to acts). In 
reply, Hanks (2015:66–73) convincingly shows that “truly” and “falsely” are verb 
modifiers, and we can apply them to acts in felicitous constructions, such as: “Obama truly 
stated that Clinton is eloquent” (ibid: 68). I will, accordingly, be using the expressions 
“true assertion” and “false assertion”.        
32 In effect, this is one of the central claims of MacFarlane’s 2014 normative account of 
assertion.  
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purposes: what matters for us here is that in normal cases, we can expect false 
assertions to be retracted because they are recognized to be false.33 That being said, 
retraction may not occur in certain cases; perhaps the phenomenon depends on 
what is at stake in a given context: if the assertion itself is about something 
insignificant, it might not require additional retraction despite its content being 
known to have been false.  
Also, the very act of retraction does not necessarily erase the responsibility or 
commitment “all-things-considered”. If your speculation leads someone to lose most 
of his savings on the stock market, a mere retraction won’t make you less culpable. 
The retraction merely amounts to taking back a speech act, and the one who retracts 
only stays clear of further illocutionary commitment. The consequences of this are 
that the speaker cannot be challenged any further, nor would there be any sense in 
acting upon her testimony, and so on.    
Until this point, I have left a number of things about retraction unspecified and 
the argument for objectivism unfinished. This particularly applies to showing that 
retracting really is a full-fledged normative consequence. I postpone the discussion 
until Chapter 4. If it turns out that the obligation to retract is a normative 
consequence in its own right, it would support the view that there is more to the 
normativity of assertion than the mere demand of reasonableness. Accordingly, we 
could concur that reasonabilists have oversimplified assertoric practice and thus 
given too weak a conception of the constitutive norm of assertion.   
33 One can retract even when the assertion is not false, as when one mistakenly thinks that 
her assertion was false or in order to clear oneself of any further commitment. However, a 
more frequent reason for retracting is when the speaker realizes the content was false.      
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2.2.2 The Meaning of “Correct Assertion” 
For the purposes of this section, I will assume that reasonableness is not a sufficient 
condition for correctness, arguing for this claim at a later stage. If this proves to be 
right, then the assessment of assertion cannot be constrained by the evidence 
available to the speaker when making the assertion. At times, we would need to 
consider a larger body of evidence than the one in the light of which the speaker 
made her statement.       
The objectivist’s account of “correct assertion” can be formulated along the 
following lines: an assertion is correct if and only if it does not lead to any negative 
normative consequence in contexts in which the competent audience is given full 
information.34   
 On such realist views, assertion is correct relative to the facts which need not be 
accessible at the context in which the assertion is being made. 35 The view is labeled 
“objectivist” as it evaluates assertion objectively, as it were, rather than against the 
evidence available when the assertion is made. By the same token, the mere fact that 
our assertion is excusable cannot render it correct on its own. Yet, to spell out what 
“correct assertion” means, we would need to decide on which normative 
consequences there are.   
34 I insist on such “ideal” contexts, as opposed to those which merely contain “larger” bodies 
of evidence, having in mind Williamson’s consideration of “lost knowledge” (Williamson, 
2000) and the possibility that despite having more information we would actually lose 
knowledge. They are ideal in the additional sense that we need not be aware that we are 
occupying them (an assertion is “objectively correct” not necessarily because of our 
capability of recognizing it as such, but from “God’s point of view”, as it were, “sub spaecie 
aeternitatis” etc.).  
35 In some cases, we would not need such further contexts, however. This applies to 
Moorean sentences, among other examples.  
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2.2.3 Factivity Conditions 
If the evidence available to the asserter is not always sufficient to judge whether her 
assertion is correct, but one must also consult contexts in which further evidence is 
available, the least demanding objectivist account would require truth as the norm 
of assertion. 36   
(TA) It is correct to assert that p only if p is true (Weiner, 2005; Whiting, 2013, 
MacFarlane, 201437). 
The claim that truth is a necessary condition for correct assertions has reached 
orthodoxy among normative theorists. To name but a few, Wright (1992) insists 
that asserting that p amounts to claiming that p is true; Greenough (2011) refers to 
it as to “a common view” and Whiting (2013) declares it as a “merest platitude”.        
36 Some authors disagree that such considerations validate the conclusion that truth is a 
norm of assertion. Teichmann (1995) discusses a case where despite having a “full warrant” 
to assert that “Patricia is in pain” (one sees her stubbing her toe and wincing), one could 
still assert incorrectly, provided that Patricia is actually not in pain but is only rehearsing for 
a play after receiving a local anesthetic. In Teichmann’s view, this example illuminates “the 
nature of certain concepts” (83), revealing that “the criteria for ‘X is in pain’ are defeasible”. 
And since such a concept can be used in non-assertoric speech acts, this example does not 
confirm that truth is the norm of assertion. However, Teichmann falsely singles out the 
concept of “pain” as being in any way special: his defeasibility feature is shared by pretty 
much any other concept, including “snow” in the example discussed above. Accordingly, 
Teichmann’s “rules governing the concept ‘pain’” (84) indeed picks out a broader type of 
rule.       
37 The TA admits of further subtleties and the formulation referred to here is aiming to be 
sufficiently general. For instance, on MacFarlane’s (2014) version, the TA rule is 
relativized to the context of use, which results in a peculiar approach to the problem of 
future contingents, different from Weiner’s (2005) version where TA is not relativized in 
the said manner.  
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 There are more demanding objectivist theories, however. The view that appears to 
be the most prominent is the knowledge account of assertion:  
(KA)  It is correct to assert that p only if one knows that p. 
KA goes back at least to Unger’s 197538 claim that by asserting that p one represents 
it as being the case that one knows that p. Some writers point out to Moore’s (1912) 
Ethics39 as proposing an intimate relation between knowledge and assertion. As 
Benton (2012) observes, Moore does claim that in asserting “we are always 
expressing…either that we think the thing in question to be so or what we know it to 
be so” (1912/2005: 63). However, one shouldn’t read Moore as proposing KA. 
For, in continuation, Moore goes on to affirm that “it is quite possible” that we are 
“never expressing knowledge” and “never really know” that an act is right or wrong 
when making assertions about it. Austin, on the other hand, came closer to 
formulating the KA, when he observed that “there are very many things which, 
having no knowledge of, not being in a position to pronounce about, you just can’t 
state” (Austin 1961/1970: 249). Still, reading KA into this passage should of course 
be tentative.     
The canonical formulation of the view, however, is found in Williamson (1996; 
2000). Subsequently, the view was endorsed by a number of authors, including 
38 Strictly speaking, Unger only offers the “representational” KA (crediting Slote) on which 
“if someone asserts…that something is so, then it follows that he represents himself as 
knowing that it is so” (1975: 253, italics added). Moore’s claim that “by asserting p 
positively you imply, though you don’t assert, that you know that p” is sometimes 
interpreted in the same key (Sosa, 2009:270f) whereby “implies” is to be understood as 
“represents oneself”.  
39 Benton (2012) offers a useful historical survey of KA proponents, where he includes 
Moore as an “early sympathizer”. Somewhat surprisingly, however, Benton adds Grice to 
the list, even though Grice is recognized as one of the strongest figures in the descriptivist, 
non-normative camp.        
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DeRose (2002); Reynolds (2002); Hawthorne, (2004); Engel (2008), Schaffer 
(2008), Turri (2010a), and Benton (2013),40 among others.   
Alternatively, objectivist theories may take the form of a safety account, a 
transfer of knowledge account, or a certainty account.    
(SA) It is correct to assert that p only if p is safe. (Pritchard, 2014)  
(TK) It is correct to assert that p only if one’s audience comes thereby to be in a 
position to know that p (García-Carpintero, 2004) 
(CA)  It is correct to assert that p only if one has epistemic certainty that p (Stanley, 
2008). 
2.2.4 A Case for Objectivism: Strict Liability 
The objectivist account of “correct” is realist in the following sense: if we ascribe 
both correctness values (correct and incorrect, that is) to the same assertion, one of 
these evaluations is necessarily invalid.   
To illustrate how an act can be reasonable and yet incorrect, consider the legal 
concept of “strict liability”.41 It is defined as a standard according to which a person 
can be legally responsible for an action even if she is not culpable, as long as it can 
be shown that the plaintiff suffered “strict liabilities”, by being injured, having 
40 In the original version, KA is formulated as an obligation: “one must: assert that P only if 
one knows that P” (Williamson, 1996: 494). For the reasons laid out at the beginning of 
this chapter, I will continue employing the “it is correct” format throughout the dissertation 
and for all normative accounts discussed.   
41 The alternative name is “absolute liability”, which fits our purposes better, as it points at 
the factual character of the legal norm. Thanks to Scott Soames for the discussion.   
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suffered a loss, damage of property and so on.42 That is, even though the agent need 
not be unreasonable, blameworthy, or have had the intention to inflict harm, she 
will still be “liable” and thus be prosecuted.    
 The case of strict liability, we may remark, identifies an action which is not 
unreasonable in any sense as an action which is objectively wrong and punishable. 
The conditions of reasonableness have no bearing on the conditions of correctness. 
This type of intuition is what the objectivist about assertion has in mind: appealing 
solely to the reasonableness of a subject’s assertion when deciding whether it is 
correct, seems to leave out something crucial.   
2.3 Three Problems for the Objectivist 
So far, we have gone through some basic features of two normative approaches, 
reasonabilism and objectivism. I now proceed to discussing three problems facing 
the objectivist solution, which the reasonabilist seems to handle with more ease: (a) 
the guidance problem, (b) validity of our assessment, and (c) accounting for the 
social norm.    
a. The Guidance Problem
If norms are prescriptive in character and give us guidance in performing the 
relevant actions they govern (Glüer & Wikforss, 2009: 32), the guidance problem 
asks: how can an individual member or a group within the linguistic community be 
successfully guided by the objectivist norm?   
42 Some examples include manipulations with wild animals, assault weapons, explosives and 
so on.   
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The reasonabilists have an easy way around the problem: our acts of asserting 
are guided insofar as we know when it is reasonable to perform such an act. And 
since the correctness condition they postulate just is that of reasonableness, the 
problem doesn’t arise.     
As we have already remarked, for most objectivists (pace the advocates of TA), 
reasonableness is a necessary condition for correctness of assertion and so they can 
account for the guidance, too. It only remains to be seen how reasonableness fits 
their preferred norms of assertion. When it comes to TA, however, things are 
somewhat more complex as reasonableness is clearly not a necessary condition for 
truth. If the norm of truth is to be guiding, it should be possible for an agent to 
know whether the proposition she wishes to assert is true or not (Glüer & Wikforss, 
2009: 44). But as we are sometimes surely ignorant of that, we cannot expect TA to 
provide us with such guidance always.     
To answer these worries, the proponent of TA has two strategies. On one line 
of reasoning, she may point out that one can be guided by a norm without this 
guaranteeing success. Say, we can be guided by the truth norm insofar as we would 
strive to assert the truth and avoid falsehood; to assert only the content we are 
convinced of; to make reference to our sources of information; to try to be as 
precise as possible, and so on. On another line of reasoning, she may invoke the 
concept of secondary correctness: an assertion that p will be secondarily correct 
only if it is reasonable to believe that p (is true). Thus, as long as the proponent of 
TA can legitimately invoke secondary correctness, no problem will arise: her 
conditions of secondary correctness will mirror the conditions for reasonableness.   
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b. Validity of our assessments
Another positive feature of the reasonabilist view is that we do not need to consult 
future contexts to make sure that our assessment of assertion’s correctness was 
justified or valid. The reasonabilist is likely to hold that the competent linguistic 
community can infer that the assertion is correct based on the fact they assessed it as 
such. 43  For the reasonabilist, then, proclaiming an assertion to be correct is 
understood as “marching in step” of the relevant community (Wright, 2007: 485) 
i.e., those that possess the mastery of the assertoric practice and the relevant body
of information. That being said, we do not need any retroactive assessment because 
the normative fact can be read off from the context of use at the context of use.    
Although the objectivists could do the same, there will be exceptions, when due 
to not knowing whether the content is true at the original context, we would not be 
able to evaluate an assertion validly at that context. That is, the objectivist may judge 
that an assertion is correct, but unless we appeal to subsequent contexts for 
confirmation, the contexts that would make larger bodies of evidence available, 
there would be no way of knowing whether our judgment was correct. At least in 
these cases, we would be engaged in the normative practice without necessarily 
being able to assess whether this practice is done correctly or not.   
Again, objectivist accounts pace TA can simply rely on reasonableness: they will 
be in a position to evaluate an assertion at the context of use, although we still need 
to see reasonableness fits in their normative account. As for proponents of TA, they 
can invoke secondary correctness which amount precisely to reasonableness.      
43 Again, barring the counter-examples of the type just discussed. 
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c. Accounting for the social norm
The third problem in this set is that the objectivist cannot readily account for some 
fairly intuitive normative features. Normally, an incorrect act can be reproached 
and criticized; one can insist that things should be done in another way; that the 
agent could and should have acted differently; and so on (Graham, 2015). Yet, if 
following the objectivist we allow for the possibility that everyone could make the 
same, incorrect assertion these fine points seem to be lost.44  
 If we could depart from the norm for no fault of our own, this kind of sanctioning 
loses most of its initial appeal and sense. Relatedly, a crucial aspect of a social norm 
is that we typically know what we’re supposed to do (Graham, ibid.) which is why 
the objectivist needs to explain how the assertoric norm could be social in nature. It 
is not even clear that people would criticize each other knowing they would do 
exactly the same if in their position. And yet, if such a criticism would take place, it 
is difficult to see whether it would be ever rational for the addressee to accept such 
a reproach. 
Again, just as with the previous cases, the social aspect of the normativity of 
assertion can be accommodated at the level of reasonable assertion, or else by 
invoking secondary correctness, in the case of TA. In sum, the objectivist can 
introduce a whole new dimension that was deemed exclusively reasonabilist.   
Finally, let us summarize the objectivist response to the three questions: (i) an 
assertion is correct if and only if it does not lead to any negative normative 
consequence in contexts in which the competent audience is given full information; 
(ii) the normative consequences of violating the norm of assertion are the speaker’s 
liability to criticism, retraction in the light of recognized falsity and (for some 
44 Some philosophers think there is such a sense. Hawthorne (2004: 23) writes: “if someone 
asserts p, it is proper to criticize that person if she does not know that p”. Such a general 
claim is clearly too strong.  
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objectivists, as we will see in Chapter 4) disavowal of knowledge; (iii) the norm of 
assertion is bound to be a factive notion.  
In continuation, I discuss the fourth question concerning the concept of 
secondary correctness. 
2.4 Secondary Correctness 
While discussing the snow scenario, it was pointed out that Amy’s assertion strikes 
us as being correct in some way. We have seen that the reasonabilist explains this 
intuition by tying up the correctness of assertion with its reasonableness. The 
objectivist, on the other hand, rejects this explanation, owing us a story in which 
sense Amy’s statement is correct, or alternatively, an explanation why our 
intuitions are pulling in the wrong direction.        
A framework that may serve the objectivist to achieve both tasks is Williamson’s 
(2000: 497–8) distinction between primary and secondary correctness (dubbed by 
DeRose, 2002: 180).45 An assertion is said to be primarily correct if and only if it 
actually obeys the norm, and secondarily correct if and only if it is reasonable to think 
that it obeys it. By plugging in the norm of truth, we get that an assertion is 
primarily correct if and only if its content is true, and secondarily correct if and only 
if it is reasonable to think its content is true. By means of illustration, TA rules that 
Amy’s assertion is primarily incorrect, secondarily correct.        
Before moving on, let me make a brief remark about the phrase “reasonable to 
think” from the definiens of secondary correctness. On Weiner’s proposal, 
“secondary propriety is determined by whether the agent has reason to believe that 
the act conforms to the norm” (2005:239). However, this seems too weak. As 
45 Actually, the terms DeRose uses are primary and secondary propriety. For the sake of 
consistency, I stick with the term correctness instead.  
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argued above, with respect to Pelling’s characterization of Lackey’s view, there will 
be circumstances in which it may be reasonable for the speaker to think her act 
conforms to the rule, although these reasons need not be shared by the rest of her 
community. A baffling consequence of such characterization is the ensuing dilemma: 
either one and the same act is both secondarily correct and secondarily incorrect, or 
else the speaker’s reason, despite being defeated by the community, still counts as 
the relevant one in determining whether the act is secondarily correct. Given that 
both horns are unacceptable, the standards of what is “reasonable to think” should be 
determined by taking into account the whole community.46           
2.4.1 The reasonabilist’s arguments against the secondary 
correctness 
In Lackey’s view, DeRose’s introduction of secondary correctness is his attempt at 
“saving the phenomena”: roughly, since “there is clearly something proper about 
assertions” which are reasonable and yet fail to satisfy the objectivity norm (2007: 
622–623, fn. 26), DeRose wants to capture this by introducing the notion of 
secondary correctness. This way, the objectivist can insist both that the assertion is 
correct insofar as it is merely reasonable, as well as incorrect in a further, objectivist 
sense. I turn to some reasonabilist’s arguments against the viability of DeRose’s 
distinction.  
46 In relation to this, one should however bear in mind the Copernicus example mentioned 
in 2.1.1.1.  
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       2.4.1.1 The redundancy claim 
Consider a definition of primary and secondary correctness where the norm is that 
of rational belief:  
PRIMARY  a is ∂P only if it is rational to believe that C (a).  
SECONDARY*   a is ∂S only if it is rational to believe that it is rational to believe 
that C (a).    
For the sake of brevity, let “a” stands for an act of assertion, “∂” for correctness, and 
the indices P and S for correctness in the primary and secondary senses, respectively. 
We may assume that the reasonabilist is prepared to accept that if it is rational to 
believe that it is rational to believe that p, then it is rational to believe that p. If so, 
secondary correctness is merely an iteration of primary correctness. As such, it 
serves no role as there is no situation where an assertion would be primarily 
incorrect but secondarily correct.   
 In contrast, the objectivist may profit from the notion of secondary correctness 
by accommodating for those cases when an assertion is primarily incorrect but 
secondarily correct. Accordingly, the reasonabilist may try to resist introducing 
secondary correctness, as is the case with Lackey’s (2007) and Kvanvig’s (2011) 
arguments to which I now turn.    
2.4.1.2 Lackey’s argument from the game analogy 
Lackey’s (2007) argument rests on the game analogy. Imagine a football player, 
Toby, who has lost his contact lens while playing, making him falsely but reasonably 
believe that his pass was proper. Lackey asks: 
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Would we then say that Toby’s pass is secondarily proper, despite the fact that 
it is primarily improper? No. Given the rules of professional football, there is 
no sense in which Toby’s pass is proper (2007: 605).     
At most, Lackey concludes, Toby would have an excuse for making an improper or 
incorrect pass, but this still wouldn’t amount to the pass itself being correct.  
 Lackey’s argument not only aims to show that the notion of secondary 
correctness is redundant for the reasonabilist (as I tried to point out) but that it is 
altogether irrelevant, that it “cannot be invoked” (ibid, 608), and that “there is no 
[such] sense” of propriety. Lackey’s thought seems to be the following. Once we 
have established whether a quarterback’s pass is correct (i.e., correct in the primary 
sense), there is nothing further left to decide. We may take notice of the fact that 
Toby sincerely believed he was playing by the book, but this is still of no avail when 
it comes to assessing his pass.   
  One of the problems with Lackey’s argument is that it doesn’t succeed in 
showing that the notion of secondary correctness is really “non-existent”. In 
Weiner’s view (2007: 193), although it is true that Toby’s pass is incorrect in the 
primary sense, it is still not “proper to criticize” Toby for making such a pass, due to 
his condition. If the phenomenon “in which the actor should not be criticized for the 
impropriety of his act” is a description of secondary correctness, then it is difficult to 
see that secondary correctness does not exist.     
  Weiner’s reply is not as helpful as it may initially seem. For, Lackey’s argument 
can be understood in more general terms, as denying any relevance to the concept of 
secondary correctness. As I read her, Lackey can reply that “secondary correctness” 
is an unnecessary substitute for an already familiar notion of reasonableness. Since 
on Lackey’s view reasonableness is a condition for being correct, the point comes 
down to the one already discussed: once we accept the reasonabilist reading, 
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“secondary correctness” becomes a redundant notion.47 Thus, if all there is to the 
correctness of an assertion is its reasonability, the notion of secondary correctness 
should be dispensed with. Later, I will deny the premiss that reasonableness equals 
correctness (in Chapter 3). I now turn to Kvanvig’s argument. 
2.4.1.3 Kvanvig’s objection 
Kvanvig (2011) writes:48 
What we do not want and cannot tolerate is multiple answers to the questions 
of what to do and what to think. If a theorist says, “well, if you do A you’ll be 
justified in so doing, and if you refrain, it will be excusable,” the appropriate 
reply is simply to repeat the request: tell me what to do. The conjunctive 
reply, distinguishing primary and secondary notions, is simply non-responsive. 
First, it should be observed that when Kvanvig uses the pair “justified”/“excusable” 
in this passage, he is referring to the “primarily correct”/“secondarily correct” 
distinction. What are we to make out of Kvanvig’s worry that by adopting both the 
primary and secondary senses of correctness, one is forced to give multiple answers 
to the central normative question of what one ought to do? Is it true that this 
precludes us from having a clear directive by which we can be guided?   
47 As García-Carpintero (2011) argues, Kvanvig’s norm of epistemic justification does admit 
of DeRose’s distinction. In Kvanvig’s case, the agent A can rationally believe that she is 
epistemically justified, and yet fail to be, instead merely having alethic justification. 
DeRose’s distinction requires that the former epistemic state be stronger, which it is, as 
only epistemic though not alethic justification can prevent a true and ungettiered belief 
from failing to count as knowledge.  
48 Although this passage is from the draft of Kvanvig’s 2011, it did not enter the published 
version of the paper. I discuss it here as it raises a worry I find important to address.  
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 I do not find this objection particularly cogent. As I will be defending the view 
close to the knowledge account, I will try to formulate how a KA theorist can reply 
to Kvanvig’s “tell me what to do” question. Roughly, the answer is that, before 
asserting that p, one ought to ask oneself “do I know that p?”.  If the answer to the 
questions is affirmative, it is reasonable for the speaker to assert that p.49    
 One may think that this answers only part of the question; for, the assertion can 
still turn out to be incorrect on KA, if p is false or the agent “gettiered”. 
Accordingly, how should we act, knowing such consequences are possible? The 
answer is the same: before asserting, one only has to answer the guiding question 
whether one knows that p. As long as we do not know that the proposition is false 
or that we are “gettiered”, we can sincerely answer the question “Do I know that p?” 
affirmatively and reasonably assert. If it turns out that our answer was wrong, the 
“tell me what to do” question can now be repeated at the later context. If p is false, 
the answer to the question is: retract your assertion; if the agent is “gettiered”, 
disavow your knowledge. (The latter point is discussed in chapter 4). But once 
again, these actions are not taken into consideration when we assert in the original 
context.   
2.5 Normativity of assertion and two notions of “should” 
At the beginning of the chapter, I mentioned that instead of opting for the rule 
schema “it is correct to assert that p only if C obtains”, one could present normative 
accounts of assertion as instances of the rule “one should assert that p only if C 
obtains”, thus avoiding the use of evaluative adjectives altogether.  
49 Of course, this kind of procedure won’t yield expected results for an irrational speaker, 
but then again, the same will hold for whichever “guiding question” Kvanvig’s theory 
would posit.   
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 Using this latter schema, we can distinguish two normative approaches to 
assertion as follows: while the reasonabilist fleshes out the normative “should” in the 
subjective sense,50 the objectivist conceives it in its objective meaning. In other words, 
the reasonabilist would claim that the correctness of an assertion is sensitive to the 
agent’s epistemic circumstances: if relative to the evidence I am given it is perfectly 
reasonable for me to assert that p then there is a sense in which I should assert it. 
This is the subjective reading. On the other hand, acts can be objectively wrong, 
regardless of the information available to the agent. Thus, the mere fact that I 
subjectively ought to assert p does not entail that I ought to assert p objectively.  
 Just as the objectivist can capture two senses of correctness (i.e., primary and 
secondary), so she can accommodate for both subjective and objective senses of 
“should”. The same type of priority we posited with respect to correctness (primary 
over secondary), applies now, as the objective sense of ought is prior to the 
subjective one. To be sure, this doesn’t show that the subjective sense is less 
significant for our linguistic practice (cf. Dorsey, 2012: 4), but it does show that to 
capture the notion of “should” we need to consider, in the order of priority, the 
objective and the subjective “ought”.   
2.6 Final remarks 
In continuation I offer an appendix, listing 20 normative accounts of assertion 
defended in the literature. Yet, regardless of what such a discouraging number may 
50 These remarks are not meant to defend the plausibility of “subjective ought”, however. In 
fact, as Broome (1999) remarks, the term “subjective ought” seems to be wrongly 
relativized to a subject as opposed to the fact, such as the state of belief. Broome extends 
his critique to those cases in which, due to having inconsistent beliefs and intentions, it 
might happen that we subjectively ought to both F and non-F, which appears to be a 
contradiction. To circumvent these difficulties, Broome suggests using the concept of 
“normative requirement”.  
2. Two Accounts of “Correct Assertion”
         ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
43	  
suggest, the normative theorists seem to principally divide into two camps, those of 
reasonabilists and objectivists.     
One point in favor of objectivism over reasonabilism is that it is better fit to 
explain the representational nature of assertion. For, if, with Lackey, we identify 
reasonable assertion with correct assertion, we would put assertion on a par with all 
other acts. The game analogy heuristics has surely influenced this way of thinking. 
Unfortunately, such normative account gives primacy to the reasonability of the 
speaker over the representational aspect of the speech act. The objectivist view, on 
the other hand, separates assertion from some acts, such as games, insofar as 
reasonableness is no longer sufficient, but now requires to call in as much 
information as possible in order to bring a valid assessment.    
2.7 Appendix: the list of normative accounts of assertion 
A. The knowledge account of assertion: 
(1) Unger’s KA51: By asserting that p one represents it as being the case that one 
knows that p.  
(2) Williamson’s KA: One must: assert that p only if one knows that p. 
(3) DeRose’s R-KA (“Relativized Knowledge Account of Assertion”): A speaker, S, is well-
enough positioned with respect to p to be able to properly assert that p if and 
only if S knows that p according to the standards for knowledge that are in place as S 
makes her assertion (DeRose 2009: 99).  
51 Although DeRose (2009:93) claims that (1) and (2) are two sides of the same coin, it is 
often claimed that Unger’s view is a “version” of KA. A reader who is unwilling to allow 
for a great deal of normative accounts listed here, can assume that I am in the business of 
outlining versions of such normative accounts.    
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(4) Schaffer’s KQ: S ought: assert that p in context c only if S knows the answer (p)
to the question under discussion in c. (Schaffer 2008: 10)
(5) Turri’s EKA: One may assert that p only if one’s assertion expresses one’s
knowledge that p. (Turri 2010b: 5)
B. Other factive accounts:
(6) The truth account: It is correct to assert that p if only if p is true. (Weiner 2007:
190)
(7) Reflective truth account: It is correct to assert that p at C only if p is true at C.
(MacFarlane 2014)
(8) Safety account: It is correct to assert that p only if one asserts p safely. (Pelling
2013b, Pritchard 2014)
(9) Transfer of knowledge account: It is correct to assert that p only if one’s audience
comes thereby to be in a position to know that p (García-Carpintero, 2004)
(10) Certainty account: It is correct to assert that p only if one has epistemic certainty
that p (Stanley, 2008).
C. Non-factive accounts:
(11) The belief rule. It is correct to assert p only if you believe p. (Bach 2008: 77).
(12) Lackey’s reasonableness norm. It is correct to assert p only if (i) it is reasonable for
one to believe that p and (ii) if one asserted that p, one would assert that p at
least in part because it is reasonable for one to believe that p. (Lackey 2007:
608)
(13) Kvanvig’s justification norm: It is correct to assert that p only if you a proper
justification for p. (Kvanvig 2009: 145)
(14) Madison’s justified to believe norm: It is correct to assert that p only if one is
justified in believing one knows. (Madison 2010).
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(15) Fricker’s BKA: One should not assert that p unless one’s epistemic position is
such that one may properly believe oneself to know that p. And one who asserts
that p thereby represents herself as knowing that p. (Fricker 2006, 594)
(16) Pelling’s knowledge provision account – It is correct to assert that p only if it is fit to
give a hearer knowledge that p. (Pelling 2013a)
(17) The Evidence Responsiveness Rule – It is correct to assert that p only if your attitude
towards p is properly responsive to the evidence you have that bears on p.
(Maitra and Weatherson 2010)
(18) The Action Rule – It is correct to assert that p only if acting as if p is true is the
thing for you to do (Maitra and Weatherson 2010)52
D. Pluralist accounts:
(19) The correctness of asserting that p depends only on one’s circumstances and
interests (Stone, 2007; Levin, 2008).
(20) The correctness of asserting that p depends only on a perspective relative to
which the norm is relevant (Greenough, 2011).
52 Note, however, that Maitra and Weatherson do not in the end decide between (17) and 
(18).  
3 
On Constitutive Rules and Commitment 
In the previous chapter, I have tried to specify what it means to say that an assertion 
is correct. In so doing, I argued there are two principled ways to understand the 
relevant notion of correctness, thus distinguishing two approaches to the normativity 
of assertion––reasonableness and objectivity views.   
       In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the notion of a constitutive rule, critically 
appraising two influential theories: the orthodox approach and Williamson's account, 
pointing out some problems with these frameworks. In the second part of the 
chapter, I aim to motivate an approach which conceives of assertoric practice in 
terms of commitment. For this reason, I examine Searle’s prominent analysis of this 
notion, and raise objections to it trying to arrive at a more satisfying account.   
3.1 Constitutive rules 
In order to keep things simple, I have avoided mentioning constitutive rules in the 
previous chapter. Instead, I talked more loosely about the rule schemas, such as: 
47	  
3. On Constitutive Rules and Commitment
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
48	  
SHOULD:         One should assert that p only if C obtains.  
CORRECT:       It is correct to assert that p only if C obtains.   
In effect, these are the schemas for constitutive rules where the C term stands for the 
correctness condition, such as “p is true” or “one knows that p”,53 the obligation to 
comply with which is constitutive of the act it governs. While the former schema 
introduces a modal auxiliary emphasizing the prescriptive nature of the rule, the 
latter schema mentions the notion of “correctness” and highlights the conditions of 
the evaluation of the acts.    
3.1.1 The performance condition 
Despite many differences between the two accounts of correctness, both 
reasonabilists and objectivists agree that the constitutive rule of assertion conforms to 
the general “performance condition”:54   
PC: By violating the constitutive rule R, one does not thereby cease to perform 
the act R constitutes.  
53 It is misleading (although not uncommon) to talk of “C” as being a norm. For, a failure to 
satisfy C does not prevent one from asserting, but only from asserting correctly. When the 
“C” term is understood as a property of a proposition (Williamson, 2000:241), an account 
positing one such condition is labeled “simple account of assertion”. Note, however, that 
such an account may still have two (or more) necessary conditions, as Lackey adds that 
when one asserts p correctly one does so at least in part because the relevant condition C 
obtains. In what follows, I will assume that a simple account of assertion is on the right 
track.  
54 I have in mind only the views developed in the wake of Williamson’s 1996 paper. Some 
theorists which would be classified as objectivists on this taxonomy, such as Searle (1979), 
dispense with the PC condition on constitutive rules.    
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There are three separate ways a theory of constitutive rules may relate to the 
performance condition (PC)––i.e., that all, some or no constitutive rule conforms to 
PC, each of which found its proponents in philosophical circles. Thus, on the 
traditional approach favored by Rawls (1955), Anscombe (1958) and Searle (1969, 
2010), often called the orthodox view,55 there is no constitutive rule conforming to PC. 
Applying this to the case of assertion, by violating its constitutive rule one fails to 
perform the speech act. In contrast, Pollock’s (1982) account, emerging as a critique 
of the orthodox approach, maintains that some types of an act A may be governed 
both by a constitutive rule which conforms to PC and by a constitutive rule which 
doesn’t. Lastly, Williamson (1996; 2000) proposed the hypothesis on which 
constitutive rules of all practices (and not just that of assertion) conform to PC. I 
start off with Williamson’s view and then go on to discuss the orthodox account.        
3.1.2 Williamson’s account of constitutive rules 
The three main tenets of Williamson’s general account of constitutive rules56 can be 
summarized as follows.    
Essentiality. Constitutive rules are essential to the act they constitute, governing 
each and every performance of an act necessarily. As such, constitutive rules are not 
conventions,57 as they are neither contingent nor replaceable (490).  
55 Strictly speaking, the view is baptized as the “orthodox theory about institutions” 
(Pollock, 1982: 210) where “institution” refers to a system of rules defining a certain 
practice, such as a language. Although these rules encompass both constitutive and 
regulative ones, I will be interested only in its analysis of the constitutive rules.      
56 Although the majority of normative accounts are grounded in Williamson’s adherence to 
PC, no one seems to defend a further step and extend the analysis to constitutive rules in 
general (i.e., outside of the assertoric practice).  
57 See Bach & Harnish (1979:121-2) for contrast between rules and conventions.   
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Sui generis. The normativity of constitutive rules is sui generis in nature. As aptly 
illustrated by Rawls on the case of promising, the sui generis normativity is distinct 
from all-things-considered58 normativity of moral or teleological rules. We can imagine 
a case where one’s breaking of a promise may be morally admirable, and this still 
wouldn’t change the fact that the promisor did something wrong––namely, have 
violated the sui generis norm for promises. Thus, although moral or teleological 
considerations apply to an act (say, one can be criticized for violating such a norm, or 
praised for following it), they should be carefully distinguished from the intended sui 
generis norms constitutively governing the act.    
Performance Condition. Finally, Williamson maintains that all constitutive rules 
satisfy the PC condition: by violating the constitutive rule of whichever act, one does 
not thereby cease to perform the act this rule constitutes. As the first two features 
are also shared by the orthodox account, I turn to discussing this third, distinguishing 
feature of Williamson’s approach.  
On Williamson’s hypothesis about the relation between PC and constitutive 
rules, the latter “do not lay down necessary conditions for performing the constituted 
act” (1996:491). The generality with which Williamson takes PC to apply to all 
constitutive rules is meant as an argument from analogy, proceeding from 
observations about games and languages:    
 [W]hen one breaks a rule of a game, one does not thereby cease to be playing 
that game. When one breaks a rule of a language, one does not thereby cease to 
be speaking that language (Williamson, 1996: 491).   
58 I find this label somewhat misleading––we can conceive of a scenario where two agents 
violate the same sui generis rule for two different reasons: one to obey a moral norm, 
another to follow an aesthetic norm. While we would say that each of them is following 
one all-things-considered norm, each of them is by the same token violating one “all-things-
considered” rule.    
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The generality of this claim might be put to test. One may urge that a soccer player 
(who happens not to be a goalkeeper) would stop playing soccer if she intentionally 
threw a ball in the goal using her hands. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to 
consider her as playing handball instead. But if this were true, we wouldn’t expect 
that her act of throwing the ball get penalized by the rules of soccer, while it 
certainly would be. In addition, if she really played handball, her act should have 
counted as scoring, although in reality it does not. Such considerations strongly 
suggest in favor of Williamson’s general claim.    
The observation that follows from Williamson’s adherence to PC is that 
constitutive rules are “should” or “must” statements,59 so as to allow to be broken. 
Further, in order to comply with PC, these imperative statements would need to 
allow an act (Y) to be performed, without it thereby fulfilling the set of conditions 
(X) considered to be mandatory by rules governing that act. The ensuing rule, thus, 
takes the following form: 
(1) One must: Y only if X. 
Rules which are instances of (1) satisfy PC and can be called, following Pollock's 
taxonomy, prescriptive rules. As far as assertion goes, Williamson adds a further 
requirement, often called the “simple account of assertion”:  
(2) There is only one constitutive rule of assertion. 
59 While both “should” and “must” can play the role in the formulation of the constitutive 
rule, Williamson considers only the latter, as it “expresses the kind of obligation 
characteristic of constitutive rules” (1996: 492). In contrast to obligation or requirement 
expressed by “must”, Gibbons (2013) claims that “should” expresses the idea of a reason: “If 
you’re required not to bury people unless they’re dead, then you have some reason not to 
bury them unless you have some evidence that they’re dead. This certainly gives the 
impression that this reason can be outweighed… But the claim that you have a reason to 
wait for evidence is simply weaker than the claim that you’re required to wait” (ibid, 81).   
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Once we have (1), (2) and  “Essentiality” (i.e., the claim that constitutive rules 
govern each and every performance of an act necessarily), we can conclude that: 
(3) Necessarily, assertion is a speech act whose unique rule is “One must: Y only if 
X”. 
Let us add the claim that if two types of acts have a single constitutive rule, and they 
have it in common, they are identical. If assertion is distinct from other speech acts, 
we can see that the “Uniqueness” or “Individuation” feature follows:   
(4) Necessarily, assertion is the unique speech act type whose unique rule is: “One 
must: Y only if X”.60   
As mentioned, in order to infer (3) and (4) from (1), it is crucial to assume that there 
is a single constitutive rule governing assertion, i.e. (2). This is why Williamson 
offers a somewhat stronger claim that the envisaged account of assertion takes the X 
rule to be individuating (492), which suggests that constitutive rules of other acts 
need not be individuating. To see this, observe that the rule “Don’t look at your 
opponent’s cards” is constitutive of both poker and bridge, although it is clearly not 
individuating of either of them.61   
60 Among further features of the assertoric rule is that it is a prima facie rule, rather than an 
all–things–considered one. For instance, if one lacks knowledge of p when asserting its 
content, one’s assertion is only prima facie incorrect: for, if the speaker’s statement can be 
justified by a practical reason which overrides the linguistic rule due to what is at stake in 
the context, her assertion can still be deemed correct all–things–considered. 
61 In response, it may be observed that the conjunction of all the rules are constitutive of an 
act is individuating of it.  
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The individuation feature (4) carries a lot of weight in a normative theory of 
assertion,62 as a failure to meet this requirement is detrimental to an account. This is 
how Williamson attacks a rival truth norm: as he points out, rightly in my view, 
conjectures are governed by the truth norm;63 assuming the simple account of 
assertion, the truth norm cannot be the norm we are after, as it fails to distinguish 
assertion from conjectures and thus to individuate it. Unlike the truth rule, 
Williamson’s argues that his knowledge rule (KA) fares better on this score:  
(5) One must: assert that p only if one knows that p. 
The idea behind KA is that the only illocutionary act individuated by knowledge is 
assertion.64 Finally, by employing the “being subject to the rule” locution, KA can tell 
us what the assertion is:  
(6) One performs an assertion with content p iff one is thereby being subject to 
the rule: “one must assert that p only if one knows that p”. 
Although (6) can be deduced from Williamson’s account, we shouldn’t maintain that 
it is a constitutive rule for two reasons: (i) we have already stated that (5) is a 
constitutive rule and (2) prohibits there being two such rules; and (ii) (6) doesn’t 
comply with Williamson’s PC and might be better viewed as a specification of what 
assertion is.     
62 It will be of special importance for us in Chapter 4, section 6, where it will be argued that 
KA falls short of individuating assertion.  
63 This hypothesis neatly explains why we are ready to confess we were wrong once the 
conjecture proves to be false. In addition, weaker proposals don’t fare that well – one might 
think that conjectures can be correct just as long they are sincerely believed, but what 
remains to be explained is the impression that only one conjecture about the given topic can 
be right.   
64 I postpone examining an argument against this claim until section 4.6.  
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3.1.3 The orthodox view 
On the orthodox approach, all constitutive rules embed the “counts-as” locution, 
taking the form “X counts as Y in I”.65 In the jargon of orthodox theorists, X stands 
for a brute fact, such as moving the castle-looking figure vertically or horizontally, 
one or more fields on the board. This move counts as the institutional, Y term, 
namely playing with the rooks, while the “I” term66 refers to the “context of the 
institution”,67 i.e., chess.  
In contrast to Williamson's conception, the orthodox account maintains that 
PC does not apply to any constitutive rule. The breach of a constitutive rule will 
never yield an incorrect act: instead, the act will not be made to begin with. To 
motivate the orthodox approach to constitutive rules, we may think of the utterance 
“I hereby baptize this ship Queen Elizabeth”. A number of authors would agree that 
such an act would either count as a baptism or not, i.e., the act will be either 
performed or will misfire, to use Austin’s taxonomy. Accordingly, if it so happens 
that the person pretending to perform the christening is not authorized to do so, or 
65 This entails that no constitutive rule would have the prescriptive form although Searle, 
somewhat intriguingly, (1969:34–5) says that “within systems of constitutive rules” some 
will have the “if Y do X” form. Unfortunately, Searle never gives any example of such a 
constitutive rule. A failure to address this point in any detail, as well as its incompatibility 
with the rest of Speech Acts has lead Bach & Harnish (1979: 395f) to describe the passage as 
mysterious and Lycan (2002: 185f) to claim that Searle’s usage of the terminology is 
inconsistent. The mystery is resolved in Searle’s (1999: 123f) where it is claimed that 
“constitutive rules always have the same logical form”, that of “X counts as Y”.   
66 I use “I” (as short for “institution”) instead of the Searle’s original “C” to avoid confusion, 
as I have previously referred to “conditions” by using “C”.  
67 We have defined institution as a system of rules defining a practice, which comprises 
both regulative and constitutive rules. The addition of the “I” term is important among 
other reasons because X can count as Y in the context of a given institution, but not 
necessarily in another (e.g., different acts will count as goals in soccer and handball). 
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else the ship has already been baptized, it is not as if baptism will be performed 
incorrectly and would thus be an abuse––instead, no baptism will take place.  
        Compared to Williamson’s “one must: Y only if X”, a failure to satisfy X simply 
falls short of performing Y.          
        Following Pollock’s taxonomy, let us call the rules of the form “X counts as Y in 
I” definitive and as such contrast them with the prescriptive “One must: Y only if X” 
type of rule.  
      Both Williamson's account and the orthodox view postulate only one kind of 
constitutive rule, characterizing it by an appeal to PC: while the former takes PC to 
apply to all constitutive rules, the latter urges it applies to none. How can we 
overcome this tension between the two views?   
        Could it be that one of the rules, be it Williamson's “One must: Y only if X” or 
the orthodox “X counts as Y in I” are not strictly speaking rules? This option has been 
suggested for the latter proposal, with the explanation that propositions of the form 
“X counts as Y in I” are akin to definitions.68 On its own, however, this does not yet 
prove there is any antagonism between a proposition being both akin to a definition 
and being a rule. As Pollock writes:   
What would it mean, for example, to talk about breaking the rule that carrying 
the football across the goal line counts as making a touchdown (in a certain 
context)? That is just a definition of what it is to make a touchdown. Such rules 
do not prescribe courses of action. Rather they define various roles…of the 
institution. (Pollock, 1982: 213; italics in the original).   
68 Searle (1969: 34), Lewis (1979: 343); 
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Accordingly, Pollock recognizes this type of proposition as definitive rules. It might be 
observed that the “counts-as”69 locution sounds quite natural:70 e.g., in common 
parlance, we say that the action of lifting one’s finger in an auction house counts as 
making a bid (Smith, 2003: 7). In this particular case, the X term (“lifting one’s 
finger”) would “count as” the Y term (“making a bid”) because of some previous 
declaration that tied the two together. The last bit is not crucial, however: it is not 
that my uttering “it is raining” counts as the assertion of the content of that sentence 
because of some previous declaration.  
The lingering intuition that definitive rules might not be rules after all can be 
expressed by saying that something is a rule only if it can be broken (and not only 
followed).71  In line with this, the proposition expressing a rule would also embed 
some modal auxiliary, such as “ought”, and this feature is missing in the case of 
definitive rules. Searle himself notes that “non-imperative constitutive rules are likely 
to strike us as extremely curious and hardly even as rules at all” (1969:34).    
This type of intuition is at odds with definitive rules altogether. Following 
Searle, I will stay clear from it, recognizing that “X counts as Y in C” propositions can 
be both analytic truths about the given Y term as well as rules. My worry with Searle’s 
position, instead, will be that definitive rules cannot be the only type of constitutive 
rules. I now turn to this objection.  
69 As an alternative, some orthodox theorists use the “is” of identity: “A set of events is the 
ordering and supplying of potatoes, and something is a bill, only in the context of our 
institutions” (Anscombe, 1958: 70).   
70 Searle’s (2010) alternatives are “X becomes Y” and “X was turned into Y”. I take these to 
sound awkward when applied to assertion, although they sound pretty natural within 
institutions that require declaration; e.g., it is fine to say that the oldest son was turned 
into a king (1999:98) according to a given constitutive rule, existing in many monarchies 
throughout European history.   
71 Thanks to Sven Rosenkranz for a discussion on this point.  
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3.1.1 Problems for the orthodox view   
Possibly following the lead of Pollock (1982), Williamson emphasized that the 
possibility of cheating underscores the existence of constitutive rules. If one can cheat 
within the institution I, it should follow that there is some constitutive rule of I one 
would thereby break while still performing the act in question.72   
To be sure, cheating cannot be thought of as a mere moral offence, given that 
the norm of assertion is sui generis. As Williamson stresses, “cheating at a game... is 
made possible only by the nonmoral rules that constitute the game” (1996: 492).73       
The orthodox account cannot accommodate cheating,74 and this can be seen as 
one of its biggest flaws. Apart from the constitutive rules, the orthodox theorist 
recognizes only regulative rules; in Searle’s words, these rules “regulate antecedently 
or independently existing forms of behavior”, such as: “Officers must wear ties at the 
dinner”. In contrast to constitutive rules, the lack of a regulative rule does not 
prevent us from making an accurate description such as “an officer wore a tie at the 
dinner”. Yet, we could not describe one’s behavior as “playing with the rooks” in the 
absence of the rules of chess. For our purposes, regulative rules are important insofar 
as they seem to be the only candidates for the sort of rules we break while cheating–
72 Williamson locates cheating in both assertion and games. See Goldberg’s (2015: 26–7) 
attempt to clarify what action amounts to cheating in assertoric practice.   
73 Against the “sui generis” feature of assertion described above, assertion could be normative 
in the derived sense, if its norm was moral in nature. It is thus important for Williamson to 
underline that while cheating in chess is morally blameworthy, this does not entail that 
chess itself is constituted by moral norms. The mere existence of certain normative 
consequences, as I will argue, shows that there are defects of assertion which cannot be 
traced back to the infringement of any moral rules (one such case is that of retracting false 
assertions, as discussed in Chapter 2.) In these cases, no relevant moral norm seems to be 
broken. Indeed, it is unlikely that there is any moral norm applying to assertoric practice 
apart from the sincerity rule. Scanlon’s (1998) What We Owe to Each Other (chapter 7) 
analyzes the case of promise and gives an alternative answer.    
74 Pollock 1982 (chapter 10) develops this criticism, by crediting Ziff and Rosenberg and 
extending their objections.    
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–after all, constitutive rules cannot be ever broken. I now move on to test the
possibility that when cheating, we are thereby breaking some regulative rule. 
a. Two types of regulative rules
Before doing so, I would like to sort out an important issue concerning regulative 
rules. Supposedly, the rule such as “one should not disturb the opponent while the 
opponent is playing” is regulative of chess. Yet, friends of the orthodox account 
might object to this reading––if the mentioned rule were indeed regulative of chess, 
it wouldn’t apply to so many other games in addition, but would be introduced 
precisely for the game of chess. Thus, instead of being regulative of chess, the rule 
governs a higher-level institution of fair-play.75 In continuation, I try to spell out the 
inference that I find contentious:    
(1) The rule R is regulative of x.  
(2) For all rules R, R can be regulative of a type of act x, only if there is no type of 
act y distinct from x, such that R applies to y.  
(3) R is a rule of a higher-order practice P.  
(4) P applies to a set of lower-order practices G.  
(5) G has as its instances x and y. 
(6) R applies to x and y. (from 3, 4, and 5) 
(7) Therefore, R is not regulative of x. (from 2, 6) 
As to the third premiss, we may think of P as being constituted by the rule R. For 
instance, the practice of fair-play, P, seems to be constituted by a set of rules, one of 
which is the rule R, not to disturb your opponent while making a move. As to the 
75 Thanks to Neri Marsili who pressed me on this point. 
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fourth premiss, since the fair play P applies to all board games G, this makes P a 
higher-order practice, and G the lower-order one.  
What is contentious about the argument (1)–(7) is the second premiss and its 
attempt to establish that a (constitutive) rule of a higher-order practice cannot be 
regulative of a lower-order practice due to its applying to more than one type of act. I 
find the second premiss to be right only if we change “regulative” for “constitutive”. 
In fact, we might be in need of yet stronger substitution, as the constitutive rule also 
has to be individuating for the argument to go through.76 Without this substitution, 
the argument is not sound––as long as a (regulative) rule applies to a given practice, it 
thereby regulates this practice.77 Insisting that it is not regulative of that practice, 
would push us towards introducing a third category of the chess rules: aside from its 
constitutive and regulative rules, we would have rules that merely “apply” to chess. 
In conclusion, the proposal lacks the simplicity found in the orthodox approach and 
may strike us as too revisionary. Further, no mention of such a maneuver was made 
either in Searle’s work or that of other proponents of the view. Consequently, one 
may doubt how “orthodox” this approach really is.  
b. Change of regulative rules and identity of acts
The hypothesis at work is that when cheating we are breaking the regulative rules. A 
salient feature of these rules is that by changing or deleting them, we would not 
thereby change the game itself, at least not profoundly so. Having argued that the 
rule “one should not disturb the opponent while the opponent is playing” is 
regulative of chess, we can note that by changing this rule, or even deleting it, we 
76 For, as we have seen above, a rule can be constitutive of A without being individuating of 
it (at least if it is not the conjunction of all constitutive rules). 
77 Williamson seems to accept this claim when he takes regulative rules to be rules of a 
“higher-order” practice. (1996: 489)  
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surely wouldn't be changing the game. For, if there were two pairs of chess players, 
where only one pair followed this rule, we would not be inclined to say that they are 
playing different games. Instead, they would be merely behaving differently while 
playing the same game. In contrast, this does not hold for the constitutive rules. On 
the orthodox account, by changing constitutive rules we would thereby “completely 
alter the nature of the institution” (Pollock, 1982: 212).    
 To test our hypothesis, let us consider the rule of Go that allows for cheating, 
such as: “place only one stone at the time”. If our hypothesis is correct, this rule 
would be regulative and, in accordance with what is said above, its change would 
minimally affect the nature of the game. But this is false. By changing the mentioned 
rule (and allowing two stones to be moved at the time, say) we could create a 
different game. One could describe the new game, Go*, as being similar to Go 
except for the fact that you are now allowed to place two stones at a time. The same 
conclusion would follow, even more obviously so, if we changed the rule in a more 
flagrant way (now allowing three stones to be moved) or in games with even smaller 
set of rules. In conclusion, the rule “place only one stone at the time” seems essential 
to the game, which is why it cannot be regulative, but constitutive.78 This goes along 
Williamson’s way, although I will shortly try to pinpoint problems for his approach, 
too.  
c. Breaking regulative rules
I want to mention another problem for the hypothesis that regulative rules cannot 
allow for cheating. Since KA can be infringed by cheating, the orthodox theorist 
would treat KA as a regulative rule of assertion, not as a constitutive one. Yet, there 
78 On its own, this doesn’t show that there could be no constitutive rules of Go on this 
account: the set of propositions describing the correct position of a stone or their capturing 
would count as constitutive.  
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are strong reasons to think that KA is significantly different from regulative rules of 
assertion.      
 To show this, imagine someone asserting a Moorean “p but I don't know that p”. 
It is fair to say that such an assertion could not be accepted in the conversational 
score, used in further conversation, acted upon, and so on. Now, the same doesn’t 
seem to follow with respect to other rules of assertion, such as those of relevance or 
politeness. Surely, a rude or irrelevant assertion may incur criticism for violating the 
rule of etiquette or relevance,79 but there is nothing inherently wrong in asserting “p 
is uninformative, but p” or “p but I am shouting that p”. For, although the speaker’s 
behavior would be awkward and perhaps misleading (as it may lead others to believe 
that after all there is a reason why she is asserting this) there would be nothing wrong 
with the assertion itself. We are perfectly epistemically positioned when knowingly 
asserting non-informative propositions.  
 How are we to capture the difference between the rule of knowledge and the 
rule of informativeness and etiquette, when applied to assertion? Claiming that all of 
them should be deemed regulative seems problematic for the reasons we mentioned–
–the set of regulative rule becomes too heterogeneous, as these rules differ in
important ways with regard to the success of the act they are governing. 
3.1.5 Problems for Williamson’s theory: success Y-terms 
As noticed above, Williamson’s conception of constitutive rules is general in 
character and applies to practices other than that of assertion. In fact, since 
79 To my knowledge, normative accounts of assertion have not yet offered any (normative) 
rule of relevance. A descriptivist account of relevance is provided by Roberts (2004: 216): 
“A move m is RELEVANT to the question under discussion q iff m either introduces a 
partial answer to q (m is an assertion) or is part of a strategy to answer q (m is a question 
subordinate to q or an imperative whose realization would plausibly help to answer q). 
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Williamson’s heuristics relies on the game analogy, introduced in the previous 
chapter, the most natural place to test Williamson’s view would be games and their 
rules.  
Recall the PC condition: “by violating the constitutive rule R, one does not 
thereby cease to perform an act of the type that R is constitutive of”. We have 
presented Williamson as holding that all constitutive rules take the form of “One 
must: Y only if X”.    
 Many, even if not all games, contain a Y term which we can call a success term, 
such as checkmate or goal. While some of them mark the winning condition, such as 
“checkmate” other terms such as “goal” do not. Be that as it may, we can raise two 
initial objections to Williamson's general account of rules. First, the rules governing 
success terms are not susceptible to PC. Secondly, such rules cannot take the form: 
“One must: Y only if X”.  
The former objection contends that one cannot violate the constitutive rule of 
checkmate and yet succeed in checking the opponent’s king. Even if the opponent 
fails to see that the move did not amount to a checkmate, it is still absurd to say there 
was one.80 In reply, it may be argued that this objection rests on a misinterpretation 
of PC. For, PC is ambiguous between two readings, PC1 and PC2:  
PC: By violating the constitutive rule R, one does not thereby cease to perform 
the act R constitutes.   
PC1: By violating the constitutive rule R, one does not thereby cease to perform 
the specific move R constitutes.   
PC2: By violating the constitutive rule R, one does not thereby cease to perform 
the general practice R constitutes, although one does cease to perform the 
specific move R constitutes.   
80 This does not entail that one cannot cheat with respect to the rules governing the success 
terms. E.g., one can still cheat and check her opponent, by putting a new figure on the 
table, which was not among those the two players played with.    
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If we interpret PC as having the meaning of PC2, then the problem disappears: 
although failing to observe the rule of checkmate prevents one from checking the 
opponent, one doesn’t thereby stop playing chess.   
However, this reading is unmotivated. To show this, recall that for Williamson 
PC must apply to assertion. Yet, PC2 is clearly false, as it predicts that by violating 
the knowledge rule one ceases to assert.  
A general idea behind the second objection is that we cannot formulate the 
constitutive rule of checkmate (or other success terms) by employing the form of a 
prescriptive rule.   
 Let us assume that the checkmate rule could take the form of “One must: Y only 
if X”. As we have seen, the “must” particle presupposes that it is possible to perform 
Y without satisfying X. But this clearly would not work in the case of checkmate: a 
failure to satisfy X precludes Y from taking place.   
Neither can we help ourselves to “One must: make a move such that it does not 
either place or leave the king in checkmate”, where “the king in checkmate” phrase 
would be further specified by a set of X terms. For, the “must” clause would fall 
short of conveying the obligation or requirement in any strict sense––a failure to 
conform to this rule would not lead to a sanction of any kind, but would instead 
mark the end of the game.  
Insisting that the checkmate is a regulative rule would be a non-starter for the 
reasons already outlined above: changing or deleting the rule of checkmate would 
result in changing the game itself. (In fact, changing the winning conditions of a game 
appears to be a more flagrant change than any other).    
To remedy the problem, in addition to the prescriptive “One must: Y only if X”, 
I suggest, we should introduce the orthodox “counts as” type of rule. On the one 
hand, this would help accommodate for the rule of checkmate and other success Y-
terms. Namely, it would enable us to state: “attacking the opponent’s king in such a 
way that no move will leave it unattacked counts as checkmate”. On the other hand, 
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the counts-as type of propositions would be useful when it comes to assertion, too, 
as we would be in a position to define the speech act.   
3.1.6 The “counts-as” rules and assertion 
As regards the latter point, I would like to pinpoint an important difference between 
the game of chess and assertoric practice. Imagine that we specify the positions 
occupied by, say, the bishop or offer a description of the figure’s shape. The ensuing 
characterization, coupled with the relevant prescriptive rule, does seem to tell us all 
there is to know about playing with the bishop in chess. Would the same kind of 
information suffice in the case of assertion?   
Arguably, one may find the prescriptive rule for assertion insufficient; for, unlike 
with the game of chess, where all the moves are confined to the game, asserting is a 
more public phenomenon, involving interpersonal relations and social commitments: 
others make decisions on our statements, act on them, reproach or praise them, 
require the asserters to provide epistemic grounds, and so on. One may think, 
accordingly, that since asserting is a much more complex endeavor than the game of 
chess, it should be specified further than by mere prescriptive rule.     
 One candidate for achieving such a task might be the individuation rule of KA: 
“Necessarily, assertion is the unique speech act type whose unique rule is: “One 
must: Y only if X”. Yet, while we may agree that such a rule is extensionally correct, 
one may wonder whether it reveals all there is to the normativity of asserting. For 
instance, does it predict that I can be challenged when offering an assertion? Does it 
predict that other agents can act on what I sincerely state? This would depend on 
how we understand the phrase “being subject to”. In any case, I don’t wish to deny 
such a possibility. My point is, rather, that even if we agree that such points could be 
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distilled, we can still provide an alternative rule that would more obviously capture 
both the normative dimension of acting as well as the social status asserting has.   
This project can be viewed as an upgrading of KA which would provide a more 
clear “analysis of what it is to participate in the institution” (Pollock, 1982: 218). I 
now turn to this task, helping myself to the notion of commitment and the “counts-as” 
type of rule. True enough, the notion of commitment itself stands in need of further 
clarification, and it will be provided later. 
3.2 The commitment 
In the remainder of the chapter, I will leave aside the prescriptive KA rule, assuming 
it is correct.81 As for now, I would like to focus on the definitive, “counts-as” rule, 
and examine a particular formulation of this rule in terms of commitment.   
A number of influential theories of assertion have characterized the assertoric 
illocutionary force in terms of commitment: such accounts are developed in the 
writings of Peirce (1934),82 Searle (1969; 1976; 1979), Brandom (1983, 1994), 
Searle and Vanderveken (1985), Wright (1992), and MacFarlane83 (2003, 2005), 
among others. My starting point will be Searle’s account of assertion, in particular 
his analysis of commitment.  
81 The set of objections to it will be addressed in Chapter 4.  
82 This appears to be the first articulation of the account (see: Goldberg, 2015:11) although 
Peirce uses the notion of responsibility more frequently than that of commitment.    
83  MacFarlane’s 2014 marks a departure from the commitment view, endorsing the 
constitutive rule approach instead, on which the norm of truth governs assertions.  
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3.2.1 Searle’s account of commitment 
Following the work of Austin, Searle offers a taxonomy of speech acts. Of five 
classes, the same number Austin attributes, Searle observed that only assertives 
express propositions that can be true or false and have proposed to define them as 
undertakings of commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed.84  
  The proposal seems intuitively appealing: we clearly commit ourselves to the 
truth when offering conjectures or assertions, say, because we are prepared to admit 
we were wrong if they turn out false. One may still worry whether the commitment 
to the truth offers a sufficient condition for individuating before different assertives. I 
now turn to examining Searle’s way of distinguishing among different assertives, i.e., 
between different sorts of commitment to the truth.  
3.2.1.1 “Degrees of commitment” 
In Searle’s view, making distinct assertives is likely to incur different degrees of 
commitment to the truth. For instance, by conjecturing that p, the speaker commits 
herself to the truth of p with a weaker degree of strength than one does in flat-out 
asserting the same content (Searle & Vanderveken, 1985:20). This is not the only 
sense in which two assertives can differ, though––complaining will also typically 
involve the additional sincerity condition, expressing the speaker’s dissatisfaction. 
There are also cases where two assertives may differ without necessarily differing in 
degrees: e.g., testimony differs from assertion in terms of its mode of achievement 
(ibid: 20) as the status of the speaker differs, e.g., while testifying in court, and yet it 
may well be that their degrees of commitment are equal.   
84 Note that Searle used the notion of “commitment” also in his 1969, but only to describe 
the class of commissives, not that of assertives.   
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  On this view, commitment is perceived as a matter of degree. Prima facie, the 
concept of “degree” captures the intuitive thought that assertives can typically be 
compared to each other as being weaker or stronger in some sense. Surely, guessing is 
weaker than asserting, and asserting is weaker than swearing. Searle aims to capture 
this thought and explain in which sense they are to be compared––in the sense of to 
what extent their speakers are thereby committed to the truth of the content. I want 
to argue that this way of understanding commitment is quite unhelpful. I start by 
pointing out some drawbacks of introducing the notion of “degree”, arguing that we 
should seek for an alternative strategy if we attempt to further clarify the central 
concept of commitment.       
1. Definition. One of the appealing features of the “commitment to truth” view is
that it provides a definition of the assertive class. Yet, a complete theory of speech 
acts should be capable of defining illocutionary acts within such classes, such as that of 
assertion, say. A recent revival of the normative theory of assertion showed more 
interest in identifying the necessary condition of the speech act than in defining it. That 
notwithstanding, providing a definition of assertion does seem to be an attempt of 
Searle’s and is, after all, a requirement for any theory of assertion in general.        
   To reconstruct Searle’s definition of assertion, we would arguably begin by 
offering its genus in terms of commitment to truth, and then proceed to establishing 
the differentia in terms of degrees of commitment. The assertion, thus, would be 
defined as the commitment to truth to a certain degree or alternatively, the 
commitment to truth within an interval between two degrees. For convenience sake, 
Searle and Vanderveken attach numbers to degrees (as opposed to more vague 
comparison of illocutionary acts in terms of “greater/lesser degree”). 
   Unfortunately, the notion of degree represented by a number is quasi-technical: 
the reader has no grasp of the particular the degree numbers. Sure enough, Searle 
and Vanderveken (1985: 42) make notice that the ascriptions of degrees may be 
more or less arbitrary, but this still does not help in defining the illocutionary acts. 
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We may contend with Searle that guessing is less committal in degree than swearing 
is, but this still would not define either guessing or swearing.    
    It is therefore surprising that some authors, such as Jary (2010:11) attribute to 
Searle a definition of assertion. In any strict sense of the word, Searle’s theory cannot 
define assertion. This is the first reason I will try to replace Searle’s “degrees” with a 
different analysis of the notion of commitment.      
2. Recognition. Although guidance is typically expected from prescriptive rules,
the definition of assertion should be able to give us at least some idea how to 
recognize an instance of the act. At the very least, by knowing the definition of 
assertion one should be in a position to know whether one is performing an assertion 
rather than a similar act, such as guessing.   
  To raise a worry, imagine a community of asserters who have practices of guessing 
and swearing but lack the adequate words for describing the practice, such as “guess”, 
“swear” and their inflections. If someone from this community were to learn a 
foreign language, such as English, she could not learn what the words “guess” and 
“swear” applied to if all they were given were Searle’s instructions. For, they could 
not rule out that “guess” may correspond to their practice of assertion, say, or that it 
denotes a practice this community did not develop.      
3. Zero and negative numbers. Finally, even by allowing for “degrees”, it seems
problematic to assign them some of the numerical values Searle and Vanderveken 
allow for. For one thing, it is difficult to make sense of incurring the commitment 
that can “reach zero” (Searle, 1979: 13) when performing an assertive. At this point, 
the worry is not that there is something wrong with the explanation itself – namely, 
that we are given mere intuitions instead of a more robust theory; rather, it is not 
comprehensible how one’s commitment can ever reach the zeroth degree.85 For, if it is 
most suitably represented by zero, what makes it a commitment rather than the lack 
85 Searle (p.c.) seems to understand “reaching zero” in the sense that by “hazarding a guess” 
one is not committed to truth of the proposition expressed.    
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of commitment? It might be suggested that such acts are limiting cases. That 
notwithstanding, it seems that the notion of commitment would not apply to all cases 
and we would have to endorse the “exception to the rule” strategy.  
  Similar point applies to the characterization in terms of negative numbers. This 
move seems even more confusing. The set of integers, note, is introduced to achieve 
the desideratum of getting “the relations of greater and lesser strength correctly 
ordered, and thus the set Z of integers can be used to mark the relation of greater 
and lesser” (42). Further, the authors specify:   
We use the set Z of integers to measure the degrees of strength with which 
illocutionary points are achieved because there is no theoretical finite lower or 
upper limit on the strength of most illocutionary points (1985: 42).  
This feature of Searle’s and Vanderveken’s approach is puzzling in at least two 
senses. First, it is unclear how one’s committal to the truth can ever be correctly 
represented by a negative number. For, on Searle’s view, what the degrees measure is 
the assertive illocutionary point, which a speaker succeeds in achieving “on a 
proposition P in a context i…iff in that context he represents the state of affairs that 
P as actual in the world of utterance wi.” Secondly, there seem to be a more sensible 
approach according to which commitment takes values between 0 and 1, where 1 is a 
full commitment and 0 is a lack of commitment. This would at least avoid somewhat 
counter-intuitive claims that commitment can reach zero or that it can be 
represented by a negative number. However, this option is not mentioned.   
  Be that as it may, I will not be employing the notion of degrees, not just their 
awkward, quasi-mathematical characterization. Accordingly, I will propose a 
different way of understanding the notion of commitment.  
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3.2.2 An alternative conception of commitment 
I have tried to argue that the notion of “degree” is not very helpful in elucidating 
different types of commitment and the role of commitment in the normative theory 
of speech acts. Thus, although assertives may well exemplify weaker and stronger 
degrees of commitment to the truth, the difference between such commitments 
should be explained in an alternative way.86     
 The ordinary concept of commitment seems to be relational in three senses: first, 
it is undertaken by a speaker; secondly, the speaker commits herself to making a 
certain condition obtain, be it one’s own epistemic state (knowledge), doxastic state 
(belief, justifiability, reasonableness), or truth; and thirdly, one commits oneself in front 
of an audience who recognizes it as a commitment of the specific type.      
  Although I think this way of understanding commitment is more promising than 
Searle’s attempt, I will not try to develop a full theory of assertives, as Searle did, 
but will confine myself to the case of assertion. At most, I will offer a definition of 
some assertives, such as proffering and presenting (in Chapter 5). That being said, the 
brief presentation of Searle’s theory of assertives only served to introduce an 
important, though faulty, conception of commitment, which will be helpful for our 
own definition of assertion.  
3.3 Final remarks 
In this chapter, I analyzed the most prominent theories of constitutive rules and 
commitment, two concepts in terms of which I aim to develop a theory of assertion in 
86 This is not to say that the theory of assertives in terms of commitment would not have as 
its consequence that assertion is stronger in degree than guessing is, say, but the point is that 
this needs to be explained on independent grounds.    
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the next chapter. As to the former, I argued that both Williamson’s approach and the 
orthodox theories face certain problems, as they are unable to accommodate for the 
success Y terms and the acts of cheating, respectively. As to the latter, I maintained 
that Searle’s conception of commitment relies on unnecessary concept of degree and 
that his theory of assertion, employing the notion of commitment, fails to define the 
speech act, contrary to what is often assumed to be the case.     

	  Part II 
A Theory of Assertion 
	  
4 
Asserting as Commitment to Knowing 
In the previous chapter, I suggested three constraints on an account of assertion, 
namely: (i) to offer a definition of assertion; (ii) to capture assertion in more 
decidedly social terms, such as that of commitment; and (iii) to think of 
commitment as a ternary relation between the speaker, a certain state of the 
world, and an audience.87 In addition, I will plug in KA and see whether the 
results will be satisfying.  
A way of satisfying these requirements, while staying faithful to KA, might 
be by defining assertion in terms of the “X counts as Y” locution, while appealing 
to the norm of knowledge, so as to reach:   
(CK)  Committing oneself to knowing the proposition expressed counts as 
asserting. 
87 A number of authors defending KA interpret the view in terms of commitment, such 
as Fricker (2012: 62–3), Hinchman (2013:613), and García-Carpintero (MS1), among 
others.    
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It is important to observe that the phrase “commitment to knowledge” suffers 
from ambiguity. On the stronger reading, by committing oneself to knowing that 
p, the agent commits herself to knowing that she knows that p. But this is unduly 
strong for our purposes. When asserting, we undertake the weaker commitment 
to defend what we take to be knowledge. Thus, if my assertion is challenged, the 
commitment incurred obliges me to be able to explain why I took this content to 
be part of what I know. Yet, this is different from committing myself to knowing 
that I know this content (or: to be able to explain that I know that I know the 
given content). The former commitment is weaker and so should be the 
repercussions in case the agent fails to stand up to her commitment. A similar 
claim is found in Unger88 who insists that by asserting that p one thereby represents 
oneself as knowing that p. Although in the same ballpark, the “commitment to 
knowing” seems to be a more accurate description of the case at hand than 
Unger’s. 
The most important reason to choose the notion of commitment is because 
it is a robustly social concept. Again, the proposal remains faithful to KA, in the 
sense that we can distill the relevant notion of commitment by a careful analysis 
of KA and its individuation feature: “Necessarily, assertion is the unique speech 
act type whose unique rule is: “One must: Y only if X.”” The following remarks 
capture some aspects of such a commitment.    
   Acting upon. In Dummett’s view, “it is essential to the understanding of 
assertions that we know what it is to act on an assertion” (Dummett 1973:302). 
Note that the same applies to many other illocutionary forces: one does not grasp 
the nature of orders or questions unless one knows how to act on them. We 
understand an order “in this house we take off our shoes” only when we 
88 This is perhaps of no more than historical interest, but it was Black (1952) who 
proposed that “in order to use the English language correctly, one has to learn that to 
pronounce the sentence “Oysters are edible” in a certain tone of voice is to represent 
oneself as knowing, or believing, or at least not disbelieving what is being said.” 
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understand how we are supposed to react. Acting on an assertion, however, is 
different from acting on a question, say, in a way that has relevance for the 
speaker. There seem to be very little, if any, commitment the speaker undertakes 
when posing a question. Yet, in most cases, the content we assert serves as a 
warrant for those acting upon it. Namely, assertions are relied on in the process 
of decision-making and acting.89 The audience relies on the speaker’s telling the 
truth. If you ask me whether the library is open until 9 in the evening, and I 
affirm that it is, then your subsequent action will rely on my assertion as its 
warrant. Our audience is indeed entitled to conclude that we know what we 
assert (McGlynn, 2014:99), and moreover, that we are thereby committed to 
knowing what we say, as a basis for subsequent actions that may rely on our 
assertions.    
  Testimony. A similar point applies to the case of testimony – one is licensed to 
use the speaker’s assertion as a testimonial uptake, again placing the commitment 
to knowing the proposition expressed on the speaker.90 The same point can be 
made about the hearer’s acquiring the mere belief on the basis of one’s assertion, 
without ever using it in any way (e.g., acting upon it or repeating it in a 
conversation).   
  Reproaching. Imagine that it turns out that the library closes at 8. In such an 
event, the hearer has a right to reproach the speaker for giving the original 
answer. Such a reproach presupposes that the speaker has committed herself in a 
certain way. To show that this is a commitment to knowing, it may be sufficient to 
observe that the speaker cannot excuse herself by insisting that she did not know 
what she said. Such a commitment to knowledge, although never asserted, is quite 
89 There is also a weaker sense of acting, as when one uses the testimony of others in 
further conversation.   
90 Fricker (2006:600) adds the following twist: “once a hearer forms the belief that P on 
a teller T’s say-so, she is consequently committed to the proposition that T knows that 
P”. 
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clearly implied, to use a Moorean term. This point can be strengthened by 
observing that the speaker will attempt to show it was reasonable for her to think 
she knew the content. Only such replies will be deemed satisfactory.      
  Retraction. Further, such a faulty assertion will typically be retracted. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, the phenomenon of retraction need not always 
manifest itself when the speaker is found unable to live up to her commitment: 
its occurrence may depend on what is at stake when the assertion was made. 
Otherwise, this would entail that the norm of retraction is constitutive of 
assertion. Be that as it may, so long as the retraction takes place, the theorist who 
endorses CK has a credible story to tell;91 if we are committed to knowledge of p 
when asserting it, then it makes perfect sense to criticize the speech act, and our 
commitment with it, if p turns out to be false. We cannot make the same 
assertion any longer because we cannot rightly commit ourselves to knowing it. I 
deal with the phenomenon of retraction in detail later in this chapter.  
  Hedging. Suppose one was reluctant to assert that the building is open until 9, 
because she wasn’t sure. This reluctance is explained by one’s unwillingness to 
commit one to knowing this content. As an alternative to offering a 
straightforward assertion of the content, we may hedge the content instead, as in: 
“I think it is open until 9”, thus committing ourselves to a weaker content. The 
practice of hedging can thus also be seen as supporting CK. For, the speaker 
chooses to assert only what she can more safely commit herself to knowing, 
where this commitment is again understood, inter alia, as involving the assuming 
of responsibility for possible actions that may rely on the assertion.   
  Challenging. It is important to note that the commitment “begins” already 
with the act of asserting (rather than, say, only once the speaker is being 
reproached). It is accordingly appropriate to challenge the speaker upon making 
an assertion if we doubt that she has the relevant epistemic grounds to live up to 
91 Goldberg (2015: 18) renders the commitment view’s explanation of retraction “a 
very simple, and highly plausible”.  
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her commitment. Perhaps the most frequently used conversational challenge is 
“How do you know that p?”, found in a number of languages.92 Although I will be 
discussing such challenges at length in Chapter 6, observe here that if we assume 
that asserting commits one to knowing the content asserted, it makes perfect 
sense to inquire how one knows what one asserts. Such challenges, thus, show 
that asserting is intimately related to the commitment to defend that the content 
is part of what is known.   
  Prompting. As assertions are often offered as answers to questions, it is of 
interest that instead of posing a straightforward question (“Where is the train 
station?”) one can instead ask “Do you know where the train station is?” (Turri, 
2010a). The propriety of formulating questions in this way, again, seems to 
explain why it is correct to think of the assertion as a commitment to knowing. 
For, by answering the question, one straightforwardly accepts such a 
commitment.     
One should note that each of these aspects of commitment indicates that the 
commitment took place: as such, their lack does not entail the lack of 
commitment itself. Thus, it is possible that asserting that p commits one to 
knowing that p even if the act itself is not acted upon, reproached, subsequently 
hedged, challenged or offered as a reply to a relevant prompt.    
In fact, not only does asserting fail to imply a defense of our commitment, 
one may assert without thereby addressing the audience,93 as when one writes a 
secret diary (Owens 2006: 117) or fails to be heard by the intended audience. 
92 Such languages include, among others, Catalan, French, German, Hebrew, Italian, 
Iranian, Portuguese, Serbo-Croatian, Spanish, and Swedish.        
93 Here I don’t have in mind the case of soliloquy although it is sometimes considered as 
an uncontroversial way of asserting (Pelling 2013a: 296). In fact, as Schiffer (1972: 79-
80) contends, such cases are not without audience as the speaker herself is the
audience. The same possibility is mentioned in Grice (1989:112–3), but contested by 
some authors, such as Fricker (2006:598f) with whom I tend to side on this point.    
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This may strike one as somewhat controversial; if compared to the act of 
promising, more obviously captured in terms of commitment, the same feature 
does not hold: if no one heard the alleged promise, the subject did not promise 
but merely tried to promise.94 Why wouldn’t the same apply to the assertion?     
One reason may be sought in the argument structure of the verb “to 
assert”––given that it does not include the hearer, but only the speaker and the 
content (as in: x asserts that p), it seems to allow the possibility of asserting 
without such a content being heard (Pagin, 2014). This contrasts both with the 
case of promising as well as with the act of telling, a sub-type of assertion 
analogous to promising (Owens, 2006; Lackey, 2008; Pelling 2014) as both 
verbs, “to promise” and “to tell”, have the speaker-hearer-content argument 
structure (x promises that p to y; and x tells that p to y).     
To sum up, while we may hold that if the assertion goes unheard the 
speaker will not exhibit any signs of commitment, the relevant claim for us is 
modal: had someone heard the utterance, the same aspects of commitment 
would be manifest.95   
4.1 The contrasting cases 
I now put to test the CK view, indicating how it is supposed to distinguish 
assertion from closely related phenomena (such as on-stage assertions, non-literal 
94 This can be contested. Alston (2000:53) urges that asking questions such as “Didn’t 
you hear me when I promised to take you?” presuppose that the speaker promised, albeit 
her addressee did not realize it. Yet, as Alston observes, such a promise may still be 
deemed defective (Searle, 1969). Moran (2005: 355-6) construes assertion, wrongly in 
my view, precisely by modeling it on the case of a promise.  
95 Green (1999).   
4. Asserting as Commitment to Knowing
    __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
81	  
assertions, and presuppositions)96 as well as how it captures certain “kinds” of 
assertion, such as indirect assertions.    
a. On-stage & non-literal assertions
A constitutive rule account of assertion, just like any other, needs to provide a 
principled way of distinguishing assertions from non-assertoric utterances of 
declarative sentences. Among the cases which deserve to be considered are those 
of “on-stage assertions”, performed by using declarative (and in some cases non-
declarative) sentences by an actor on stage, and non-literal assertions, where the 
speaker seems to be asserting a different content from the literal one.    
The CK has a simple answer to both phenomena. As to the former, we 
don’t take an actor on stage to be committing herself to knowing what she utters: 
we do not take her to be sincere, we do not act on what she utters, challenge her 
while on stage, and so on. Consequently, we should not take her to be asserting 
either, nor perform any illocutionary act for that matter. The CK thus captures 
our pre-theoretic intuition that these utterances are not assertions and it can be 
used to explain a broader class of such cases, including practicing the 
pronunciation, testing a microphone, reciting poetry and so on.    
Equally straightforward explanations can be given of non-literal assertions. 
To revisit Nunberg’s (1979: 149) example, in uttering “The ham sandwich is 
sitting at table 20”, the waitress seems to be committing herself to knowing that 
the person sitting at table 20 ordered a ham sandwich. According to CK, this 
96 The list is far from exhaustive as other phenomena could be added, such as that of 
conditional assertions. My preferred solution would be that what is asserted is the 
consequent, provided that the antecedent obtains.   
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would likewise be the content asserted, although in more complex examples of 
non-literal assertions, one might need to work out what the content really is.    
b. Indirect assertions
Cases of asserting by using sentences in a mood other than the indicative one97 
are somewhat trickier. Let us consider assertions indirectly made by the use of 
sentences in the interrogative mood, 98 such as Davidson’s example: “Have you 
noticed Jane wore a blue hat today?”.99  
Uncontroversially, the speaker manages to assert that Jane wore a blue hat 
today, and one needs to explain in virtue of what does such commitment take 
place. The answer cannot be that it is because the proposition that Jane wore a blue 
hat today is thereby expressed. For, if the question were “Had Jane wore a blue 
hat today?”, we would express precisely that proposition but would not be 
inclined to say that one thereby asserted such content. The reason why only the 
former utterance can be used to assert is due to the occurrence of the factive verb 
“to notice”. By uttering “Have you noticed that p?”, the speaker conveys the 
knowledge of the subordinate clause (“that Jane wore a blue hat”). The mere 
employment of the interrogative mood does not carry much weight. Indeed, the 
questions are plausibly governed by the norm of ignorance (Hawthorne 2004: 
97 This is not to say that one cannot assert indirectly by using a sentence in the indicative 
mood. On the contrary, I will argue for this claim in section 4.2. Hooper & Thompson 
(1973) took the same stance on the issue with regard to utterances such as “It is true that 
p” or “I’m certain that p”.   
98 However, I don’t wish to disprove the possibility that one can assert indirectly by 
using sentences in the imperative mood.  
99 Dummett (1993) disagrees with Davidson (1984: 110) that these utterances should be 
viewed as assertions, as they should be understood as (mere) communication (Stainton 
1997: 61).  
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24)100 which cannot be plausibly attributed to our speaker. Upon making such an
utterance, she can be challenged (e.g., “Are you sure, though? I am pretty 
confident she doesn’t like hats at all”) and the commitment incurred cannot be 
avoided by insisting that one only meant to ask a question.    
c. Presupposition
At least since Strawson’s (1950) criticism of Russell’s (1905) “On Denoting”, it 
has been a desideratum in pragmatics to carefully distinguish the concepts of 
assertion and presupposition. Pace Russell (and most Russellians), in uttering 
“The present king of France is bald” a speaker wouldn’t be asserting but only 
presupposing that there is one and only one king of France.101   
In the previous section, we needed to explain the mechanism by which the 
assertoric commitment was incurred by using a sentence in the interrogative 
mood, as opposed to a more standard, if not default, a declarative one. The 
problem with presupposition is somewhat the opposite: we need to explain why 
despite using a declarative mood, the incurred commitment is not assertoric in 
nature.102   
 Consider to this extent a sentence “Jane stopped beating her husband”. By 
assertorically uttering this sentence, the speaker seems to commit herself to 
knowing two propositions: that Jane stopped being her husband, and that Jane used to 
100 In Hawthorne’s view, “at least in the normal case, we shouldn’t ask a question if we 
already know the answer” (2004: 24), where the qualifier excludes cases in which a 
teacher asks a student an exam question, and so on.   
101 See: Alston (2000:115).  
102 I am not suggesting, of course, that one cannot make a presupposition by using a 
non-declarative sentence, but merely focusing on cases which appear to be more 
common.  
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beat her husband. The worry with CK is that, unlike with the former content, we 
are unwilling to accept that the latter content is asserted. How do we distinguish, 
then, between the two propositions? Why is only one of them asserted?    
     My solution will consist in claiming that assertions are those commitments 
which are related to expressed propositions. However I postpone unpacking the 
notion of “expressed proposition” until section 4.6.3.   
 4.1.1 Objections 
In this chapter and the next two, I turn to discuss a set of objections to CK. Since 
the position has not been proposed in the literature, the existing arguments 
against it are scarce. However, given the similarities between CK and the 
knowledge account, it will be convenient to examine counter-arguments against 
the latter position, even more so as not all of them have been addressed in the 
literature.   
 I will discuss four sets of arguments against CK: in this chapter I will examine 
objections to (i) commitment views in general and four problems for (ii) the 
knowledge account of assertion. In chapter 5, I will try to block the arguments 
(iii) against speaker-centered norms, such as KA and, finally, in chapter 6, (iv) 
against the thesis that KA and CK can accommodate conversational challenges 
better than their rivals.    
   In this chapter, I start out with Pagin’s (2004) argument against the 
commitment view, applying it to CK as a special case. I then turn on to discuss 
four arguments against KA, three of which deserve special attention. The first is 
the twin argument (section 4.3) reminiscent of Williamson’s snow scenario, which 
is in my view one of the central objections the reasonabilist can address against 
the objectivist proposal in general. The ability to accommodate for such a worry, 
rather than merely proclaim its central case incorrect on the basis of intuitions (as 
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done by Williamson and DeRose) is fundamental to any objectivist proposal in 
my view. The second and more specific argument I find even more puzzling 
raises a worry concerning gettiered assertions (section 4.5), which likewise failed 
to receive due attention in the literature. In answering both arguments, my main 
motive will be to test how cogently we can pursue the strategy of normative 
consequences introduced in the second chapter. Finally, the third objection I will be 
discussing in more detail is the argument from presupposition (section 4.6). In 
contrast to the first two, I find Williamson’s version of KA less equipped to 
answer this challenge, which may motivate the departure from the orthodox 
defense of the knowledge norm.      
In addition to these three objections, I will discuss the argument from 
imprecise assertions (section 4.4). Although I find it less puzzling, it raises an 
interesting issue and has not been addressed in the literature. Finally, let me add 
that while further arguments against KA and CK are analyzed in Chapters 5 and 
6, all this hardly covers a large industry of producing counterarguments to KA. 
Yet, a considerable portion of these arguments has been already replied in the 
literature.    
4.2 Commitment as a social act 
If asserting commits ourselves to knowing the proposition expressed, it thereby 
changes our social status: by asserting, we take certain responsibilities we did not 
previously have. All it takes is to pronounce the right words in the right 
circumstances (Stainton, 1997: 59).  
     In Pagin’s (2004) terminology, such analyses take assertion to be a “social act”. 
Although Pagin discusses a number of social accounts, I focus on the 
consequences his criticism has for CK––committing oneself to knowing the 
4. Asserting as Commitment to Knowing
         _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
86	  
proposition expressed counts as asserting. While asserting may indeed incur 
certain commitment, 103  Pagin’s worry is that a mere committal to the 
proposition expressed need not always suffice for asserting.104  
 Pagin contends that for each social analysis of assertion – “to assert that p is to 
Φ (p)”, there will be a corresponding construction of an explicit performative “I 
hereby Φ (p)”.105 By means of example, (1) yields an explicit performative of the 
form:  
(1) I hereby commit myself to knowing that p.106  
By allowing that uttering (1) involves a commitment to knowing the proposition 
expressed,107 CK classifies an earnest utterance of (1) as an assertion of p. What 
Pagin’s argument sets out to show is that while the asserter commits herself to 
knowing p by uttering (1), she does not manage to assert that p. In support of this 
claim, Pagin gives three arguments: (i) an argument from logical incompatibility; 
(ii) an argument from the irrelevance of the indirect assertion models; and (iii) an 
argument from what he calls the inferential integration test.       
103 At least in some cases, Pagin does not object that when asserting that p, the speaker 
incurs a commitment. True enough, he considers commitment to truth, rather than 
knowledge (in Pagin’s words, we put our “authority behind the proposition” and if the 
proposition turns out false, we retract the speech act).      
104 I will address a similar worry in Chapter 8, as applied to non-linguistic assertions.  
105 The strategy is somewhat reminiscent of Davidson’s observation that “whatever is 
conventional about assertion can be put into words, or somehow made an explicit part 
of the sentence…It is easy to see that merely speaking a sentence in the strengthened 
mood cannot be counted on to result in an assertion” (Davidson 1979: 113, “Moods and 
Performances, reprinted in 1984).    
106 Pagin also considers the following alternative: “I hereby commit myself to knowing 
what is expressed by this proposition: P” (2004: 840).  
107  At this point, Pagin remarks that (1) would “surely…leave most audiences 
perplexed, but this would most probably be because of failing to understand the 
philosophical jargon” (2004: 849).   
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a. Logical incompatibility
The first argument centers on the notion of “logical incompatibility” and the 
expression “what I say”. In Pagin’s words, “when I assert that p what I say implies 
that p; it is logically incompatible with the falsity of p” (2004: 839). In contrast, 
Pagin believes, “what I say [by uttering (1)] is logically compatible with the falsity 
of p.” (ibid). Consequently, one cannot manage to assert p by uttering (1). Of 
course, Pagin allows that one would still make an assertion, namely that one 
hereby commits oneself to p, but not an assertion that p. Instead, the content that p is 
better viewed as a declaration on the speaker’s stand on the issue (Pagin, 2014) 
which could be accurate even if p is false.      
       We can understand the central notion of logical incompatibility as follows: if 
an assertion of p is logically incompatible with the falsity of p, the conjunction of 
p and its negation would yield a contradiction, as in (2): 
(2) p and ¬p.   
By contrast, if we replace the first conjunct of (2) by the explicit performative 
(1), the resulting proposition would not yield any inconsistency.   
(3) I hereby commit myself to knowing p, and ¬p.  
This, I take it, is Pagin’s point behind questioning the social analyses of assertion 
with the notion of “logical incompatibility.” From the logical point of view, 
nothing about the proposition (3) strikes us as odd. Both conjuncts can be true. 
What’s more, there are ways in which the proposition could plausibly also be 
asserted, as when we phrase (3) in the past tense:  
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(4) I thereby committed myself to knowing p but p was false.    
The same should hold if we changed the occurrence of “I” and “myself” for that of 
a term in the second and third person singular and plural.   
    In reply, the worry with Pagin’s argument is that asserting (3) is simply 
infelicitous.108 To explain this, García-Carpintero (2013:13) proposes to 
understand the expression “what I say” as meaning “what I state”. Accordingly, 
Pagin’s contention that “what I say [by uttering (1)] is logically compatible with 
the falsity of p” (839) would turn out to be false: (1) is not compatible with ¬p, 
because what (1) states just is p. 
b. Irrelevance of indirect assertion models
If by uttering “I hereby commit myself to knowing that p” one asserts that p, such 
an assertion must be indirect (2004: 850). Pagin contends, however, that there is 
no model of indirect assertion which can deliver such a result. In so doing, Pagin 
starts off with the Gricean model.   
To work out the conversational import of (1) on Gricean proposal, we start 
by assuming that the speaker complies with the cooperative principle, in 
particular the maxim of relevance. If so, her intention cannot be to convey that 
she commits herself to knowing that p, as this would be irrelevant for the present 
purpose. Instead, she is uttering (1) because she wants to convey that p. In turn, 
we can conclude, the speaker implies that p. Although this is still a far cry from 
showing that p gets asserted, it can serve in mounting the following argument.  
Let us start by considering the utterance of (1) in a larger context. Since (1) 
is an assertion, it would be natural to hear replies such as “You’re wrong” or 
108 I say “infelicitous” here to signal there is something wrong in asserting (3).  
4. Asserting as Commitment to Knowing
    __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
89	  
challenges such as “How do you know that?”. And, if by uttering (1) we assert 
only (1), it should be clear that these accusations and challenges target precisely 
(1). Yet this is false: one cannot be sensibly challenged by asking “How do you 
know you commit yourself to knowing p?”, let alone be accused for offering the 
same content. In contrast, such replies are perfectly appropriate when targeting 
p.    
How can we explain the fact that p can be challenged? If p is merely implied 
but not asserted, it should follow that other implicatures which do not get 
asserted can be challenged. Invoking Grice’s famous handwriting scenario should 
show us that this is not the case. As the example goes, when writing a 
recommendation letter, a professor praises only the student’s handwriting. By 
doing so, the writer implicates that the student is a poor candidate for the 
position. Granted that such an implicature is not asserted, observe that the writer 
cannot be either challenged or accused––if one were to raise the “How do you 
know that?” challenge, the question would be clearly out of place; on the most 
charitable reading, the challenge would not target the implicature (that the 
student does not have a good record) but instead the statement that she has a nice 
handwriting. Since, as we have seen, such a challenge does target the implied 
content of (1), namely p, this suggests that p is not merely implied, but also 
asserted.  
Of course (1) is not a solitary case where a single proposition is both 
implied and asserted. To use another of Grice’s examples, imagine that upon 
asking a local resident where to get some charcoal, they reply that there is a 
garage around the corner. By asking “Are you sure?”, one would be targeting the 
implicature (that one can get charcoal in the garage around the corner) and this 
would suggest that the implied content is also indirectly asserted.  
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 Thus, returning to (1), while it clearly implies that p, the propriety of 
conversational challenges targeting the content of p suggests that p is not merely 
implied, but also indirectly asserted.   
c. The inferential integration test
The last argument in support of the thesis that by uttering (1) one does not assert 
p, directly or indirectly, comes in the form of the inferential integration test.  
       According to this test, indirect assertions “should integrate inferentially with 
other assertions of the speaker” (2004: 851); that is, “if I perform an indirect 
assertion that p … then inferentially it should be as if I had performed a direct 
assertion. And so it is, I think, with irony and with rhetorical questions, to the 
extent that these are used for indirect assertions” (ibid: 851).  
     Pagin goes on to contrast two acceptable inferences, (5) and (6), with that 
of (7) which he comes to reject:     
(5)      If 73 is a prime number, we cannot share the stones equally. (Assertion) 
73 is nicely divisible. (Ironic premiss)  
     So, we cannot share the stones equally. (Assertion) 
(6)  If 73 is a prime number, we cannot share the stones equally. (Assertion) 
Is 73, perhaps, divisible? (Rhetorical premiss) 
So, we cannot share the stones equally. (Assertion) 
(7) If 73 is a prime number, we cannot share the stones equally. (Assertion) 
I commit myself to knowing that 73 is a prime number. (Commissive 
premiss)  
So, we cannot share the stones equally. (Assertion) 
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It might be helpful to note a disanalogy between the second premisses in (5) and 
(6) on the one hand, and the second premiss in (7) on the other. While the latter 
is labeled “commissive” merely because it contains the performative verb “to 
commit”, labeling the former two “ironic” and “rhetorical” respectively requires 
further assumptions. For, there is nothing on their syntactic surface that makes 
their utterances an ironical statement or a rhetorical question.  
  In order to spell out these additional assumptions, let us assume that the first 
premiss in each (5)–(7) is uttered by one speaker, A, and the second premiss in 
each (5)–(7) is uttered by another, B. To my mind, A could infer the conclusions 
in (5) and (6) only if she assumes both that B is fully cooperative and that B has 
some minimal mathematical knowledge109 (for, B might be wrong despite being 
fully cooperative). But if A is willing to grant as much, she could infer the 
conclusion in (7), too. For, assuming that B complies with the cooperative 
principle in uttering the second premiss of (7), her cooperation consists precisely 
in allowing A to reach the conclusion and settle whether to divide the stones or 
not. Once we assume that B acts cooperatively, her contribution cannot be 
evaluated solely on the basis of the performative verb she uses: the cooperation 
should be read off the whole sentence. On a plausible reading, she asserts that 73 
is a prime number.   
  In other words, the strategy that would make clear why the second premisses 
in (5) and (6) are ironical statement and a rhetorical question, respectively, 
would also make clear why the second premiss in (7) is an assertion. It is for this 
reason that I find Pagin’s contention that (7) is not “intuitively correct” 
ungrounded. Pagin notices that for the inference in (7) to go through, we would 
109 García-Carpintero (2013:15) makes a similar point, insisting that if the speaker were 
known to be arithmetically incompetent, the second premiss in (5) would not be taken 
to be ironical, contrary to Pagin’s assumption.    
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need an additional premiss, such as “If I commit myself to knowing that 73 is a 
prime number, then 73 is a prime number.” But, as I suggested, this step is just 
an explicit, verbal formulation of B’s concession to cooperate, which he would 
need to grant to (5) and (6). Indeed, if A were to reply impatiently to B’s 
utterance of “I commit myself to knowing that 73 is a prime number” by saying 
“So, are you saying that 73 is a prime number or that it is not?”, B could simply 
retort “If I commit myself to knowing that 73 is a prime number, I thereby say 
that 73 is a prime number”.110  
4.3 The twin argument 
This finishes the discussion of the arguments against CK and other commitment 
views. In continuation, I turn to a more general task of analyzing the arguments 
against objectivism, broadly construed. I start out with Jennifer Lackey’s (2007; 
2008) “twin argument”, whose structure can be represented as follows:    
(i) For some proposition p, an agent A asserts p at the context C reasonably. 
(ii) If A asserts p at C reasonably, then A asserts p at C correctly.   
(iii) p at C is false.        
(iv) Therefore, A asserts that p at C correctly even though p is false.  
110 MacFarlane (2011: 93) offers an insightful response. Assume, as we did above, that A 
and B utter the first and the second premiss of (7), respectively. Imagine, further, that A 
is skeptical of what B says. In this event, A would accept that B commits herself to 
knowing that 73 is prime, but would reject the assertion that 73 is a prime: i.e., A 
would regard the whole argument as “needing a further premise connecting… [B’s] 
commitment with the primeness of 73”. And, MacFarlane contends, such a further 
premiss is needed only when what the hearer rejects is precisely the assertion that 73 is 
a prime number. In conclusion, the fact that we cannot always substitute the second 
premiss for a single assertion, that 73 is prime, namely, can be explained by assuming 
that the second premiss expresses the two assertions just mentioned.  
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In developing this argument,111 Lackey (2007) asks us to imagine the following 
scenario. My twin inhabits the possible world in which she is manipulated by the 
Cartesian evil demon; despite the fact that in such a world cats fly, my twin will 
form the belief that cats do not fly as the evil demon manipulates her brain, making 
her experiences indistinguishable from my own and her beliefs and perception 
non-veridical (Lackey, 2007:607).        
 How should we treat my twin’s assertion that cats don’t fly? Lackey’s 
reasonabilist starts by considering the case of belief. If our belief, in this world, that 
cats do not fly is reasonable, then my twin’s beliefs “should be regarded as 
reasonable”, too (ibid: 607). This much is fairly acceptable:   
In the world run by the Cartesian Demon, our thinker is no less judicious and 
no less scrupulous in attending to (what he blamelessly takes to be) relevant 
considerations than he is in our world. Because of his unfortunate 
circumstances, however, his beliefs embody a radically false picture of his 
environment. Granted that the thinker's beliefs about his environment are 
false, are they any less justified than in our world? Is the thinker himself any 
less rational? Many philosophers maintain that the thinker's beliefs are equally 
well-justified and that the thinker himself is equally rational in the two 
worlds (See e.g., Cohen 1984 and Pryor 2001). Apparently, there is strong 
intuitive resistance to the idea that a thinker whose underlying dispositions 
and habits of thought remain unchanged might become less rational simply in 
virtue of being located in less fortuitous circumstances. (Kelly, 2007) 
In fact, if someone in the evil demon world were to think that cats do fly, based 
on the exact same evidence available to my twin (i.e., phenomenological 
111 The argument is originally posed as a problem for the truth account. 
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experience) one would intuitively find this person’s belief subject to criticism. 
Once we agree on this, the next step is to adopt the claim that beliefs are 
“internal analogues” of assertions.112 This link should establish that if a belief that 
p is not liable to criticism, an assertion of p should not be liable to criticism, 
either:113     
[M]y twin also should not be subject to criticism for offering the same 
assertions as me, even if the truth value of our respective assertions varies 
significantly (Lackey, 2007: 607).     
The second premiss of the argument ties together a reasonable assertion with a 
correct assertion. As discussed in the second chapter, this is part and parcel of the 
reasonabilist’s program: an assertion is correct if and only if the speaker is not 
liable to criticism for making it. Finally, we need to be reminded that the 
asserted proposition is actually false. This creates a difficulty for the advocates of 
KA and CK, as they cannot allow for cases where an assertion is correct but the 
proposition expressed is false.  
4.3.1 The retraction data 
The twin argument is problematic due to its premiss (ii): “if A asserts p at C 
reasonably, then A asserts p at C correctly”. According to this premiss, we can 
always reason from “x is reasonable” to “x is correct”. However, if “x is correct” 
112 The proposal can be traced back as early as to Kant, who considered assertions as 
outward manifestation of an internal judgment. In contemporary literature, it was Adler 
(2002) who developed the “assertion-belief parallel” probably in most detail.     
113 The entailment in the other direction does not hold for Lackey, however. I discuss 
this feature in Chapter 5 in relation to the phenomenon of selfless assertion.  
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is ambiguous between “x is reasonable” and “x is objectively correct”, as urged in 
the second chapter, the inference fails – an assertion can be both reasonable and 
incorrect. In what follows, I will try to undermine premiss (ii) by examining the 
phenomenon of retraction in more detail. The thought will be that once my twin 
is told cats do fly in the evil demon world, it is likely she would take back her 
original assertion. In turn, her retraction would signal that her assertion was 
faulty. In arguing for this case, I will run through a set of worries the Lackeyan 
reasonabilist might have about the role of retraction. As a result, I hope to show 
that retraction is a normative consequence in its own right, which would support 
the objectivist intuitions empirically.    
a. Is retraction replaceable?
I have tried to portray a normative consequence as a robust phenomenon, an act 
we can expect to take place in certain conditions, as a reaction to an incorrect 
assertion. 114  On one line of thought, however, retraction is completely 
replaceable––as long as the asserter admits she said something false, there is no 
further need to retract the given speech act. Recognizing that falsity is not a 
normative concept, the objection goes, my twin’s concession that she said 
something false will not be a normative act, either.115 In turn, retraction is not a 
normative consequence and there is no further normative consequence effected 
by making false assertions. The reasonabilist’s inference from “x is reasonable” to 
“x is correct” is reclaimed.       
114  For more in-depth discussion on retraction, see: Ferrari & Zeman (2014), 
MacFarlane (2014), Marques (2014, 2015).    
115 I developed this objection in conversation with Scott Soames, although I cannot say 
he would defend it.  
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In replying to this argument, we should not contest the initial premiss: in 
the context described, it would indeed suffice that my twin admits she said 
something false, without performing the retraction in addition to it. That 
notwithstanding, the argument works under the assumption that an act of 
retraction will necessarily involve uses of some normative term. Such an 
assumption can be resisted, however. For, an act is considered to be a retraction 
if it brings about changes both in the normative status of the retracted assertion as 
well as between the speaker and her auditor. For instance, upon retraction, the 
assertion would not be acted upon nor could the speaker be appropriately 
challenged. But if this is the right rendering of retraction, it is not essential to use 
any normative terms in order to retract. By merely admitting one's assertion was 
false, the same effects take place. Indeed, upon such an admission, the retraction 
would be superfluous, just as asserting “I said something false, but I’m not taking 
it back” would be unacceptable.     
In sum, the fact that falsity is not a normative concept is of no avail, 
because the very act of calling an assertion false can still be normative in 
character.  
b. Inference across contexts
Granted that retraction induces changes in the normative status of both the 
assertion and the asserter, as well as signals the incorrectness of the speech act, 
this would still not show that my twin’s speech act was incorrect. At best, the 
reasonabilist may insist, it shows that my twin’s assertion is incorrect at the 
context in which it has been retracted. Accordingly, Lackey might prohibit the 
objectivist’s conclusion (iv) by denying the premiss (iii): 
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(i) The assertion A made at the context of use, CU, is retracted at the context 
of assessment, CA.   
(ii) Since retraction signals incorrectness, A is incorrect at CA. 
(iii) If A is incorrect at CA it is incorrect at CU.  
(iv) A is incorrect at CU.  
In denying premiss (iii), Lackey may insist that while it was reasonable (= it was 
correct) to assert that cats don’t fly at CU, it is not reasonable (= it is not correct) to 
assert it any longer, at CA. Accordingly, my twin’s retraction should not be 
viewed as her attempt to deny the correctness of the assertion as performed at 
CU––if anything, this would entail that her speech act was unreasonable, contrary 
to the facts.     
How are we, then, to explain the intuition that my twin would retract? A 
natural response for a Lackeyan would be that the assertion is not reasonable any 
longer. I find this unconvincing for two reasons. On the one hand, this proposal 
suggests that the norm of reasonableness is violated, which in turn legitimizes the 
retraction. But it is confusing what act breaks this norm. For, no assertion is 
being made after the original one. On the other hand, it seems that when we 
retract, we do more than merely signal that an assertion is no longer reasonable. 
Namely, our retractions seem to refer to past actions. We remark that we 
shouldn’t have said that, or that it was wrong to make such an assertion. This much 
suggests that there was something incorrect with the assertion when it was made, 
not only when we realize it is incongruous with the governing norm. In sum, 
contra Lackey, by retracting we seem to make manifest that an assertion was 
incorrect in the context in which it was made (see: Davis 2007: 399). 
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c. Pragmatic blindness
Another option for the reasonabilist is to bite the bullet here, insisting that the 
normative significance of retraction at CA cannot outweigh the normative 
significance of the agent’s being reasonable in making the assertion at CU. In so 
doing, the reasonabilist would advocate a sort of error theory: she would be 
forced to describe speakers as being systematically misled into retracting 
perfectly correct assertions. The reasonabilist who adopts such an error theory 
faces two problems.  
First, her error-theoretical proposal is clearly inferior to the objectivist’s 
capability of accounting for these data. The way I portrayed normative theories of 
assertion, a discovery that an assertion was incorrect should have consequences 
on anyone’s account. Since the objectivist claims that false assertions are eo ipso 
incorrect, she predicts that realizing that the assertion was false will have 
normative consequences.   
Secondly, the reasonabilist fails to explain the following asymmetry. By 
her own lights, retraction amounts to a normative consequence in certain cases. 
For instance, when a subject fails to respond to the evidence and yet goes on to 
make the assertion, she may be required to retract the speech act, which would 
signal its incorrectness at the context in which it was made. If so, why wouldn’t 
the act of retraction at a later context also signal its initial incorrectness? The 
reasonabilist seems to lack resources to explain away such an asymmetry. 
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 4.3.2 Retraction as a normative consequence 
Retraction in the light of recognized falsity116 is a first normative consequence we 
discussed so far that is not shared by the reasonabilist. In order for the objectivist 
to explain this normative consequence, we need to postulate a larger context, 
which allows for our assertions to be assessed from a better informed perspective 
and as such, to recognize its falsity. The ensuing rule capturing the normative 
consequence of retraction can be phrased as follows: 
RET: For all assertions that p, once it is known that p is false at CU, one ought 
to retract its assertion at CA, thereby signalling the incorrectness of the 
assertion made at CU. 
Notice, first, that “ought” is defeasible: there might be considerations which 
trump the obligation to retract. In addition, observe that the second part of the 
rule is decidedly objectivist: the reasonabilist would not allow that a retraction 
indicates the incorrectness of assertion, as long as the original assertion was 
reasonable. This rule of retraction gives the expected predictions: Amy from the 
snow scenario and the twin ought to retract their assertion as their contents are 
false relative to the original context.    
4.3.2.1 MacFarlane's rule of retraction 
Before moving on to the next argument, I wanted to briefly touch upon an 
alternative rule of retraction offered by MacFarlane, and offer some reasons why 
116 One may also choose to retract even if one merely believes the asserted content may 
be false, regardless of what is really the case.    
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I think it is not the best option for the objectivist. His rule of retraction is 
formulated as follows:   
RR   An agent in context CA is required to retract an (unretracted) assertion of 
p made at CU if p is not true as used at CU and assessed from CA.
117 
The RR and MacFarlane’s notion of assessment are part and parcel of his radical 
relativism.118  Generally speaking, RR will give the same predictions as the rule I 
outlined above: as applied to the twin case, it will rule that my twin is obliged to 
retract, given that her assertion is false when used at CU (the evil demon world) 
and assessed at CA (the context of the twin’s “return”). However, RR will give 
more peculiar results about certain uses of language, such as predicates of 
personal taste. To illustrate this, consider the scenario in which Joey asserts that 
fish sticks are tasty at CU and Bob reminding Joey ten years later of having said 
that. If Joey no longer likes fish sticks, RR predicts that Joey is required to retract 
the assertion made at CU (MacFarlane, 2014:109–110; 145).    
While RR gives a normative significance to the context of assessment, 
there is a lingering worry as to how well it fits the overall account of assertion. 
117 I have changed MacFarlane’s notation for the context of use/context of assessment, 
using CU/CA instead of his c1/c2.  
118 On radical relativism, the truth of a proposition is relativized both to the context of 
use as well as to the context of assessment. Accordingly, RR is markedly relativist, as it 
makes use of the argument place for such a context of assessment, giving it a normative 
rule, unlike the rule for making assertion which does not mention it. As we will shortly 
see, radical relativism allows one’s assertion of, say, “fish sticks are tasty” to be both 
true and false, relative to these two contexts, which in turn accommodates for both the 
“assertion condition” (that one is warranted in offering such a statement) and the 
“retraction condition” (that one will retract the claim, once one’s opinion changes). In 
addition to MacFarlane’s radical relativist’s RR, there is an alternative, moderate 
relativist proposal I will not consider here. For discussion, see Ferrari & Zeman (2014) 
arguing why the moderate version of RR fails to capture what is essential about the act 
of retraction. 
4. Asserting as Commitment to Knowing
    __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
101	  
To start, one just does not feel the intuitive pull of the claim that Joey is 
compelled to retract.119 In fact, MacFarlane himself concedes that this “may seem 
odd” (2014: 110). 120 Interestingly, in defending this claim, MacFarlane insists 
that such an oddity cannot lie merely in the fact that Joey’s assertion was 
perfectly permissible121 to be made. As he reminds us, there are cases where a 
perfectly reasonable assertion must be retracted despite its speaker not being at 
fault – as both the snow scenario and the twin argument testify. Unfortunately, 
this seems to be beside the point: for the objectivist, such as MacFarlane, 
“reasonable” is not tantamount to “correct”. Accordingly, MacFarlane needs to 
show that there are cases where one is required to retract the assertion which is 
correct in the objectivist sense. We can be rightly skeptical that this is possible.   
To conclude, in addressing MacFarlane’s RR, we do not need to deny 
that Joey may say that he changed his mind about the tastiness of fish sticks. 
Similarly, we don’t need to question that his reasons may be those outlined by 
MacFarlane’s relativist. Nonetheless, it seems that Joey’s putative action would 
119 Marques (2015) convincingly argues that speakers are not under the obligation to 
retract in the sense conceived by MacFarlane. She also discusses the results of the 
experiment conducted by Knobe and Yalcin (2014), which further show that even when 
retraction is in place, it is not motivated by the falsity of assertion. That being said, 
Knobe and Yalcin’s work focused only on epistemic modals, rather than on the taste 
predicates discussed here.   
120 MacFarlane actually offers a different story at the beginning of his book, where he 
writes: “Now that I have exposed my palate to a broader range of tastes, I think I was 
wrong about that; I’ve changed my mind about the tastiness of fish sticks” (MacFarlane, 
2014: 13-14). On this stronger thesis, we are given the answer about the source of the 
normative strength (that Joey must retract, namely). In other words, it is because our 
tastes change that “we may say that we were mistaken in saying that the food was “tasty”” 
(2014:13, emphasis added).  
121 MacFarlane uses “permissibility” in the low-key sense, akin to the meaning of 
“reasonableness” I outlined in the second chapter. On this reading, Joey was 
appropriately sensitive to MacFarlane’s norm of truth, and has made an assertion he had 
“every right to make”, and was “perfectly reasonable” in so doing (2014:110).  
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be a more elaborate version of, if not entirely different from, the speech act of 
retraction as witnessed in the ordinary language. Accordingly, this kind of act is 
at odds with the empirical data by appeal to which relativists had hoped to 
strengthen their position.   
4.4 The argument from imprecise assertions 
The next argument centers on the so-called “imprecise assertions”. As Lackey 
notices, we are accustomed to using them in everyday speech:   
[T]he weatherman asserts that there is a 40% chance of rain tomorrow, 
when in fact there is only a 39.96% chance; a friend asserts that she is 28, 
when in fact she is 27 years, 364 days old… a friend asserts that it is 6:00 
PM, when in fact it is 6:01 PM, and so on. (Lackey, 2007:607)      
Lackey develops the argument from imprecise assertions as having the same form 
as the previous argument: 
(i)  For some proposition p, an agent A asserts p at the context C reasonably. 
(ii)  If A asserts p at C reasonably, then A asserts p at C correctly.  
(iii) p at C is false.        
(iv) Therefore, A asserts that p at C correctly even though p is false.  
To examine her argument, imagine someone uttering (8) at 6:01 PM: 
(8) It is 6 PM. 
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With Lackey, we can contend that the first premiss is uncontroversial, and that 
asserting (8) in such circumstances would be “perfectly proper”. Although, as I 
have argued, the objectivist will render premiss (ii) false, it is not a cause for 
concern in the present argument. Instead, the worry is how tenable premiss (iii) 
is. If it were in order, and (8) were false, the objectivist could not accommodate 
the data, 122 as any false assertion is incorrect, contrary to their stated view.    
Fortunately, a way around this objection is to question a fairly controversial 
criterion of “absolute precision” which Lackey’s reasoning trades on. Instead of 
appealing to such a stringent criterion, one could in turn invoke a Lewisian type 
of index consisting of a world, time, location and standards of precision. This 
would lead us to assigning a different truth-value to (8) depending on the 
circumstances in which it is uttered. To see how this could work, consider 
Lewis’ (1979) remarks about the famous Austin’s example: 
Austin’s “France is hexagonal” is a good example of a sentence that is true 
enough for many contexts, but not true enough for many others. Under low 
standards of precision it is acceptable. Raise the standards and it loses its 
acceptability. (Lewis, 1979:352; emphasis added)  
Unlike Austin, who denies that the sentence “France is hexagonal” can be 
evaluated in terms of truth and falsity (1962:142), Lewis allows for this 
possibility by introducing the standards of precision in the index.123 Thus, “France is 
122 As discussed in Chapter 2, Lackey blocks the possibility that asserting (8) can be 
secondarily correct, by rejecting the concept of secondary correctness as being 
“spurious”.    
123 Lewis (1998) characterizes index as “an n–tuple of features”, called coordinates, “of 
context of various sorts”. A coordinate, such as a standard of precision, may differ from 
one context to another. In assessing “it is six o’clock”, it is appropriate to introduce one 
such coordinate, and relativize its truth to such standards.  
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hexagonal” would be rendered true under a top-ranking general’s standard of 
precision and yet false under the standards of a geographer––the former standard 
being low, the latter high. Similarly, a Lewisian approach can be applied to 
Lackey’s example; in determining the truth-conditions of the sentence (8), we 
can say that (8) “is true enough for many contexts”, particularly for everyday, 
low-stake contexts, although it might be false for some other contexts (e.g., if 
someone was setting the clock). Since Lackey’s scenario features precisely one 
such low-stake context, we would get a different result than Lackey predicts, 
yielding that (8) is “true enough”.   
In reply, Lackey might resist introducing precision standards as a new 
coordinate. For, if the speaker could be precise, why should we introduce 
standards of precision each time she fails to be precise? As Lackey notes, “there 
need not be any practical circumstances” preventing the speaker of (8) from 
delivering a more precise report (2007:608).     
Here the suspicion may be that Lackey falsely assumes that as long as the 
practical circumstances allow for absolute precision, we should act in accordance 
with such a possibility, delivering absolutely precise reports. On this proposal, it 
would be appropriate to introduce the precision coordinate only when one is not 
in a position to be absolutely precise. Unfortunately, this mischaracterizes our 
linguistic practice. Following Grice’s maxim of quantity, we ought not to make 
our contribution more informative than it is required (Grice 1989: 26). Indeed, 
such absolutely precise reports would mislead someone into believing that there 
is a reason for providing such information, when in reality there is none, thus 
creating confusion (ibid.). The reason we choose to round the number to 6 as 
opposed to offering a more precise report, is because we know that our 
interlocutor didn’t ask for anything more precise. Our assertoric competence is 
here reflected in our sensitivity to contextual features, such as the standards of 
precision: one’s mastery in asserting involves responding adequately to what is at 
stake. At the contexts which require only lenient, “true enough” reports, a 
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competent speaker will offer a proposition which is “true enough” at those 
contexts; at the context where the bar is set higher and the standard of precision 
more demanding, the said competence would require avoiding to assert (8) as it 
would count as a false report. 
In conclusion, Lackey’s proposal doesn’t sit well with Grice’s conversational 
maxims and should be abandoned.  
4.5 The argument from gettiered assertions 
Let us recap. So far, we have discussed Pagin’s objection against CK and the 
commitment views in general, and two Lackey’s arguments against the 
objectivist proposals. The following argument has a more specific target, as it 
addresses only some objectivist accounts, in particular those of KA and CK.  
The argument is based on Gettier-type of cases, hypothetical scenarios 
where the subject has the belief that is both true and supported by the evidence, 
and yet which fails to be knowledge (Gettier, 1963; Goldman 1976; Turri 2011). 
We will focus on an earnest expression of such a belief, a gettiered 
assertion. Although a number of authors consider gettiered assertions to be 
perfectly in order,124 they are rendered incorrect by the advocates of KA, as their 
contents do not qualify as part of what is known. A further reason for concern is 
that certain objectivist views can allow for gettiered assertions to be correct.125  
I will consider a gettiered assertion from Goldman’s barn scenario:       
Henry is driving in the country-side with his son. For the boy’s edification 
124 Madison, 2010; McGlynn 2014:112; Wright 2014: 255–256, to name but a few.  
125 The truth account treats gettiered assertions as being both primarily correct (for 
being true) as well as secondarily correct (as it is reasonable to think that they are true).  
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Henry identifies various objects on the landscape as they come into view. 
‘That’s a cow,’ says Henry, ‘That’s a tractor,’ ‘That’s a silo,’ ‘That’s a 
barn,’ etc.  […] Suppose we are told that, unknown to Henry, the district 
he has just entered is full of papier-mâché facsimiles of barns. […] They are 
so cleverly constructed that travelers invariably mistake them for barns. 
Having just entered the district, Henry has not encountered any facsimiles; 
the object he sees is a genuine barn. (Goldman, 1976: 772–773)  
As Goldman writes, we are disinclined to say that Henry knows126 the object is a 
barn (1976:773) as he cannot rule out the relevant alternative that he is actually 
pointing at a barn facsimile. We might also say that there is too much of 
epistemic luck surrounding the case. For, in a nearby possible world, Henry 
forms the same belief on the basis of there seeming to be a barn in front of him, 
although his belief is now false as there is no real barn (Madison, 2010).   
There are two types of data that needs to be accounted for: that Henry's 
assertion seems correct and that, contrary to the appearances, it is not. In 
McGlynn's view,127 the main strategy the advocates of KA have used in dealing 
with gettiered assertions appeals to the notion of secondary correctness. Namely, 
as Henry reasonably believes he knows the given content,128 his assertion is 
secondarily correct. As far as this goes, the proponent of KA appeals to the same 
126 Some authors, such as Sutton (2007), argue that Henry also lack justification. On 
Sutton’s view, one is justified in believing that p iff one knows that p.   
127 McGlynn (2014:112) attributes this strategy to Williamson (2000:257) and DeRose 
(2002: 80). As Williamson writes: “the distinction between having warrant to assert p 
and reasonably believing oneself to have such warrant becomes a special case of the 
distinction between having the authority to do something and reasonably believing 
oneself to have that authority”, i.e., a special case of the distinction between primary 
and secondary correctness.   
128 Another strategy may be to outright resist Gettier’s conclusion, arguing that Henry 
in fact knows the asserted content. Weatherson (2003) makes such a point, although for 
reasons independent of KA, arguing for the “justified true belief” theory of knowledge. 
For a survey of different solutions to the Gettier problem, see Turri (2011).        
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explanation as her reasonabilist counterpart. As a result, a KA theorist needs to 
accommodate for the second datum and explain why Henry's assertion is 
incorrect. Merely repeating that KA judges it as such would only sweep the 
problem under the carpet, and the reasonabilist would be right to protest that a 
friend of KA owes an explanation.129  
4.5.1 Disavowing knowledge 
Let us recapitulate the main strategy used so far in determining whether a given 
assertion is incorrect. Roughly, we tried to identify certain types of data which 
typically coincide with assertions we deem faulty. In so doing, we have 
proclaimed the speaker’s liability to criticism as the most common type of normative 
consequence. By means of example, if one were to make an assertion in a 
situation where it would be only appropriate to hazard a guess, one would be 
liable to criticism for making the assertion instead of a guess. Likewise, if one’s 
statement was irrational, inconsistent, or unjustified, the same normative 
consequence would manifest itself. Another normative consequence we discussed 
was retraction in the light of recognized falsity. I argued that, in Williamson’s snow 
scenario, Amy ought to retract once she learns there was no snow. Both types of 
consequences are normative in character: whenever the speaker is liable to 
criticism for making an assertion, and whenever the speaker ought to retract, the 
relevant assertion is faulty.   
This brings us to gettiered assertions. If we were to proceed with our 
strategy and assess gettiered assertions as incorrect due to there being a 
normative consequence related to it, what consequence would it be? The 
129   The same can be said of Williamson’s and DeRose’s treatment of the snow 
scenario––there is no story as to why Amy’s assertion is incorrect.  
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phenomenon of retracting in the light of recognized falsity wouldn’t help, as 
gettiered assertions are true by definition. The speaker’s liability to criticism 
cannot be invoked, either: the agents in Gettier-type of cases seem perfectly 
reasonable in making their statements.130 What is, then, a distinct, normative 
phenomenon we can link to gettiered assertions, if any?  
I believe that there is a cluster of related phenomena that ought to occur as 
a consequence of making a gettiered assertion. I will label them “disavowing 
knowledge”.   
In presenting the first of these cases, let us consider two scenarios, A and B. 
In A, Henry knows that he is in Barn Façade County. Thus, when he utters a 
sentence “That’s a barn”, he immediately asks one of the residents whether he 
guessed correctly. In this scenario, we can understand Henry’s question as 
appropriate under the assumption that his speech act was a guess. To support the 
claim that Henry’s act can be viewed as guess,  consider the following passage 
from Austin:       
[S]o often there are things you cannot state – have no right to state – are in 
no position to state. You cannot now state how many people there are in the 
next room; if you say ‘There are fifty people in the next room’, I can only 
regard you as guessing or conjecturing. (1962: 138) 
As applied to our case, Henry’s audience would not regard him as asserting, 
either, precisely because he cannot tell real from fake barns. Thus, in posing such 
a question, Henry represents his original utterance as being a guess.   
Moving on to scenario B, Henry utters the same sentence, “That’s a 
barn”, with the sole difference that Henry doesn’t know about fake barns and 
130 Not everyone agrees on this, though: Schaffer (2008:8) stresses the subject is “open 
to censure. He does not know what he is talking about”. In relation to the notion of 
reasonableness glossed in Chapter 2, I disagree with Schaffer and look out for a further 
normative consequence.  
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strongly believes that the object in front of him is a real barn. Once Henry learns 
that he is in Barn Façade County, he goes on to ask one of the residents whether 
he guessed correctly. Unlike in A, I submit, Henry was not making a guess when he 
uttered “That’s a barn”. Instead, he performed a flat-out assertion as he was by all 
means epistemically positioned to make such an act.   
What needs to be explained is why Henry’s question sounds appropriate 
in B. We have already seen that Henry’s question sounds natural in A because 
Henry was merely venturing a guess. But since Henry makes a confident 
assertion in B, we need to look for the answer elsewhere.  
 My proposal starts out with a commonly accepted thesis that the 
standard for correct assertion is more demanding than the standard for correct 
guessing. To support this claim, imagine that Henry in A does not know about 
the existence of fake barns. If his subsequent question “Did I guess correctly?” 
were appropriate (e.g., he has only a vague idea how a barn might look like), we 
would consider his first utterance rather awkward. More intuitively, Henry 
should have hedged the content, thereby saying something along the lines of 
“This might be a barn”. In this case, his question whether he guessed correctly 
would be appropriate because the act is a guess, rather than a flat-out assertion. 
That being said, if Henry question “Did I guess correctly” in B is natural or 
appropriate, then he thereby seems to distance himself from the earlier act and 
admits that his grounds for making an assertion were insufficient.131    
Given that Henry lacked knowledge, this piece of data supports KA and 
CK. But it likewise supports the safety and certainty accounts, as Henry fails to be 
in these states, too. To wrap up, I want to make three final remarks. First, one 
important result is that the argument just described motivates objectivism over 
131 I don’t wish to claim that the strategy which relies on guessing extends over Gettier-
type of cases in general. The original “Ford” scenario, for instance, cannot be explained 
by appealing to it. Nonetheless, in my view, a more general disavowal maneuver applies 
equally well.  
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reasonabilism, as Henry’s assertion in B seems to satisfy all non-factive norms, 
contrary to the conclusion that it was incorrect. Secondly, the argument avoids 
Williamson’s and DeRose’s strategies in dealing with gettiered assertions, which 
I argued to fall short of explaining why such assertions are incorrect.132 Thirdly, 
the “disavowal of knowledge” can presumably be achieved more directly. Once 
he learned about the existence of fake barns, Henry might have disavowed his 
authority by retorting that he lacked knowledge. The fact that we wouldn’t 
normally mention safety or certainty in such a case might lend some further 
support for KA and CK. At least when it comes to certainty, this is of interest as 
we sometimes use this notion in assertoric practice to challenge a speaker’s 
statement by uttering “Are you certain?” (in Chapter 6, I do, however, argue that 
we shouldn’t understand such data as supporting the certainty account). But if 
someone were to distance herself from her previous assertion by remarking “I 
wasn’t certain after all”, we would not accept the implication that such high 
standards were appropriate for determining correctness of her assertion.  
4.6 The argument from presupposition 
In the previous chapter, I have mentioned the individuation feature of KA, 
according to which assertion is individuated by the knowledge rule. It was 
precisely on these grounds that Williamson (1996, 2000) attempts to disqualify 
the truth account, taking truth also to govern the speech act of conjectures. In a 
recent argument, García-Carpintero (MS1) aims to establish that the 
individuation feature turns on itself: the knowledge norm seems to govern the 
132 In his recent defense of a safety account, Pritchard (2014) follows Williamson and 
DeRose and pursues the same strategy.   
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“ancillary”133 speech act of presupposing which, if true, would entail that it cannot 
be individuating of assertion. Instead, García-Carpintero (2004) argues, we 
should think that the norm of assertion is transfer of knowledge, ruling an 
assertion that p to be correct only if one’s audience comes thereby to be in a 
position to know p.    
  Williamson (1996, 2000) discusses three motivations for KA, based on 
lottery propositions,134 Moorean sentences, and conversational challenges. As 
García-Carpintero (MS1) attempts to show, each of these points may apply 
equally well to the knowledge account of presupposition. If so, they would fail to 
secure the core, individuation thesis which was one of the main tenets of 
Williamson’s conception of constitutive rules, as we saw in Chapter 3.      
 Let us start by considering the argument from lottery propositions,135 as used 
in support of KA. Imagine you bought a ticket in a large lottery, with the chances 
of winning as low as one in a million. The drawing has already taken place, but 
we still don’t know who is the winner. If I were to assert on probabilistic 
grounds that “your ticket did not win”, I would be acting inappropriately136 even 
if, in fact, your ticket is a loser and the probabilistic grounds are excellent.137     
133 The characterization of speech acts as “ancillary” goes back at least to Searle (1969) 
who deemed referring a propositional act (1969: 24), occurring within another speech 
act. To give an example, by uttering “Sam smokes habitually” one refers to Sam when 
making a statement about him. Another such propositional act is predicating.    
134 While two other type of data were already noticed by Unger (1975), Williamson 
seems to be the first to introduce the lottery propositions, probably influenced by the 
lottery paradox. 
135  The original argument is presented in Williamson (1996, 2000) and further 
developed in Hawthorne (2004). Weiner (2005), Hill & Schechter (2007) and Lackey 
(2007, 2008) offer Gricean solution to the problem, although the details of their 
accounts differ. McGlynn (2014) is sympathetic to Weiner’s proposal. Pritchard (2014) 
claims norms weaker than KA, such as his “safety norm” accounts for the data.  
136 Lackey (2008:137) disagrees with this, emphasizing that a reasonable assertion is eo 
ipso correct. In line with my reply to the twin argument, one can consider a case where 
a lottery assertion turns out to be false, which would in turn give rise to a retraction.     
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 Imagine someone uttering, in the exact same conditions, “your losing ticket 
fell on the ground”. The utterance still strikes us as incorrect, although it is now 
the presupposition that the ticket is a loser which is to blame, and the 
presupposition is not an assertion. Just as with the assertion, the needed authority 
seems to be missing: it seems inappropriate to presuppose that the ticket is a 
loser if one doesn’t know that this is so. This appears to be the first case for the 
knowledge account of presupposition.   
 Moving on to Moorean sentences, it has been widely argued that asserting “p 
and I don’t know that p” is deeply problematic.138 As it happens, the knowledge 
account of presupposition is equally strong: if one was to utter “My brother is 
coming to town, but I don’t know that I have a brother”, the act would come 
across as absurd. As the possessive triggers the presupposition that I have a 
brother, I cannot go on to deny I know it, despite not having asserted it.   
 Finally, it is often pointed out that conversational challenges, in particular 
“how do you know that p?”, support KA.139 Undeniably, KA is in an excellent 
position to explain the appropriateness of raising such a challenge: by stressing 
that one must know that p when asserting it, it makes perfect sense to inquire 
whether one has the needed authority. In turn, García-Carpintero argues that 
there is an analogous type of data for presupposition––von Fintel’s “hey, wait a 
minute, I did not know this” test.140 The test is said to distinguish between 
presupposition and assertion: while it would be appropriate to reply to the 
utterance above by saying “hey, wait a minute, I didn’t know you have a 
brother”, it would be inappropriate to retort “hey, wait a minute, I didn’t know 
137 Excellent probabilistic grounds for believing a true proposition can be argued to 
count as knowledge. See Hill and Schechter (2007) and Reed (2010) for the view that 
lottery assertions can be known. The first pair of authors, in addition, go on to discredit 
KA.   
138 I discuss these data in more detail in the next chapter.  
139 Chapter 5 examines this type of linguistic data.  
140 von Fintel gives credit to Shannon (1976). 
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you are going to pick him up at the airport”. Such a question overlooks that the 
point of asserting is precisely to provide the new information, which is why the 
speaker will typically make statements her addressee would not know.     
4.6.1 Challenging the presuppositions 
I would like to make two remarks about García-Carpintero’s argument. First, it 
is not obvious that we need to introduce von Fintel’s test, at least not judging 
from the way the dialectic has been set up. For, the main idea was to show that 
the three types of data Williamson offers for the knowledge account of assertion 
apply equally well to the knowledge account of presupposition. Having seen that 
both Moorean sentences and lottery propositions can motivate knowledge 
account of presupposition, all it takes to complete the argument is to show that 
presuppositions can be conversationally challenged. And given that this can 
indeed be shown, von Fintel’s test (which is not a conversational challenge) is not 
strictly speaking necessary.      
      When Jane’s sister announces that Jane has stopped beating her husband, she 
can be rightly challenged: “How do you know that Jane used to beat her spouse?”. 
Few remarks are in place. If the challenge raised was only “How do you know 
that?”, it would target the assertion, rather than a presupposition. But this is as it 
should be – for, once again, we are trying to show that Williamson’s data apply 
equally well to both assertion and presupposition. Indeed, in order to challenge 
the presupposition naturally, it only takes to make the challenge more explicit: 
“You are presupposing that Jane used to beat her husband. How do you know 
that?”. Further, challenges such as “Are you sure Jane used to beat her husband” 
can be counted in as a datum. Of course, this will not work for all 
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presuppositions. But nor would it work for all assertions, either. The same 
applies to von Fintel’s test to which I now turn.141  
4.6.2 von Fintel’s objection 
While it is undeniable that the parallel drawn between conversational challenges 
and von Fintel’s test holds, it is not obvious that there is the “same pattern” 
emerging among these phenomena. As a matter of fact, we can found more 
similar patterns in some other objections, or so I will argue.  
  To observe the similarities between conversational challenges and von 
Fintel’s test, it is instructive to look at the cases when the speaker is making an 
“informative presupposition”, the content of which is not in the common 
ground.142 In asking von Fintel’s question, one is asking both “whether the 
speaker knew the presupposed proposition” and “whether or not it is common 
knowledge”. Should the presupposition indeed turn out to be informative, the 
speaker would make an incorrect presupposition.143  
 In reply, one may point to disanalogies between conversational challenges 
and von Fintel’s test, and urge that the occurrences of “know” in “how do you 
know that?” and in “hey, wait a minute, I didn’t know that!” play rather different 
roles. To show this, compare the consequences of failing to reply satisfactorily to 
a conversational challenge and to von Fintel’s test. In the former case, a failure to 
offer an adequate reply, while sticking to the same assertion, amounts to an 
implicit Moorean sentence “p but I don’t know that p”, and leads to rejection of 
141 Thanks to Sven Rosenkranz for discussion.  
142 On García-Carpintero’s account, a proposition p is in the common ground of a group 
G iff p is common knowledge in G, where p is common knowledge in G when 
everybody in G accepts p, everybody accepts that everybody accepts p, and so on.   
143 The correctness conditions are phrased in terms of a biconditional: a presupposition 
that p is correct iff it is mutually known that p.    
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the assertion challenged. Yet, the same hardly applies to von Fintel’s “hey, wait a 
minute” test. Under the assumption that the speaker’s concession that p was not 
in the common ground counts as an unsatisfactory reply,144 the consequences 
would typically be milder. This, I want to suggest, is a feature of von Fintel’s 
test, which need not occur if we used an analogous challenge. Before exploring 
such a possibility, notice that von Fintel’s test need not even signal one’s 
ignorance about the content presupposed. For, in uttering “hey, wait a minute, I 
didn’t know you have a brother”, one thereby affirms that one learned I have a 
brother. Oftentimes, one thereby only indicates that one lacked the relevant 
knowledge before the presupposition was discerned.    
 Instead of relying on von Fintel’s test, it would be more helpful to consider 
alternative ways of questioning one’s presupposition. As said, von Fintel’s 
objection rarely amounts to a rejection of the presupposition, and it seems we 
need precisely this feature if we want to pursue the analogy with conversational 
challenges.  
 Consider a case in which we venture to presuppose what others won’t have 
reasons to think that we know, or even believe. This would introduce the 
content that was not updated in the conversational score, and would amount to 
an incorrect presupposition. It seems that, at least in some cases, it would be less 
natural to use von Fintel’s objection, in place of stronger objections such as “hey, 
wait a minute, I never accepted that” or “hey, wait a minute, I’m not sure about 
that”. Not only that they exhibit the “same pattern” outlined above, but they can 
actually challenge the presupposition and, in case of an inadequate answer, reject 
it without accommodating it.    
144 An adequate reply to such a test can take several forms. One of them is to point out 
that the addressee was in fact informed of the presupposed content: “what do you mean, 
I have told you I have a brother. You must have forgotten”. Another one is to admit the 
addressee is right and now assert the presupposed content: “well, I have a brother, and I 
need to pick him up at the airport”.  
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 Unlike von Fintel’s objection, the “accept” and “sure” variants are not useful 
as a test for distinguishing between presupposition and assertion. For instance, 
replying “hey, wait a minute, I never accepted that” can be used to demand from 
the speaker to further justify her assertion. But this shouldn’t worry us as long as 
they can be appropriately used to challenge presuppositions. The two objections 
exhibit “the same pattern” mentioned above, addressing both the speaker’s 
knowledge of the presupposition as well as challenging whether it was the 
common knowledge. To see this, consider García-Carpintero’s example, where 
one is asked for the opinion about the philosophy talk one just attended, and 
replies: “You know, as usual with this guy, premised on the typical Fregean 
confusion of semantics with psychology”. If we do not share such “confusion” to 
begin with, the presupposition can be challenged with “hey, wait a minute, I 
never accepted that”. In sum, I think that the data from conversational challenges 
can be compared to the available objections to presuppositions, and the similarity 
can be observed more easily with the “accept” and “sure” objections. 
4.6.3 Distinguishing assertion from presupposition 
The argument from presupposition, as we have seen, threatens to undermine the 
claim that knowledge is individuating of assertion: Williamson’s motivation for 
KA presents equally good reasons to regard knowledge as being constitutive of 
presupposition, too.   
 An obvious reply is that the argument challenges only Williamson’s defense of 
KA. To remedy this problem, one need not abandon KA: it would suffice to offer 
further arguments in its favor. As I am interested in defending an alternative, CK 
approach to assertion, I will leave this possibility aside.   
 Another line of thought might be to argue that the norm of presupposition is 
stronger than that of assertion. This way, knowledge would remain individuating 
4. Asserting as Commitment to Knowing
    __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
117	  
of assertion, while it would form a part of the presupposition norm. This kind of 
manoeuver might extend to other speech acts: e.g., the condition of knowledge 
enters the constitutive norm of swearing, although the rule of swearing is stronger 
than that of knowledge. This hypothesis would hardly work, however. At least 
on the given prescriptive account, a presupposition is incorrect because it is not 
yet in the common ground, and the way its content enters the conversational 
score is precisely by means of an assertion. Notice, further, that there is no 
additional constraint on the correctness of presupposition. Its norm does seem to 
be intimately linked to knowledge, and it is not stronger than it.   
 The third approach might be to contend that knowledge is central to 
assertion, but for different reasons than those outlined by KA. This way, we 
could keep knowledge as constitutive of presupposition and introduce a further 
variation on normative account of assertion, namely CK. To motivate this 
strategy, start by noticing that presupposition is not a speech act on a par with 
other illocutionary forces (apart from referring, perhaps). 145  Instead, as 
mentioned, it is an ancillary speech act we use in performing other illocutionary 
acts. Its closest kin is arguably assertion, at least for the following reason: when 
an incorrect presupposition is objected to, the speaker replies to it by now 
asserting the same content (something she should have done initially). The same 
content can now enter as a presupposition, on the grounds already met by the 
performance of correct assertion. How are we to capture this normative relation 
between the two speech acts?  
 One tempting way to do this is by noting that before responding to von 
Fintel’s objection and asserting the content previously presupposed, the speaker 
committed herself to knowing its content. On this approach, the difference between 
asserting and presupposing would consist in that, in the former case, one is 
committing oneself to knowing the explicitly expressed content, while in the 
145 See Searle (1969) 
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latter case, one is committing oneself to knowing the implicitly expressed 
content.  
(CK*)  Committing oneself to knowing the proposition explicitly expressed 
counts as asserting. 
This would be too quick, however, as presuppositions can also be explicitly 
expressed. Consider the following utterance:    
(9) Julie doesn’t know that she will have a surprise party. 
In asserting (9), the speaker is presupposing the content of the subordinate 
clause, namely that Julie will have a surprise party. Given that the speaker appears 
to be committing herself to knowing this content, it would follow that the 
content is asserted, rather than presupposed. This was Geach’s (1965) proposal, 
according to which the speaker performs a “double-barreled” assertion: in 
uttering (9), she asserts both that Julie doesn’t know that she will have a surprise party 
and that Julie will have a surprise party. Geach’s approach doesn’t survive the 
scrutiny, however, as the proposition expressed by the subordinate clause 
satisfies key tests for presuppositions. As to the phenomenon of projection (“the 
hallmark of presuppositions”, Beaver and Geurts, 2011), when (9) is embedded 
under negation, as an antecedent of a conditional or in a question among other 
contexts, the proposition that Julie will have a surprise party will still be present. 
Likewise, von Fintel’s test applies equally well (“Hey, wait a minute, I didn’t 
know Julie will have a surprise party”). Thus, CK* cannot be the right 
interpretation of CK.    
 In turn, I suggest, we can specify the relation “to express” from CK in the 
following manner: a proposition p is expressed iff there is a sentence s of which 
the speaker makes a free-standing use such that p is, or is part of, the truth 
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condition of s. In (9), the speaker does use sentence “She will have a surprise 
party”. However, it is not free-standing, but occurs as a subordinate clause of a 
larger sentence. Accordingly, the speaker does not assert that Julie will have a 
surprise party.146  
     To motivate this kind of approach, note once again that presupposition is an 
ancillary speech act – as such, it is performed in the company of the main speech 
act, which in this case is that of assertion. The fact that we sometimes help 
ourselves to presuppositional contents, when making assertions, is reflected in 
our commitment to knowing such contents: due to the ancillary nature of 
presupposition, whenever we commit ourselves to knowing assertoric and 
presuppositional content, the assertoric content will be expressed by a free-
standing, larger sentence.     
  On an alternative strategy, the difference between presupposition and 
assertion is reflected in the norms governing these acts. Unlike assertion, 
governed by the transfer of knowledge norm, the presupposed content need not 
be transferred knowledge in order to be correct. Instead, it ought to be already 
in the common grounds. Although such an approach is elegant and tailor-made to 
address the present issue, it is not without problems of its own. In particular, it is 
unclear why we should think of transfer of knowledge as a norm of assertion, 
rather than its aim. As Williamson suggests, (crediting McDowell, Evans and 
Recanati) assertion is needed in order for knowledge to be transferred within a 
linguistic community (2000:267). With this in mind, why would we conflate 
146 Alston (2000: 116–20) offers a similar solution, according to which the proposition 
that Julie will have a surprise party is not “explicitly presented” by the declarative sentence 
(9)––and accordingly, not asserted––due to the lack of isomorphism between the 
sentence (9) and that proposition. Unlike CK, Alston maintains that asserting that p 
commits one only to the truth of the proposition, making the position vulnerable to 
worries against TA, such as Williamson’s argument that the truth norm is not 
individuating of assertion (as it governs conjectures) and the problem that the assertion 
will be deemed correct even if the speaker is liable to criticism.      
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such a teleological point with a normative one? Or better, why should one and 
the same condition state both the aim of, and the norm of correctness for, a given 
act? What would be lost if, instead, we took transfer of knowledge to be the aim, 
and knowledge to be the norm of the illocutionary act?147   
 Another worry for the transfer of knowledge account, although less 
problematical in my view, was formulated by Pelling (2013a). Recall that 
according to this account, it is correct to assert that p only if one’s audience 
comes thereby to be in a position to know that p. As Pelling argues, the concept 
of “being in a position to know”, borrowed from Williamson, is worrisome:   
To be in a position to know p, it is neither necessary to know p nor 
sufficient to be physically and psychologically capable of knowing p. No 
obstacle must block one’s path to knowing p. If one is in a position to know 
p, and one has done what one is in a position to do to decide whether p is 
true, then one does know p. The fact is open to one’s view, unhidden, even 
if one does not yet see it. Thus being in a position to know, like knowing 
and unlike being physically and psychologically capable of knowing, is 
factive: if one is in a position to know p, then p is true (Williamson, 2000: 
95). 
To make sense of the worry, imagine that Camper makes the assertion so quietly 
that nobody can hear it. While the assertion would nevertheless be made 
correctly, the audience would not be in a position to know its content.    
 Pelling’s worry, perhaps, might be allayed by avoiding Williamson’s concept 
and pursuing a more dispositionalist account. Alternatively, following Pelling, 
one might simply reorient one’s account of assertion, away from the speaker, and 
assign the central role to the hearer. On this approach, it is correct to assert that 
p only if it is fit to give a hearer knowledge that p. Since the assertion above is 
147 Thanks to Janet Levin for helpful discussions on this point. 
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indeed fit to give a hearer such knowledge, no problem arises. In the next 
chapter, I discuss two arguments which pursue this line, and argue that they 
should ultimately be dismissed.    
4.6.4 Final remarks 
I have examined two sets of arguments against the hybrid CK view I set out to 
defend. While the first type of objection raised a worry about defining assertion 
in terms of commitment, the second type of objection questioned whether 
knowledge is the necessary condition for correct assertion. I hope to have shown 
that CK is indeed equipped to dismiss with such challenges. Further, I have 
introduced a new normative consequence, that of disavowing knowledge, and 
argued it supports the norms of knowledge (and perhaps safety) over the rival 
objectivist accounts. Finally, following the lead from Alston, I tried to explain 
how assertion is to be distinguished from presupposition in normative terms.    
5 
The Role of the Audience 
The communicative aspect of assertion can hardly be overestimated: not only that it 
is “our main vehicle for transmitting the information”,148 but any further end it may 
be used for – to give advise or compliment, to warn or predict – assertions are 
directed towards the audience.149 With such pre-theoretical characterization in place, 
it is to be expected of a normative theory to account for the role of the audience. 
Yet, as Pelling (2013a) observes, most views on the table have disregarded this 
aspect, portraying the correctness condition of assertion as depending “purely on the 
relation between the asserter and the proposition asserted” (2013a: 293). This kind 
of “epistemic relationism”, as Pelling calls it, has been endorsed by a majority of 
theorists, in particular those espousing the norms of belief, justification, and 
knowledge.    
Pelling’s worry is important and rarely observed in the literature.150 As a side 
remark, the extent to which it applies is somewhat more limited than Pelling takes it 
148 Buckwalter & Turri (2014: 16).  
149 As noted before, there are cases where assertion lacks any audience whatsoever. I leave 
them aside as a relatively rare and plausibly derived phenomenon.    
150  To my knowledge, it has only been discussed by García-Carpintero (2004) who 
develops Evans’ (1982:310) point that “communication is essentially a mode of the 
transmission of knowledge”.  
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to be. For, it would seem that the justification account, on at least some of its 
versions, does not neglect the role of the hearer. Think again of Lackey’s 
reasonableness condition. 151  As I insisted in Chapter 2, the criterion of 
“reasonableness” is plausibly determined by the linguistic community and not by the 
speaker herself. On this picture, I assert correctly only if what I assert is reasonable 
for both me and my audience. Thus, although the norm itself – “one asserts that p 
correctly only if it is reasonable for one to believe that p”152 does not mention the 
hearer explicitly, the standard of “reasonableness” is determined by the competent 
audience, too. 153       
Unlike Lackey’s norm, KA cannot plausibly be understood as making reference 
to the hearer. Instead, the hearer must be added to the picture, as in: “one asserts 
correctly only if one knows that p and the hearer thereby learns or is in a position to 
learn that p”. This seems to be the most simple and straightforward solution. Yet, it 
is not KA anymore. On another proposal, pursued by Pelling, an assertion is correct 
only if it is fit to give a hearer the knowledge of its content. On Pelling’s approach, 
the speaker is now substituted for the hearer. By failing to introduce the speaker, the 
strategy falls short of delivering an interpersonal account. I find this result somewhat 
surprising as one would expect the hearer to be introduced at a lesser cost. Just as we 
conceded that the hearer’s importance has unjustifiably been ignored, Pelling’s 
proposal is now guilty of leaving out the more obvious role of the speaker.       
In supporting this kind of strategy, Pelling offers the argument from existentially 
known assertions (section 5.1) and uses for this purpose Lackey’s argument from 
151 I here assume that reasonableness just is a way of cashing out justification.   
152 This is one of the two necessary conditions Lackey posits, the other being that the 
assertion that p is made at least in part because it is reasonable for the speaker to believe 
that p.  
153 The exception are those cases when the speaker is the relevant community. For instance, 
it might be plausible that at one point in time, Copernicus was the only relevant assessor of 
the heliocentric claim.   
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selfless assertion (section 5.2). This chapter examines these two arguments in detail, 
and ends with a proposal of how KA and CK can accommodate the interpersonal 
nature of assertion.  
5.1 Existentially known assertions154	  
There is a commonly made distinction between knowing the truth of a sentence and 
knowing what is expressed by that sentence (Donnellan 1979: 51). One may know 
that “quarks combine to form hadrons” is true, given the reliability of the source, 
without knowing what the sentence means. In such cases, it seems appropriate to 
describe one’s knowledge as “existential”: 155  one knows that the proposition 
expressed by the sentence “quarks combine to form hadrons” is true, without 
knowing which proposition this is. The main issue in this section will be how to 
characterize a speech act of uttering a sentence that expresses a proposition one only 
knows existentially.     
 Pelling (2013a, 2013b) argues that such speech acts should be understood as 
assertions which are existentially known. According to this proposal, A makes an 
existentially known assertion (henceforth: EK assertion) if and only if the following 
three conditions hold:  
(i)  A knows that the sentence she uses to make the assertion expresses a true 
proposition.     
(ii)  A makes the assertion based on that knowledge. 
154 This section is published in The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261): 813–821.  
155 See Pelling (2013a: 308) for the origin of the name. I avoid using Pelling’s “for some 
proposition”, as it may suggest that there may be more than one proposition expressed by a 
single sentence.   
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(iii)  A does not know, believe, or have a justification to believe the particular 
proposition she asserts (Pelling 2013a: 308).     
When (i) – (iii) are satisfied, the speaker asserts the proposition expressed by the 
sentence she utters, such as that quarks combine to form hadrons. At first sight, Pelling’s 
suggestion may seem uncontroversial and inviting. However, once we grant that EK 
assertions can be made correctly––which should appear as an equally natural 
assumption––we give up the fairly intuitive idea that a speaker’s belief in, 
justification for and knowledge of a proposition are necessary conditions for the 
correct assertion of that proposition. Accordingly, Pelling’s argument would 
undermine in one fell swoop the norms of belief (Bach 2007; Hindriks 2007), 
rational credibility (Douven 2006), reasonableness (Lackey 2007, 2008), justification 
(Kvanvig 2009), transfer of knowledge 156  (García-Carpintero 2004), certainty 
(Stanley 2008), and arguably the most prominent, the knowledge norm of assertion 
(Unger 1975; Williamson 1996, 2000; DeRose 2002; Hawthorne 2004; Schaffer 
2008; Benton 2011):    
(KA)         It is correct to assert that p only if one knows that p.  
Although several views in the literature seem equipped to deal with EK assertions,157 
Pelling’s own solution is revisory in a further respect. Pelling suggests, along the 
lines of García-Carpintero (2004), that we abandon the “speaker-centered” 
formulation, vital to KA, and shift the norm away from the speaker’s epistemic state 
156 On the face of it, the transfer of knowledge account––“one must assert p only if one’s 
audience comes thereby to be in a position to know p” (2004: 156)––is compatible with the 
possibility that the speaker does not know the proposition expressed. However, on García-
Carpintero’s variant of the view, this possibility is excluded. See footnote 158.  
157 In addition to Pelling’s (2013b) and Pritchard’s (2014) safety account, the truth rule 
(Weiner 2005; Whiting 2013; MacFarlane 2014) is also equipped to address the issue.     
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and onto the hearer’s. He thus proposes a “hearer-centered” view, the knowledge 
provision account:    
 (KP)   It is correct to assert that p only if asserting p is fit to give a hearer the 
knowledge that p (Pelling, 2013a: 294).       
However, unlike García-Carpintero (2004), 158 Pelling allows for the possibility that 
an assertion can be correct even if the speaker does not know the truth of the 
proposition, so long as the assertion is fit to impart propositional knowledge to the 
hearer. This is in fact how Pelling accommodates EK assertions while still 
maintaining that the concept of knowledge is central to the constitutive norm of 
assertion. Hence, unless KA can offer an alternative solution for the class of EK 
assertions, Pelling’s account would suggest we move towards his hearer-centered 
view.    
In this section, I analyze two of Pelling’s scenarios that he claims involve EK 
assertions: “TELLING THE TIME” and “POINTING WITHOUT SEEING”.  Since 
KA can be seen as a consequence of CK, my aim is to show that Pelling’s argument 
against KA is inconclusive, as it relies on two assumptions, both of which can be 
resisted. I also offer alternatives to those two assumptions and show how KA can 
explain EK assertions. If my strategy turns out to be viable, it could be applied across 
the board to the other accounts mentioned, including those which invoke the norms 
of belief and justification.  
158 KA is seen as an “illocutionary consequence” (134) of García-Carpintero’s transmission 
of knowledge rule––“like Williamson’s KR, the (transfer of knowledge) norm still 
requires…that the act be connected with the truth-maker so as to allow for knowledge. 
Thus, although both views are hearer-centered, García-Carpintero’s account is a hearer-
oriented variant of KA, unlike Pelling’s proposal which departs from KA.    
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5.1.1 “Telling the time” 
The first scenario in which Pelling introduces EK assertions is as follows: 
TELLING THE TIME: “French holidaymakers Sophie and Marc are visiting 
England. A stranger asks them the time. Marc doesn’t speak English, and so 
doesn’t understand the question. Sophie does speak English, however, and she 
knows it is exactly five o’clock. Sophie wants to be helpful, but since she is too 
shy to reply to the stranger herself, she tells Marc to say “it’s five o’clock”. Marc 
doesn’t understand that sentence, so he doesn’t know which proposition it 
expresses. This sort of thing has happened before, however, and Marc knows 
that the sentence must express some true proposition, or else Sophie would not 
have told him to say it. On the basis of that knowledge, Marc says to the 
stranger ‘it’s five o’clock’. Marc himself has no idea what the time is” (Pelling 
2013a: 308). 
In order for Pelling’s argument against KA to get off the ground, we must grant the 
following three assumptions: (1) Marc is making a genuine assertion; (2) the 
propositional content of Marc’s speech act is that it is five o’clock; and (3) Marc’s 
speech act is normatively correct. Since Marc does not know the propositional 
content of his utterance, KA seems to have considerable difficulty in showing that 
Marc’s assertion, if it is one, can be correct.   
If KA is to be saved, at least one of the assumptions (1)–(3) has got to give. In 
what follows, I will grant the last assumption but argue that we have good reasons to 
resist both (1) and (2), which would yield Pelling’s argument against KA 
inconclusive. In addition, I will offer two alternative assumptions, (1*) and (2*), and 
present them in the context of two strategies that support KA.   
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5.1.1.1 Asserting meta-linguistic content 
Adopting one approach, the KA theorist may deny assumption (2) according to 
which by uttering the declarative sentence “It is five o’clock”, Marc asserts that it is 
five o’clock. The other two assumptions, (1) and (3)––namely, that Marc makes a 
genuine assertion and that he does so in a normatively correct fashion––can be 
granted.  
On the face of it, assumption (2) may not strike one as implausible; after all, it is 
five o’clock is the conventional meaning of the sentence Marc utters and people 
generally convey this proposition by uttering that string of words. Yet, although this 
seems to hold in the majority of cases, the role of the context described in 
“TELLING THE TIME” is peculiar and may lead us to a different reading in the end. 
To show this, observe that Marc is not a competent speaker of the language and does 
not understand what he utters. Instead, he merely reproduces the words Sophie 
whispers to him. Is it plausible to think, then, that (2*) Marc may be asserting the 
meta-linguistic content that “It is five o’clock” is true? Marc’s linguistic and epistemic 
position, as well as his dependence on Sophie, makes an affirmative reply to this 
question a live option.     
If we allow for (2*), namely that Marc does assert such meta-linguistic content in 
place of the conventional content, KA would be on safe ground: (1) Marc makes a 
genuine assertion, namely (2*) that “It is five o’clock” is true, and (3) he does so in a 
normatively correct way. Furthermore, Marc cannot fail to know that the 
proposition expressed by the sentence he utters is true: that much is secured by the 
scenario and Sophie’s reliability. Since this option is not ruled out by Pelling’s 
argument, unless we are given a good reason to think that Marc does not actually 
assert that meta-linguistic content, then KA seems well-equipped to handle this kind 
of objection.    
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     5.1.1.2 The proffering strategy     
A proponent of KA may adopt an alternative approach: instead of denying 
assumption (2), she may keep the propositional content intact, but now reject 
assumption (1) and insist that Pelling misidentifies Marc’s speech act. 
According to the scenario, Marc utters a declarative sentence which is generally 
used to make an assertion. That is why it is natural to think that Marc manages to 
assert, although it is less than obvious that he actually does; due to the peculiarity of 
the context, this assumption can be weakened.    
On its own, an utterance of the declarative sentence “It is five o’clock” is not 
always used to convey the illocutionary act of assertion. Instead, one may use it when 
guessing what time it is. On such an occasion, the pragmatic mechanism at work 
would cancel the assertoric force of the utterance. Likewise, similar considerations 
may apply in Marc’s situation and render his speech act different from assertion.     
To examine what speech act Marc is performing, consider conveying a coded 
message. An agent utters a declarative sentence she does not understand, while being 
aware that the recipient of the message will grasp the information it contains. In such 
a setting, it would be unusual to say that the agent is asserting the content.159 Instead, 
we should look for an alternative way to express the act of communicating the 
message. Let us call such a speech act proffering.160   
159 If the speaker knew the meaning of the code, it would be more common to describe the 
situation as one of asserting.    
160 I borrow the term from von Fintel and Gillies (2007: 44). Note, however, that von Fintel 
and Gillies use the term in its ordinary sense, where “proffering” roughly means “offering for 
acceptance”; accordingly, all assertions would turn out to be a kind of “proffering”, contrary 
to my intention here. Roberts (2004) uses it as “a cover term for what is asserted in an 
assertion”.  
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If we introduce an alternative assumption (1*), according to which the 
illocutionary force of Marc’s speech act is that of proffering rather than of assertion, 
it allows us to keep assumption (2), that the propositional content of Marc’s speech 
act is that it is five o’clock. It is important to mention that the proffered content is that 
it is five o’clock, not that “It is five o’clock” is true. Consequently, having ruled out the 
assumption that Marc’s speech act is an assertion, KA does not apply and thus the 
problem is avoided.        
Although the phenomenon of proffering is too rare for it to have a name in 
ordinary language, it makes perfect sense to think of it as a distinctive kind of speech 
act different from asserting. For instance, if Marc declined to proffer upon Sophie’s 
request, perhaps it would be strange to say that Marc refused to assert; if the 
Englishman reported the event, it would sound odd to describe Marc as having made 
an assertion, and so on.   
Just as assertion is governed by knowledge, one may argue that proffering is 
governed by existential knowledge. Since Marc satisfies the epistemic requirement, 
he would perform the speech act correctly, in accordance with assumption (3). 
Furthermore, this proposal is in the spirit of a broader, normative speech act theory 
that assumes the truth of KA.    
Finally, by arguing that Marc proffers rather than asserts, we also manage to save 
a rather plausible claim that all competent asserters are also competent speakers. KP 
on the other hand must abandon that claim; according to KP, Marc falls into the 
former but not the latter category.     
This completes the second strategy for dealing with the “TELLING THE TIME” 
scenario. It is important to emphasize that in uttering “It is five o’clock”, Marc is not 
performing two speech acts (namely, asserting and proffering) with the same 
content. This is not to say, however, that the two strategies cannot be combined: 
one may argue that Marc both asserts that “It is five o’clock” is true and proffers that it 
is five o’clock. Such a proposal introduces two speech acts with two distinct 
contents. By opting for this third solution, we would grant all three of Pelling’s 
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assumptions: (1) Marc makes a genuine assertion (even though he performs an 
additional speech act); (2) the propositional content of one of Marc’s speech acts is 
that it is five o’clock (although this content is not asserted, but proffered) and (3) 
Marc’s speech act is normatively correct (in fact, both of his speech acts are). In 
summary, KA is consistent with (1)–(3) under the assumption that the content of (2) 
need not be conveyed by the speech act in (1), just as the speech act in (1) need not 
convey the content of (2).    
5.1.2 “Pointing without seeing” 
Let us now consider the second scenario which Pelling (2013a) introduces in his 
discussion of EK assertions:   
POINTING WITHOUT SEEING: “Although Bill knows there is a coloured 
object in the corner, he hasn’t seen it himself. Without looking at the object, 
Bill points to it and says ‘that object has that shade’. Bill doesn’t know the truth161 
of the particular demonstrative proposition he asserts. Indeed he does not even 
grasp it: since he hasn’t seen the object, he doesn’t possess the relevant 
demonstrative concepts of either ‘that object’ or ‘that shade’. Bill does know, 
however, that given the way in which the references of the demonstratives are 
fixed by his act of pointing, whatever proposition he asserts, it is one which 
must be true. Bill asserts what he does on the basis of that knowledge.” (Pelling 
2013a: 308) (italics added) 
161  It would be more accurate to say that Bill does not know the meaning of the 
proposition, rather than that he does not know its truth because, according to the scenario, 
“Bill does know” that the same proposition “must be true”.  
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Imagine that Bill is pointing to a chair and its brown shade. There are two options as 
to what Bill is asserting. On the one hand, he may be asserting a general proposition, 
along the lines of (1):  
(1) The object I am pointing to has the shade it actually does. 
This option cannot be what Pelling has in mind, however, for Bill knows that he is 
pointing at a colored object as well as that all colored objects have the shade they 
actually have. Consequently, if Bill asserted (1), he would actually know its content, 
in accordance with KA. Instead, Pelling should demand that Bill asserts a singular 
proposition, such as: 
(2) That chair has that shade of brown. 
Now, if Bill asserts the singular proposition (2) and his interlocutor Jill is looking at 
the salient object, then in order for Bill’s assertion to be correct, he would have to 
know the exact same content Jill does. But how could he achieve this without 
knowing which object he is pointing at? It seems that Pelling only needs to show that 
Bill asserts (2) correctly in order to argue against KA. 
5.1.3 Two strategies for saving the knowledge account 
I want to argue that the proponent of KA can adopt two strategies to explain why 
Bill’s utterance counts as a correct speech act. In turn, these strategies can be 
presented as two horns of a dilemma for Pelling.    
 Assume, on the first horn, that Bill grasps the proposition expressed. The 
advocate of KA can insist that the relevant object and its color property may appear 
under different modes of presentation or guises. For Jill, who perceives the chair, the 
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object and its color appear under a mode of presentation that allows her to entertain 
the proposition that that chair has a brown shade in just these terms. For Bill, in 
contrast, they appear under a different mode of presentation, i.e. that object has that 
shade: it is true enough that this mode of presentation is not very informative, but it 
still follows that Bill knows the same proposition as Jill does.162 Given that Bill knows 
the proposition asserted, KA can successfully be defended from Pelling’s challenge. 
What is more, according to this proposal, Bill does not merely have existential 
knowledge, as Marc did, but knowledge proper.      
Suppose, on the second horn of the dilemma, that Bill does not grasp the 
propositional content. KA theorist can revert to the alternative strategy of 
proffering. For illustrative purposes, think again of signalling a code. Bill knows that 
by uttering a string of words he will manage to convey a certain message, without 
really knowing what the message is. Given the way we ordinarily use the verb, it 
would sound counterintuitive to say that Bill manages to assert the message. Instead, 
as I propose above, we should better describe him as proffering the message. Since Bill 
would not be making any assertion according to this proposal, the threat to KA 
would not arise either. In addition, one may argue that the norm of proffering is 
existential knowledge, in which case Bill would proffer correctly, as he knows that 
by uttering “that object has that shade”, he will convey some true proposition.  
162 Likewise, we may conceive of further cases: if Jill could identify the shade of brown as a 
chestnut shade, say, she may have entertained the proposition using the sentence “That 
chair has a chestnut shade”, and so on. Again, the propositional content would stay the 
same and KA could explain how Bill knows the same assertion as Jill does.   
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5.2 Selfless assertions 
I now turn to the second argument against the speaker-centered norms of assertion, 
put forward by Lackey (2007), who draws attention to the class of “selfless 
assertion”. Let us say that an assertion that p is selfless if and only if:     
(i)  a subject, for purely non-epistemic reasons, does not believe that p; 
(ii)  despite this lack of belief, the subject is aware that p is very well supported by 
all of the available evidence;  and   
(iii)  because of this, the subject asserts that p without believing that p. (Lackey, 
2007: 599) 
If selfless assertions are a genuine class of speech acts, it is intuitive to think that they 
can be made correctly. Yet, according to premiss (ii), the speaker would be asserting 
correctly while lacking the relevant belief, and thus knowledge, contrary to KA. 
That notwithstanding, there are at least two initial reasons to be suspicious that 
selfless assertions could be made correctly. One worry is that such a possibility rules 
out the speaker’s belief in p as a necessary condition for correctly asserting p––a 
claim agreed upon by most theorists within the normative tradition.163 Another 
misgiving is that by conjoining a report of one’s own attitude towards a selfless 
assertion, namely disbelief, one thereby utters a Moorean sentence: “p and I don’t 
believe that p”, and ends up making an assertion which is simultaneously both correct 
and absurd.164         
These worries might still fail to dissuade one from maintaining that selfless 
assertions can be made correctly. On the one hand, one may pursue a less canonical 
163 Among others, this view is shared by proponents of the belief rule (Bach, 2007; 
Hindriks, 2007), the knowledge rule (Unger, 1975; Williamson, 1996, 2000; DeRose, 
2002; Hawthorne, 2004), the transmission of knowledge rule (García-Carpintero, 2004) 
and the certainty rule (Stanley, 2008).        
164 Moorean absurdity is discussed in section 3 below.  
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account of assertion which does not require the speaker’s belief as a necessary 
condition for correct assertion. For instance, Pelling (2013a) and Pritchard (2014) 
argue that selfless assertions are made correctly for reasons pertaining to safety;165 
Wright (2014) appeals to different, virtue-theoretic considerations,166 while García-
Carpintero (MS1) introduces epistemic obligations.167 On the other hand, one may 
argue that while the assertions expressing Moorean absurdity are strictly speaking 
correct, they still fail to satisfy some further norm; to this extent, Lackey (2007) 
provides a Gricean strategy.         
In section 5.2.1 I examine two defenses of KA, by Montminy (2013) and Turri 
(2014), and motivate a departure from such responses. I discuss Lackey’s treatment 
of Moorean absurdity in section 5.2.2, where I claim that her argument rests on the 
false assumption that Moorean sentences are absurd solely due to being misleading. 
Section 5.2.3 develops two alternative takes on selfless assertions, both of which 
attempt to satisfy the following set of desiderata: (i) they should remain faithful to 
Lackey’s intuition about the correctness of the speech act performed; (ii) they should 
stay clear of Moorean absurdity; (iii) they should preserve the orthodox approach to 
165 Pelling (2013b) offers an alternative account that relies on the norm of knowledge 
provision.    
166 The relevant standard, according to Wright (2014), is “either what the intellectually 
virtuous person would believe or what the speakers would believe if they were more 
intellectually virtuous” (253). The protagonists of Lackey’s scenario fit this description, so 
they are epistemically positioned to properly believe what they assert, despite their refusal 
to believe: “if the psychological blocks were removed the speakers would come to have the 
beliefs that reflect their assertions” (253). Finally, Wright claims, by being in an epistemic 
position to properly believe p, one is also in a position to correctly assert that p.   
167 According to this approach, selfless assertions are made in a qualified manner: when 
pertinent, an epistemic obligation is ascribed to the speaker and the correctness condition 
shifts relatively to it. To anticipate the first scenario, the epistemic obligation of a teacher 
in asserting p consists of knowing that p is true according to the best scientific evidence. 
Thus, despite a personal belief that p is false, the protagonist’s epistemic state is sufficient 
to render the speech act correct: knowing that p is true according to the evolutionary 
theory and thus asserting p correctly qua teacher.   
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the necessity of belief for the correctness of assertion; and (iv) they should offer an 
account that obeys the knowledge rule. Although I remain neutral between the two 
views, I develop the approach which classifies “selfless assertions” as “presentations” 
in more detail; “presentations” are assertives168 distinct from genuine assertions in 
both the commitment the speaker incurs as well as the characteristic intention one 
typically has when performing them. The proposal is further motivated by allowing 
for the expansion of normative approaches to other assertives, a feature we may be 
interested in, in the light of a recent wave of normative accounts of speech acts.169 
     5.2.1 Two responses to Lackey’s argument 
To introduce the phenomenon of selfless assertions, let us start by considering the 
following scenario:      
CREATIONIST TEACHER. Stella is a devoutly Christian fourth-grade teacher, 
and her religious beliefs are grounded in a deep faith that she has had since she 
was a very young child. Part of this faith includes a belief in the truth of 
creationism and, accordingly, a belief in the falsity of evolutionary theory. 
Despite this, Stella fully recognizes that there is an overwhelming amount of 
scientific evidence against both of these beliefs. Indeed, she readily admits that 
she is not basing her own commitment to creationism on evidence at all but, 
rather, on the personal faith that she has in an all-powerful Creator. Because of 
168  On Bach and Harnish’s (1979) taxonomy, (simple) assertives include: affirming, 
alleging, asserting, averring, avowing, claiming, declaring, denying (asserting …not), 
indicating, maintaining, propounding, saying, stating, and submitting. Alston (2000: 34) 
adds admitting, agreeing, announcing, answering, complaining, conceding, disclosing, 
insisting, mentioning, predicting, remarking, reminding, reporting, and testifying.       
169  Such accounts are offered for commands (Alston, 2000), fiction-making (García-
Carpintero, 2013), showing (Buckwalter & Turri, 2014), telling (Pelling, 2014), etc.   
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this, Stella does not think that religion is something that she should impose on 
those around her, and this is especially true with respect to her fourth-grade 
students. Instead, she regards her duty as a teacher to include presenting 
material that is best supported by the available evidence, which clearly includes 
the truth of evolutionary theory. As a result, while presenting her biology lesson 
today, Stella asserts to her students (1), though she herself neither believes nor 
knows this proposition: 
(3) Modern day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus.170 
Under the assumption that Stella asserts (3) correctly––the intuition Lackey’s 
argument relies on––it is not obvious how accounts that posit norms of belief or 
knowledge could explain its correctness. I now turn to two proposals found in the 
literature,171 that defend KA, which were offered by Montminy (2013) and Turri 
(2014), respectively.172     
170 Adapted from Lackey (2007: 599)  
171 Engel (2008) argues that Stella does not make a genuine assertion but only simulates 
assertoric force (2008: 52). Engel describes Stella as accepting (1) due to the nature of her 
profession. By adopting a further premiss, according to which anyone who utters p merely 
on the basis of accepting it (without believing it) is only simulating assertion, Engel 
concludes that KA is inapplicable. It is left unspecified how one should develop the general 
claim concerning simulation of assertions. It may be objected that we seem to be 
acquainted with feigned acts of assertion, and would use the simulation talk to describe the 
speech in theater shows, but not so obviously in the classroom. And although Engel may 
try to explain the nature of Stella’s simulation differently, it is of theoretical interest to 
offer a more positive account, thus avoiding the jargon of simulation altogether, and 
exploring other strategies to defend KA. Madison (2010) claims selfless assertions are not 
genuine, though I find his view even more shaky as he goes as far as to insist that lies should 
not be viewed as assertions.        
172 See also Turri’s related (2015) experimental study.  




Although Montminy (2013) denies that Stella asserts (3) correctly due to her 
violation of the knowledge norm, he observes that Stella chooses to break the 
linguistic rule in order to obey a more salient, pragmatic rule and avoid acting against 
her professional obligations. Given that breaking the linguistic rule is a “minor” 
offense compared to violating the pragmatic one, Stella asserts correctly all things 
considered: “we think she makes the right decision: given her social role, teaching 
evolutionary theory to her students is what she should do” (Montminy, 2013: 47).             
Montminy’s approach suggests that Lackey’s argument from selfless assertions 
simply restates the old problem of a pragmatic norm outweighing KA. Moreover, as 
Montminy reminds us, Williamson (1996, 2009) already provided a recipe for 
dealing with this sort of case. In Williamson’s original scenario, someone shouts “that 
is your train” without really knowing it, concerned that her addressee may miss the 
train; yet, despite lacking the relevant knowledge, the assertion is made correctly 
given the “urgency of the situation” (1996: 508). The knowledge norm is overridden 
by a pragmatic norm; the fact one asserted something incorrectly is secondary 
compared to the importance of the practical matters at hand. The same happens, 
Montminy argues, with the “CREATIONIST TEACHER”. The exact nature of the 
pragmatic norm may be different from that in Williamson’s train scenario, but it 
likewise takes precedence over KA.       
If Montminy is right and Williamson-style considerations do offer a solution,173 
then Lackey’s argument is hardly “the strongest type of counterexample” to KA 
(Lackey, 2007: 598). It merely shows that KA is not an “all-things-considered” rule: 
if one had to make a choice between obeying KA and a norm of a pragmatic or moral 
nature, it would be correct to prioritize the latter. That notwithstanding, Lackey’s 
argument still falls short of undermining or even addressing the sui generis normativity 
173 Williamson himself (2009:343) seems to accept this strategy. 
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of KA, precisely the kind of normativity in which the proponents of KA are 
interested.        
I part ways with Montminy’s approach due to the intuitions he appeals to: as we 
have seen, Montminy assumes that Stella’s speech act is sui generis incorrect. As this 
clashes with the intuition that Lackey’s argument rests upon, the approach I advance 
is motivated by an interest in seeing whether KA can explain selfless assertions 
without having to tweak the foundations of Lackey’s argument. That said, I find 
Lackey’s intuitions more natural anyway. In addition, as we shall see later, a possible 
drawback with Montminy’s proposal comes from “RACIST JUROR” scenario174 
(postponed until section 5.2.3.3), which is why it may be argued that Montminy’s 
strategy does not cover all cases of selfless assertions.175    
5.2.1.2 Turri	  
John Turri (2014) offers three responses to Lackey’s argument. In his first response, 
Turri challenges Lackey’s rendering of Stella’s doxastic state:176 contrary to what 
174 As pointed out by Pelling (2013b: 307). The “RACIST JUROR” seems to be introduced 
precisely to deal with the kind of proposals Montminy advances. In fact, Lackey mentions 
Williamson’s train scenario (2007: 596) but clearly does not consider it to be a threat to 
her argument.   
175 Pelling’s general worry is the possibility of cases where we would not be able to 
“identify some particular pragmatic rule which is in play, and which conflicts with the 
epistemic rule of assertion” (2013b: 307). By means of example, we could “imagine cases 
of selfless assertion which do not involve a hearer”, where it would be “particularly difficult 
to see what type of pragmatic rule might override the epistemic rule of assertion”. While 
this last worry has a promissory character, in need of a specific example, Montminy would 
still have to broaden the scope of his argument.  
176 As a matter of fact, Turri (2014) formulates his replies against the background of a 
different scenario (namely “DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR”, discussed in section 5.2.3.2 
below). When applied to Stella’s case, however, his response to Lackey seems less 
persuasive.        
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Lackey concedes, Turri remarks that Stella may actually believe (3); for, if Stella 
offers (3) as “what is most likely to be true”177 (Lackey, 2007: 599), then, Turri 
suggests, she “mostly believes” that (3) is true. Further, Turri takes one’s “mostly 
believing” that p as sufficient for knowing p. Thus, even if Stella does not believe (3) 
after all, her “mostly believing” could still be deemed sufficient for knowledge in this 
particular case.       
Lackey seems to be aware of the possibility that Stella may be seen as “weakly 
believing” the proposition in question.178 But in Lackey’s defense, I find it disputable 
that Stella believes (3) even weakly; we have seen that Stella “regards her duty as a 
teacher to include presenting material that is best supported by the available 
evidence” (2007: 599). What this suggests is only that Stella believes that (3) is 
supported by the scientific data, but not that any positive degree of credence in (3) 
can be ascribed to her. After all, in all probability, Stella is skeptical of evolutionary 
biology precisely because it conflicts with Scripture.       
According to Turri’s second response, Stella makes a “double assertion”; in the 
order of explanation, Stella first makes an individual assertion, whereby she speaks 
only for herself (to be explained shortly) and it is by means of making this statement 
that Stella produces another, communal assertion, made on behalf of the community of 
science educators.   
Turri then proceeds to demonstrate how KA can explain our ordinary intuitions 
about the permissibility of both types of assertions. As communal assertion is 
permissible according to Turri’s view, KA is equipped to account for such an 
impression of correctness by highlighting that the scientific community, on whose 
behalf Stella asserts (3), does indeed know the proposition. This much is fairly 
uncontroversial, I take it. The worry for Turri’s position comes from elaborating on 
Stella’s individual assertion. In order to motivate the reader to accept that in such 
177 The claim is somewhat hedged, as the quote comes from Lackey’s discussion of a 
different scenario, “DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR”.   
178 See Lackey (2007), page 620, fn. 14.  
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contexts the individual assertions are made impermissibly, Turri considers the 
following example:   
(4) Speaking just for myself here, modern day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo 
erectus. 
It is fairly easy to agree with Turri that if Stella had asserted the individual assertion 
(4), then she could not have done so permissibly: due to its added qualifier, we 
understand that (4) is a lie and thus incorrect. Strangely enough, Turri never shows 
that the content of (4) does in fact get asserted. He seems to accept that the individual 
and communal assertions share their content: that of (3). However, if Stella’s 
individual assertion does indeed lack a prefixed qualifier, it is not a lie nor is it 
incorrect in any discernible way. Thus, although some aspects of Turri’s second 
response seem to be along the right track, the argument is incomplete. It remains to 
be shown that Stella’s individual assertion is different from her communal assertion, 
even though the two assertions are made by uttering one and the same sentence.   
Finally, in his third response, Turri tries to support the claim that Stella is not 
permitted to assert (3), insofar as she does not believe its content, thus making her 
assertion incorrect. In so doing, Turri first appeals to the data from conversational 
challenges: the propriety of asking the speaker: “Why do you believe that?” seems 
easily explained by the hypothesis that when making an assertion, one represents 
oneself as believing the content. Similarly, more aggressive replies such as: “You 
don’t really believe that!” as well as the impropriety of Moorean sentences “p but I 
don’t believe that p”, seem well handled by the same proposal.      
Although the points on conversational challenges and Moorean sentences are 
widely acknowledged in the literature, Lackey does try to meet the challenge, at 
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least with regard to Moorean sentences. Since Turri does not discuss Lackey’s reply, 
I now turn to examine her view and extend Turri’s point.179   
5.2.2 Lackey’s treatment of Moorean absurdity 
Arguably the most pressing worry for an advocate of selfless assertions comes from 
Moorean sentences: “p but I don’t believe that p”.180 If the first conjunct is a selfless 
assertion, it seems that whenever we deem both the assertion of p and the assertion 
of “I don’t believe p” correct, the assertion of whole conjunction should be evaluated 
as correct, too: 
(5) Modern day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus but I don’t believe it. 
According to Lackey’s account, (5) is correct as both of its conjuncts are reasonable 
for Stella to assert.181 The result is problematic, as Moorean sentences are evaluated 
as extremely odd (Levin, 2008: 376), defective (Schaffer, 2008: 8) and even 
irrational (Almeida, 2007: 54). Recognizing the difficulty that Moorean sentences 
pose for her view, Lackey attempts to offer a broadly Gricean account of the 
incorrectness of asserting (5). According to this view, Stella would mislead her 
students by uttering (5), as they would either form false beliefs or no relevant beliefs 
at all (Lackey, 2007: 615). The fact that (5) is misleading is hence supposed to be 
explanatory of why it is impermissible to assert (5), although Lackey does not 
179 Of course, I do not wish to suggest that explaining why Lackey’s treatment of Moorean 
absurdity fails is sufficient to defend KA. I turn to these considerations in section 4 below.   
180 The same worry applies to the knowledge version of Moorean sentences.   
181 More precisely, Stella would not be subject to criticism as an asserter of (3) or as an 
asserter of “I don’t believe (3)”.   
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provide a detailed account of the relation between being misleading and being 
incorrect.  
In developing her response, Lackey discusses the following scenario, where an 
assertion is misleading although not absurd in the Moorean sense:   
LOSING DRINKER: Nadia and Hank know both that their friend Nina tends to 
go to the bar only when she loses a tennis match and that this is a fact that is 
generally known by all of her friends. However, Nadia knows further that Nina 
went to the bar today to have a drink with her opponent despite having won 
her tennis match. Nevertheless, while discussing Nina’s recent tennis matches, 
Nadia asserts to Hank, “Nina went to the bar earlier today after her tennis 
match” (Lackey, 2007: 614).182      
Lackey contends that no normative account of assertion is equipped to assess Nadia’s 
assertion as incorrect. For this reason, she insists, all normative accounts should 
adduce the “Not Misleading Norm of Assertion” (in one of its two versions) as “an 
additional norm governing assertion” 183 (2007: 615):   
NMNA: S should assert that p in context C only if it is not reasonable for S to believe 
that the assertion that p will be misleading in C. 
NMNA*: S should assert that p in context C only if it is reasonable for S to believe 
that the assertion that p will not be misleading in C.  
182 The additional scenario Lackey provides is omitted here, as it does not add anything to 
the discussion.     
183 Lackey responds to Williamson’s argument from the lottery propositions by maintaining 
that they likewise fail to obey NMNA (2008: 137–8).   
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The two norms are suggested to be “at least akin to Grice’s Maxim of Quantity”, 
according to which one ought to make one’s contribution as informative as required 
for the purposes of the exchange. 
As applied to “CREATIONIST TEACHER”, Stella would be offering “either too 
little or too much information” when uttering (5): too much for adding the second 
conjunct in the first place, or too little if she does not explain why she asserts (5) 
(Lackey, 2007: 616). Thus Stella, like Nadia, would be violating NMNA, which is 
why her assertion should be rendered incorrect.        
Observe that Lackey’s argument relies on two main claims: (i) misleading 
assertions should be evaluated as incorrect assertions; and (ii) asserting the 
conjunction of a selfless assertion and the reported disbelief in its content is absurd in 
the Moorean sense for being misleading.     
As far as the first thesis goes, there are two strong reasons to be skeptical about 
it. First, Nadia’s assertion is misleading because her audience is likely to form the 
false belief that Nina lost the match. However, a different audience need not form 
any false belief when hearing Nadia’s assertion; her speech act might therefore be 
perfectly in order. Secondly, Nadia’s assertion could also fail to mislead her actual 
hearers: if Nadia were asked whether Nina had indeed lost her match, then, assuming 
Nadia would tell the truth, the very same assertion would again fail to mislead her 
audience.     
Therefore, NMNA cannot be aptly introduced as a rule of assertion; it is more 
appropriately viewed as an instance of a general rule of conversational exchange, 
which can be adapted to any illocutionary force. (One may substitute “assert” in 
NMNA for “ask” or “guess” and obtain equally good rules.) Assessing Nadia’s 
behavior as violating an assertoric norm is thus beside the point: when making her 
statement, Nadia could not be epistemically positioned any better than she is; her 
fault lies only in her uncooperative behavior.        
As far as the second thesis goes, the explanation behind the “LOSING DRINKER” 
falls short of clarifying what is truly problematic about (5); describing (5) as being 
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misleading is a far cry from capturing what is absurd about Moorean sentences. Had 
Stella uttered (5), her act would not be odd due to its alleged effect on the audience, 
but because it would be self-refuting and irrational. Nadia, in contrast, merely acts 
carelessly.     
In short, Lackey’s treatment of Moorean absurdity as a pragmatic phenomenon is 
unsuccessful. The explanation that whenever a Moorean sentence is uttered, the 
ensuing act is absurd because it is misleading to the hearers and there is nothing 
further that is “absurd” about it, misses the point. The Moorean sentence (5) cannot 
be treated analogously to “LOSING DRINKER”, as the differences between the two 
cases are striking.    
5.2.3 In defense of the knowledge account 
In the remainder of this chapter, I outline two responses to Lackey’s argument on 
behalf of KA. Both responses retain the orthodox belief condition concerning the 
correctness of assertion, and neither response presents the speaker as committed to a 
Moorean absurdity. In addition, they both preserve Lackey’s intuition that the 
illocutionary act performed is correct.   
 The two approaches attempt to explain how one gets into the situation where 
“selfless assertions” occur and are made correctly. We should observe that 
“CREATIONIST TEACHER” features utterances made by a “spokesperson” of a 
certain profession. As far as the teaching profession is concerned, any teacher 
uttering (3), whether they share Stella’s convictions or not, seems required to defend 
only the following, hedged content:   
(6) According to the best available evidence, modern day Homo sapiens evolved 
from Homo erectus. 
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To see this, note that if a teacher were challenged for uttering (3), it would not be 
necessary to defend evolutionary theory, but only (6). What is more, if any teacher 
were to add that they, personally, prefer an alternative to (3), the pragmatics of the 
ensuing assertion would not be odd. Finally, any attempt to press teachers to defend 
the stronger (3), rather than (6), would be out of place.   
Through the act of teaching, we may say, it is due to certain contextual 
parameters that one conveys a weaker content than we may think simply by looking 
at the sentences uttered. Yet, once a teacher is out of the classroom, those contextual 
parameters are no longer in force, and uttering (3) would then commit that person 
to defending precisely (3), and not (6).    
To explain these remarks, the first proposal contends that what is asserted is only 
the hedged content: (6). Prefixing the propositional content with the evidential184 
“according to the best scientific evidence” does double duty insofar as it explains that 
Stella’s assertion is neither selfless nor incorrect: Stella firstly believes the content of 
(6) and secondly knows it.   
Note that if such “contextual parameters” applied to all assertions across the 
board, the consequences would be counterintuitive: we would not be able to make 
flat-out assertions, but instead only guardedly express the content prefixed by the 
appropriate evidential (“I have read that p”, “I was told that p”, and so on). So what is 
it that prevents the proposed strategy from overgeneralizing?  
First, notice that such contextual parameters can be cancelled within professional 
settings themselves; if Stella prefixed (3) by “in my opinion”, she would assert 
precisely (3), not (6), despite addressing the audience as a teacher. The “in my 
opinion” would signal she is now committing herself to defending (3).    
Secondly, assume by reductio that by uttering “it is 6 o’clock” one asserts the 
hedged content: “according to my watch, it is 6 o’clock”. If we assume further that 
184  Such evidentials are called illocutionary evidentials and are often phrased as 
parentheticals. See Murray (2010) for more on evidentials.  
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one’s watch stopped working and it is actually 8 o’clock, the intuition we have is that 
the assertion would nonetheless be incorrect. However, if one indeed managed to 
assert the hedged content, “according to my watch, it is 6 o’clock”, the assertion 
should be correct instead: it is both true and known by the speaker. Thus, in deciding 
whether one asserts the straightforward p or a hedged “evidential, p”, a natural 
suggestion is to ask ourselves whether the speaker is committed to the former or only 
to the latter content.        
At this point, one may object that the explanation of why Stella is committed to 
defending only (6) is a result of her professional role and does not alter the fact that 
she asserts (3). Accordingly, Stella is committed to (6) not because she asserts (6) but 
because it is her professional obligation to defend only (6) and not (3). 
In reply, I find the remarks on the origin of Stella’s commitment misguided. If 
Stella is indeed committed to knowing (6), i.e., if she licenses others to act on (6), if 
it is true that when challenged she must defend (6), and so on, then she indeed 
asserts (6). By clarifying the origin of Stella’s commitment one does not show that 
(6) doesn’t get asserted; instead, one only fleshes out the general idea of “contextual 
parameters” referred to above.  
5.2.3.1 “Creationist teacher” 
The second proposal attempts to account for the same intuition: that Stella is not 
committed to knowing (3) when she utters (3) in the classroom. The explanation is 
now different, however. According to this view, Stella is not making an assertion to 
begin with; instead she is performing a different illocutionary act. It is by focusing on 
the nature of this illocutionary act that we can explain why teachers are committed 
only to the weaker (6) in virtue of uttering (3).     
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In introducing “CREATIONIST TEACHER”, Lackey describes Stella as 
“presenting material that is best supported by the available evidence” (599, italics 
added). According to my proposal, “presenting” denotes an illocutionary act that is 
different from assertion; in presenting that p, I submit, the speaker’s obligation is 
different from that associated with assertion (and, arguably, other assertives). For, as 
discussed above, by presenting p one commits oneself to knowing that p is true 
according to the given source which, in Stella’s case, amounts to the given scientific 
theory. What is important to note is that Stella in no way commits herself to 
knowing p simpliciter, as this would be the case with assertoric commitments.185         
In support of the second approach, observe that Stella merely presents a theory 
(or a part of it, such as (3)) and can therefore deny that she is thereby asserting it. 
The motivation for this was already mentioned above: if challenged for uttering (3), 
Stella could reply by defending (6) as true without making the case for (3) etc. That 
said, since Stella must justify (6) and not (3), we may say that the illocutionary act 
teachers perform is one by which, in uttering a sentence s, they commit themselves 
to knowing that p (the proposition expressed by a sentence s) is true according to the 
given theory.186        
Furthermore, as Pelling (2014) argues, if two illocutionary acts are different, 
then the intentions characteristically associated with them will probably be different 
too. This seems to be corroborated in the case of presenting p and asserting p: the 
speaker’s communicative intention while presenting p (say, as a piece of scientific 
theory) is to undertake responsibility for the truth of p relative to such a scientific 
view, but not to defend p itself. The latter intention, to defend p, is characteristic of 
185 As it is often claimed that in asserting p one “presents” p as being true, we should make 
clear that on such a use of the verb “to present” one has in mind the truth of p per se, while 
when talking about the illocutionary act of “presenting” we appeal to a weaker claim, the 
truth of p according to some source.   
186 Typically, in addition to being the theory presented, the theory will also be supported by 
“the best scientific evidence”.   
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assertion, and in the present case is something we would expect an evolutionary 
biologist to have.    
Here, the worry concerning overgeneralization reappears: if we claim that Stella 
is performing a different illocutionary act, one may wonder why our ordinary 
assertions should not also be viewed as presentations, that are made relative to the 
relevant sources. By means of example, it might be that by uttering “it is six o’clock” 
I am merely presenting that it is six o’clock according to my watch, but not 
straightforwardly asserting that it is six o’clock.        
My reply here parallels the one given before: to settle on which illocutionary act 
is being made, we need to understand which content the speaker is committed to; 
even if my watch is broken, my act will be normatively incorrect (i.e., I will have to 
retract it, once I realize its content is false). This suggests that the content conveyed 
is not that associated with presenting; for, as argued above, one presents that p always 
relative to some source. Thus, if this were a case of presenting, our normative 
intuitions should be precisely the opposite from those they are. In contrast, even if 
(3) were false, Stella’s speech act would still appear normatively correct, which 
might be due to the fact she only presents (3) relative to a given theory.       
In short, while we assert (3) correctly only if we know that (3), we present (3) 
correctly only if we know that (6). By endorsing either of the two views proposed, 
we avoid the accusation that Stella asserts correctly what she does not believe. In 
keeping with the first proposal, Stella asserts (6) and does so correctly because she 
knows (6). In keeping with the second, Stella presents (3) and does so correctly 
because she knows that (3) is true according to the best available evidence. This is a 
normative account of presenting that we may find plausible, provided that we 
previously accept KA. Furthermore, in keeping with either of the two approaches, 
Stella is not committed to the Moorean absurdity (7) but only to the uncontroversial 
(8): 
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(7) Modern day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus but I don’t believe that.    
(8) According to accepted scientific consensus, modern day Homo sapiens evolved 
from Homo erectus but I don’t believe that Homo sapiens evolved from Homo 
erectus.   
5.2.3.2 “Distraught doctor” 
In the remainder of the chapter, I apply the second strategy to two further scenarios: 
“DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR” and “RACIST JUROR”.   
DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR. “Sebastian is an extremely well-respected 
pediatrician and researcher who has done extensive work studying childhood 
vaccines. He recognizes and appreciates that all of the scientific evidence shows 
that there is absolutely no connection between vaccines and autism. However, 
shortly after his apparently normal 18-month-old daughter received one of her 
vaccines she was soon diagnosed with autism. While Sebastian is aware that signs 
of autism typically emerge around this age, regardless of whether a child 
received any vaccines, the grief and exhaustion brought on by his daughter’s 
recent diagnosis cause him to abandon his previously deeply-held beliefs 
regarding vaccines. Today, while performing a well-baby checkup on one of his 
patients, the child’s parents ask him about the legitimacy of the rumors 
surrounding vaccines and autism. Recognizing both that the current doubt he 
has towards vaccines was probably brought about through the emotional trauma 
of dealing with his daughter’s condition and that he has an obligation to his 
patients to present what is most likely to be true, Sebastian asserts, “There is no 
connection between vaccines and autism.” In spite of this, at the time of this 
assertion, it would not be correct to say that Sebastian himself believes or knows 
this proposition” (Lackey, 2007: 598-9).  
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To take a slightly different starting point, observe that while Sebastian’s uttering of 
(9) would not strike us as redundant, his uttering of the evidential qualifier in (10) in 
the same circumstances would:     
(9) There is no connection between vaccines and autism. 
(10) According to the best available evidence, there is no connection between 
vaccines and autism. 
Again, this is because, in asking for a professional opinion, we are interested in 
hearing precisely what the best available evidence suggests. Thus, analogously to the 
case of Stella, we can say that in presenting (9), Sebastian commits himself to (10), 
without asserting either of the two; like Stella, Sebastian is a “spokesperson” for his 
profession and has “an obligation to his patients to present what is most likely to be 
true” (2008: 599). In presenting (9), Sebastian is doing what every pediatrician 
should be doing in his place. Relatedly, Sebastian does not mention the rumors, nor 
express doubts motivated by what happened to his daughter. Finally, as in the case of 
Stella, Sebastian does not correctly assert what he disbelieves nor does he commit 
himself to a Moorean absurdity of any kind.     
5.2.3.3 “Racist juror” 
Lastly, let us work through “RACIST JUROR”. 
RACIST JUROR. “Martin was raised by racist parents in a very small-minded 
community and, for most of his life, he shared the majority of beliefs held by 
his friends and family members. After graduating from high school, he started 
taking classes at a local community college and soon began recognizing some of 
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the causes of, and consequences of, racism. During this time, Martin was called 
to serve on the jury of a case involving a black man on trial for raping a white 
woman. After hearing the relatively flimsy evidence presented by the 
prosecution and the strong exculpatory evidence offered by the defense, Martin 
is able to recognize that the evidence clearly does not support the conclusion 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he is accused. In spite of this, 
however, he can’t shake the feeling that the man on trial is guilty of raping the 
woman in question. Upon further reflection, Martin begins to suspect that such 
a feeling is grounded in the racism that he still harbors, and so he concludes that 
even if he can’t quite come to believe that the defendant is innocent himself, he 
nonetheless has an obligation to present the case to others this way. Shortly 
after leaving the courthouse, Martin bumps into a childhood friend who asks 
him whether the “guy did it.” Despite the fact that he does not believe, and 
hence does not know, that the defendant in question is innocent, Martin 
asserts, 
(11) No, the guy did not rape her.” (Lackey, 2007: 598) 
Start by noticing that Martin utters (11) twice: once in a “high stakes” context (to his 
fellow jurors in the courthouse), and once in a “low stakes” context (to his friend 
over lunch).187 While in the courthouse, Martin has an obligation to present the case 
according to what the evidence seems to suggest. This kind of obligation is common 
to all three scenarios, and so Martin’s first utterance of (11) can be understood 
analogously to the two cases previously discussed––as a speech act of presenting. More 
precisely, since Martin must deliberate relative to the standard set of legal rules, 
which do not allow for a biased conclusion, by uttering a sentence s Martin commits 
187 Lackey (2007: 601). 
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himself to knowing the content of: “according to the evidence presented at court, s”. 
Thus, in presenting (11), Martin commits himself only to the content of (12):   
(12) No, according to the evidence presented to the court, the guy did not rape 
her. 
The reason why Lackey introduces “RACIST JUROR” is to avoid tying selfless 
assertions to professional settings; thus, unlike Sebastian and Stella who made 
statements at their places of work, Martin speaks outside the courthouse and hence 
lacks the obligations he would otherwise have as a juror (2007: 601). This should 
make us rethink our strategy; even if we grant that Martin did not make any assertion 
in the court, it seems that he must be doing so now (and moreover doing it selflessly). 
To support this worry, note that adding the prefix to Martin’s original assertion, as 
in (12), would not be redundant as it was in the case of Sebastian.    
A point worth noting is that Martin repeats (11) during the lunch even though he 
is now not under any obligation to do so. As far as I can tell, (11) is either a lie or it is 
not a selfless assertion. To show this, note that in these particular circumstances, 
both (12) and (13) seem to be better candidates:  
(13) Yes, the guy did it. 
Lackey could still object that while (12) may confuse the hearer as to why Martin is 
not offering his own view on the matter, (13) may require further justification which 
Martin might not be prepared to offer. All this notwithstanding, if Martin were to 
assert (rather than present) (11) in the given low-stakes context, his act should count 
as lying. Martin asserts what he does not believe while there are no practical 
considerations compelling him to do so. Lackey, however, disagrees that Martin is 
lying:    
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[T]here is absolutely no intention on the part of the asserter to deceive or 
otherwise mislead. Indeed, quite the contrary is true—the asserter in question 
positively intends to not deceive or mislead her hearer and, as a result, asserts what she 
herself does not believe. (Lackey, 2007: 602)  
In support of her claim, Lackey calls attention to Augustine’s two necessary 
conditions for lying: the speaker must (a) assert that p without believing it and (b) 
assert that p with the deliberate intention of deceiving.      
This may be too quick, however. For one thing, (b) is arguably not a necessary 
condition for lying: as Carson (2006), Sorensen (2007) and Fallis (2009) have 
argued, bald-faced lies seem to pose a counter-example to Augustine’s conception. 
Regardless of that, (b) in fact holds in Martin’s case: although Martin does not 
mislead his friend about the decision made at court, he is still deceiving his friend 
about his own belief. Moreover, it is plausible that it is strictly the content of Martin’s 
belief that his friend is interested in. Indeed, by repeating the judge’s verdict, Martin 
would not count as answering “whether the guy did it” (as required by the scenario), 
but only what the final verdict was, what the judge declared concerning this issue. 
Hence, if Martin were really asked to give his own take on the issue, he would be 
lying by offering (11).         
Assume, for the sake of the argument, that (11) is not a lie. In that case, it is most 
plausible to think that Martin chose to utter (11) to hide his racist views. In so doing, 
Martin would play along as if he was being asked about the court decision. But in this 
case, Martin would be presenting what he does not believe and hence would not be 
making a selfless assertion.    
Finally, a potential concern may be that in uttering (13), Martin would be concealing 
the conclusion reached by the court. To prevent this, it is more pragmatically 
appropriate to offer a fuller reply:    
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(14) According to the evidence presented at the court, the guy did not rape her. 
But if you’re asking me what I think, I still think he did it. 
As Martin believes both conjuncts, no selfless assertion is made by uttering (14), 
either.  
5.2.4 Final remarks 
This completes my answer to those accounts of assertion which set the speaker’s 
epistemic situation aside. Both available arguments in their favor fail, or so I have 
argued.  
 As regards Pelling’s argument from existentially known assertions, I have argued 
that it is inconclusive and does not pose a threat to the knowledge account of 
assertion. I have offered a pair of strategies to defend KA in each scenario. In replying 
to the first, “TELLING THE TIME” scenario, a strategy that fits neatly with KA is to 
see the content of Marc’s assertion as meta-linguistic, in which case Marc would 
know the proposition asserted and KA would deliver the correct prediction. 
According to the alternative proposal, the KA theorist could stick to the conventional 
meaning, but now introduce a different speech act of proffering. Plausibly, the act of 
proffering may require only existential knowledge in order to be correct, thus 
rendering Marc’s speech act correct.    
In responding to the second, “POINTING WITHOUT SEEING” scenario, I 
considered two lines of thought. Along the first, we may understand Bill as asserting 
the singular proposition under a rather uninformative mode of presentation. In this 
way, Bill would know the same proposition as that entertained by his audience 
looking at the relevant object. Accordingly, we would not need to introduce the 
hearer-centred view to accommodate Pelling’s worry. According to the second 
5. The Role of the Audience
 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
157	  
proposal, we may appeal to the proffering strategy, maintaining that the singular 
proposition is proffered, rather than asserted.  
 In reply to Lackey’s argument from selfless assertions, I have offered two 
alternative accounts of selfless assertions which would satisfy the following set of 
desiderata: (i) they should remain faithful to Lackey’s intuition about the correctness 
of the speech act performed; (ii) they should stay clear of Moorean absurdity; (iii) 
they should preserve the orthodox approach concerning the necessity of belief for the 
correctness of assertion; and (iv) they should offer an account that obeys the 
knowledge rule. While I tried to stay neutral between these two accounts, I here 
expanded on the version according to which selfless assertions are best viewed as a 
type of assertive distinct from assertion, namely presenting. In so doing, I have 
argued that performing these acts commits the speaker to knowing the propositional 
content prefixed by a relevant evidential. Such an account is motivated by allowing 
for the expansion of the normative approach to other assertives, a feature of interest, 
in light of the recent wave of normative accounts of speech acts.      
What this may suggest is that the best way to accommodate the hearer-oriented 
intuitions is by adding the hearer into the picture, rather than substituting the hearer 
for the speaker. For those who are concerned that this is done at the cost of 
“simplicity” or “elegance” of the resulting view, it might be noted that CK avoids all 
this. For, the notion of “commitment”, as I argued above, has a relation to the hearer 
already built in, as it were––in asserting, one is committed to the audience who is, in 




The appropriateness of conversational challenges188 is a feature189 of assertions, 
broadly construed: they can be seen as a type of demand requiring the speaker to 
epistemically support their assertions both when their content is hedged as well as 
flat-out asserted.  
Let us start with what we may call the K-challenge, such as “How do you know 
that?” or more aggressively “You don’t know that!”. 190 The K-challenge is typically 
used in addressing flat-out assertions such as “Caesar crossed the Rubicon”. 
However, its scope appears to be limited, as it cannot be posed appropriately to 
hedged statements: the asserter of “Possibly, p” or “I think that p”, can block the K-
188 Alternative names include “conversational patterns” (Williamson, 2000:252) and 
“justificatory challenges” (Faulkner, 2011:141).   
189 I use “feature” rather than a more common “mark” as the latter may imply that 
conversational challenges cannot be linked to any other speech act, the claim I have argued 
to be false in Chapter 4. The point is not merely that other illocutionary acts, such as 
presupposition, might have conversational challenges on their own, but that they can be 
challenged in the exact same way assertions can.    
190 The K-challenge, I think, need not deploy the notion of knowledge. As far as I can see, 





challenge by retorting that she never represented herself as, or committed herself 
to, knowing that p.    
What’s more, the K-challenge does not always apply to flat-out assertions either, 
although for a different reason. For instance, it might be out of place to K-challenge 
the speaker when it is obvious what the source of her evidence is. Thus, I cannot 
sensibly K-challenge a person who asserts that she is tired or hungry, because it is 
clear that the source of her evidence is her first-hand knowledge. 
Nothing hinges on the reports of the occurrent mental states, however: 
whenever it is already part of the context that it is known how the speaker has the 
evidence for asserting p, the assertion of p cannot be K-challenged. If you know that 
the speaker uttering “New York City avenues run north and south” lives in New 
York, it is typically redundant to inquire how she knows it. We can assume that the 
K-challenge inquires into the type of the evidence one has when making a given 
claim. 191   
The C-challenge – “Are you certain?” or “Are you sure?” – is quite different in 
nature. First of all, unlike the K-challenge, it can be naturally put to subjects even 
when it is obvious where their evidence derives from. For instance, by C-
challenging one’s claim that one is tired, the question need not come across as 
redundant but as doubting its veracity: “Are you sure? You’ve spent all day on the 
couch, how can you be tired?”.192 In this and many other cases, the C-challenge 
demands justification from the speaker. In contrast to the K-challenge, which cannot 
sensibly be posed on this occasion, the C-challenge is more obviously performing 
191 As Adler (2002: 160) mentions, it is also possible to view the hearer’s “how do you 
know?” as a mere expression of interest or curiosity rather than a challenge. I agree such 
cases can easily be construed. Of course, the mere fact that such questions can be posed in 
this sense doesn’t eliminate the normative character that they otherwise have.    
192  In the given example, the C-challenge behaves like a criticism of sorts. That 
notwithstanding, Lackey’s claim that conversational challenges are generally speaking 
“criticisms of assertions” (2007: 610) seems rather inadequate. As mentioned, they should 




the function of a challenge. Hence, the C and K challenges, at least on some 
occasions, differ in nature.   
Further, just like the K-challenge, the C-challenge can sound unnatural, too. The 
less justification the speaker represents herself as having, the more likely it is that 
the C-challenge would be unsuitable. Whenever the hedge is as strong as in “I really 
don’t know, maybe p”, it would be out of place to reply with the C-challenge. 
However, no general rule applies to all qualifications. A weak claim such as “Arnaud 
might be in a bar” might still be greeted with a C-challenge and demanded 
justification, even though its speaker commit herself to much less knowledge than if 
she asserted that Arnaud is in a bar.      
Finally, although the C-challenge is portrayed as requiring justification, it is not 
unreasonable to think that it can be used to enquire about the speaker’s confidence 
or subjective certainty. I will turn to this discussion in section 6.3.1.    
The two challenges have in common that they never apply to any other act apart 
from assertions, including any other assertive. This is not to say that if I am 
guessing, especially if offering an educated guess, I cannot have some sort of 
evidence. The explanation seems to be that, when guessing, I am not committing 
myself to knowing the content or having justification for it. At this preliminary 
stage, this need not be clear when it comes to the C-challenge, but it will hopefully 
get clear later.    
In addition, K– and C– challenges might require the same output. If asking the 
questions “How do you know that is the solution?” and “Are you sure that is the 
solution?”, addressed to a person who claims to have an answer to a mathematical 
problem, the two challenges arguably come to the same: they demand a list of steps 




The two challenges just mentioned are the ones most frequently posed.193 The
question I will try to answer is, provided that K and C challenges have a normative
character, which of the normative theories of assertion is most apt to accommodate
these data. In the first part of the chapter, I will argue that KA and CK are equipped
to account for the K-challenge with ease. In so doing, I will assess the merits of
Lackey’s (2007) and Schieber’s (2009) objections against such a proposal and try to
dismiss them. In the second part, I will analyze the C-challenge: I will discuss the
strategies offered by Unger (1975), Turri (2010a) and Egan (2012) in explaining
how the C-challenge bolsters KA, and try to offer a diagnosis of each of these
solutions, contrasting them with my proposal.
6.1 The K-challenge 
The K-challenge has proved to be one of the most important data for the knowledge 
account of assertion, leading Unger (1975), Williamson (1996), and Turri (2010a), 
among others, to argue for this view. To motivate the normativity of the K-
challenge, we can say that unless it is replied to satisfactorily, the content of the 
challenged assertion will not be added to the conversational score, used in the rest 
of the conversation, in decision-making, and so on. What remains unclear, as we 
will see, is how to unpack what a “satisfactory reply” amounts to. I now turn to 
Lackey’s (2007) argument which offers a distinct, although in my view problematic, 
answer to this problem.  
193 Other challenges question the speaker’s belief (“Do you believe that?”). Although I focus 




6.1.1 Lackey’s argument  
The following passage delivers Lackey’s view on the K-challenge:             
[I]mplicit in these challenges [“How do you know that?” and “You couldn’t know 
that”] is the expectation that the asserter will respond with some reason for 
believing that the proposition asserted is true. A natural response to “How do you 
know that North Korea tested a nuclear bomb?” is “I read it in the The New York 
Times.” Here, I am offering my reason for believing that such a nuclear bomb 
was tested in response to a question challenging my knowledge. Thus, the 
central way in which assertions are criticized—where the speaker is accused of 
lacking reasons for believing the proposition in question—is exactly what the 
RTBNA predicts [i.e., One should assert that p only if it is reasonable for one to 
believe that p.].  
If Lackey is right, the defender of the reasonableness norm appears to be in equally 
good, if not better position than her KA/CK rival.  
In reply, I wish to argue that Lackey’s norm does not account for the K-challenge 
as her proposal suffers from two problems. First, by focusing solely on the reply to 
the challenge, it conceives of the conversational challenge data too narrowly, losing 
out of sight the effect the challenge might have on the assertion. Secondly, even on 
such a narrow reading, her predictions do not pan out as expected given that her 
reasonableness norm can still be countenanced on this score.      
Starting with the second observation, let us revisit Lackey’s North Korea 
example. In the passage above, it is assumed that the response “I read it in the New 
York Times” is accepted by the audience, which suggests that all that is needed to 
comply with the K-challenge is that the speaker offers her “reason for believing” the 




audience is skeptical of North Korea testing a nuclear bomb, they need not accept 
an appeal to NY Times, or any other newspaper, as a good reason.     
In addition, as mentioned, Lackey leaves out a crucial feature of conversational 
challenges––the effect such challenges might have for the assertion in question. 
Thus, there are at least two ways to think of the speaker’s referring to the NY 
Times as the source of her challenged assertion. On the one hand, she might appeal 
to the source as a way of supporting her claim to knowledge that North Korea 
tested a nuclear bomb. On the other hand, the speaker might be portrayed as 
withdrawing the original assertion (1), and offering in turn a hedged statement, such 
as (2):      
(1) North Korea tested a nuclear bomb. 
(2) According to the NY Times, North Korea tested a nuclear bomb. 
As it happens, Lackey’s account has a hard time explaining such a withdrawal. For, 
given that it is still reasonable to believe (1), it should likewise be correct to assert it 
in the line with Lackey’s reasonableness norm. So why shouldn’t the speaker stand 
by the original assertion but instead offer (2)? Notice that KA and CK can account 
for this datum with ease: the speaker abandons (1) as she lacks the relevant 
knowledge and opts for (2) as she knows its content.      
In reply to this worry, a Lackeyan could bite the bullet, stressing that a refusal to 
make a given assertion need not always be evidence for its incorrectness. As I urged 
in the previous chapters, we are disinclined to put forward an uninformative or 
irrelevant assertion even though it can be correct. Still, this doesn’t seem to be the 
way out of the problem for Lackey. The worry is rather epistemic in nature: the 
mere fact that the content is reasonable to be believed doesn’t seem to suffice 
anymore. Instead, a higher epistemic state is demanded. This is the reason why we 




Hence, the K-challenge seems to require (i) the source of the evidence and demands 
that this (ii) evidence confers knowledge. But when the response to the K-
challenge–“I read it in the New York Times”–is given, it seems to deliver (in some 
cases) only the answer to the first requirement posed by the K-challenge, not the 
latter. Indeed, asking “And how do you know the NYT is reliable on this score?” is a 
general inquiry about the source of evidence. The main suspicion with Lackey’s 
reply, hence, is that it does not give a satisfying account of the second requirement 
of the K-challenge, viz. that the evidence represents knowledge.  
6.1.2 Lackey’s reasonableness norm and the B-challenge 
I have tried to argue that KA fares better than its rival, i.e., Lackey’s reasonableness 
account, in accommodating the data stemming from the K-challenge. My worry is 
that Lackey’s theory fails in explaining weaker challenges, too, such as that of “Why 
would you believe that?”.194 For the sake of brevity, let us call it the B-challenge. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Lackey argues that one need not believe 
a proposition in order to correctly assert it. Her argument was based on the class of 
“selfless assertions”. To raise a different worry, recall the case of the creationist 
teacher who asserts (3) without believing its content:      
(3) Modern–day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus. 
194 Lackey claims that her account “derives support” from such data, although she doesn’t 
provide any argument to this effect which would counterbalance the worry I described 
above. She only maintains that “the expectation that the asserter will respond with some 
reason for believing that the proposition asserted is true” is “implicit in these challenges” 
(610). But if Stella were B-challenged for offering (3), it is quite implausible she would 
offer any reason for believing: instead, she would straightforwardly deny she believes (3) to 




In Lackey’s view, the assertion of (3) is correct because it is reasonable to be 
believed. The worry here is whether such a rendition sits well with the main 
characterization of conversational challenges as demands. Namely, how could it be 
that Stella replies unsatisfactorily to the B-challenge (as she would, if challenged for 
(3)) and yet proceeds on making the challenged assertion correctly? What makes the 
B-challenge – a challenge?   
 The normative force of the challenge, thus, seems to be lacking: one can reply 
unsatisfactorily (i.e., denying one meets the condition that one is required to meet) 
and yet be seen as asserting correctly. Lackey might bite the bullet here, conceiving 
of the B-challenge in different terms than other types of conversational challenges. 
She may urge that, since belief and assertion go apart in some cases, it should be 
allowed that the B-challenge can be replied unsatisfactorily without this having any 
normative repercussions on the status of the assertion itself. One can be praised for 
asserting p while at the same time being criticized for believing p. In addition, it 
could perhaps also be argued that the B-challenge is not really a challenge as much as 
a query of a sort.   
But then, the account becomes unattractive as it portrays the B-challenge as 
devoid of any strength attributed to other challenges. As such, it loses the 
uniformity in accounting for all conversational challenges in the same fashion.  
 That being said, we should keep in mind that the reasonableness norm might 
still be compatible with the thesis that belief is a necessary condition for correct 
assertion. In such a case, the reasonableness norm could explain the B-challenge, as 
KA and CK do so with ease. On the latter two accounts, given that knowledge 
entails belief, and knowledge is the norm of assertion, we can require one to believe 




justified. 195  Consequently, the B-challenge is no less a demand than other 
conversational challenges are.     
6.1.3 Schieber’s argument 
Joseph Schieber (2009) offers a similar argument to the one given by Lackey, 
attempting to sever the link between KA and the K-challenge. Although he writes 
from a Stalnakerian perspective, his argument doesn’t depend on this framework 
and can be evaluated independently from it. 
6.1.3.1 “The rain scenario” 
Schieber’s stated purpose is to show that the knowledge norm is artificial and is not 
supported by the K-challenge. In so doing, Schieber offers two scenarios which I 
discuss in turn.  
A1: It’s going to rain. 
B1:  You don’t know that. 
A2: Maybe not, but I’m pretty sure it will. 
B2: Oh. If it’s going to rain I should take an umbrella, then. (Schieber, 2009: 172) 
195 Observe that the B-challenge is sometimes concerned with the justification, rather 
than belief. In the given example, we already grant that the person believes the content in 




After A’s assertion “It’s going to rain” is K-challenged, A offers a reply, A2. In so 
doing, A should be understood as downplaying her original assertion to “I’m pretty 
sure it’s going to rain”. As the speaker is now only expressing her confidence that it 
is going to rain, she knows the content of A2 which explains why she is no longer 
challenged. So far, KA has a ready reply to the phenomenon. The worry comes with 
B2––it is unclear why the speaker B neglects A2 and uses A1, despite the fact A 
confessed ignorance about its content. Schieber’s argument, thus, confronts the 
claim that K-challenge is indeed linked to knowledge, under the assumption that B2 
is a correct assertion.196	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   There are two points to be made. First, Schieber’s argument seems primarily to 
target the knowledge account of action, rather than assertion.197 Namely, “the rain 
scenario” is meant to cast doubt on the claim that one cannot appropriately act on 
the basis which falls short of knowledge. But this issue is orthogonal to KA and 
should be ignored.    
 The second point, however, is more pertinent. The proponent of KA might still 
be required to explain why B uses A1 in her conditional assertion rather than A2. If 
anything, it is A2 that should be given priority, as it was made clear that its content 
is known.    
In reply, note that in conditional assertions, such as B2, it is not required that the 
speaker knows the antecedent in order for the speech act to be correct. If I realize 
on Saturday afternoon that I don’t know whether supermarkets would be open on 
Sunday, I can still go on and assert “If supermarkets are closed on Sunday, then I 
should go buy groceries today”. The fact that supermarkets turn out not to be closed 
on Sunday would not make my statement in any way problematic. The same goes 
for B’s assertion: it is only if the speaker went on to offer a distinct consequent, as in 
196 Schieber makes a more general point, denying the knowledge norm tout court rather than 
focusing merely on its prospects of accounting for the K-challenge data.   
197 For a defense of this view, see Fantl and McGrath (2002) and Hawthorne and Stanley 
(2008). The view came under attack in Maitra and Weatherson (2010) and Benton (2012), 




“If it’s going to rain I should not take an umbrella”, that the assertion would be 
problematic (assuming B’s desire not to get wet, say).   
	  6.1.3.2 “The Obama scenario” 
A1: Barack will win the nomination. 
B1: You can’t know that. 
A2: No, but I think he will. 
B2: Good. We need a real change in this country. (Schieber, 2009: 172) 
Arguably, the two dialogues have the same form: the speaker A is K-challenged and 
offers a weaker A2 in reply; despite the fact that A knows the content of her latter 
claim, B goes on to use the former, challenged assertion when offering B2. And if B2 
is correct, KA is clearly threatened: for, B2 seems to presume the truth of A1, which 
A confesses to lack knowledge of.  
 The dialogue is described as a “perfectly natural example of conversation” (172). 
However, it is not an easy task to show that B2 indeed presumes A1 rather than A2; 
neither part of B2 seems to rely more obviously on A1: “good” may refer to A’s 
judgment in A2 and “we need a real change in this country” may be completely 
independent of it, reporting the speaker’s personal opinion. The interpretative 
work seems to depend on the right understanding of “good” and its link with the 
sentence “we need a real change in this country”. On one reading, “good” can be 
seen as conceding that A1 is true, which in turn warrants the further comment about 
the “real change”. However, the speaker B is clearly not in a position to make such a 
point: the elections are yet to take place, and B lacks an inside information. In word, 




tense version of A1: “Barack Obama won the nomination”. On another reading, B’s 
“good” might be referring to A’s opinion that Obama will win. Similarly, when B 
says that “we need a real change” she would be expressing her opinion which is 
clearly independent of the truth of A1. Finally, as B is offering a personal judgment, 
her assertion is known and according to KA, correct. This second interpretation 
would sound more natural if the sentence read “Good. I share your view” or “I hope 
so. We need a real change in this country”.  
6.2 The C-challenge 
In the previous two sections, I have analyzed two arguments by Lackey (2007) and 
Schieber (2009), respectively. The conclusion we reached was that neither of these 
arguments succeeds in showing that KA and CK cannot account for the K-challenge. 
In this section, I turn to the C-challenge (“Are you certain?”/”Are you sure?”) and 
evaluate the prospects of KA/CK in accounting for it.    
  I have already argued above that the C-challenge typically demands the speaker’s 
justification. Further, as the challenge mentions the term “certainty”, it might be 
thought to be about subjective or objective certainty, which would further explain the 
nature of the justification required.  
  The idea that the C-challenge invokes the notion of objective certainty is not 
without its proponents, both within the KA camp (Turri, 2010a)198 as well as within 
the camp of those who endorse the certainty account (Stanley, 2008).199 By taking 
the C-challenge to demand objective certainty, we can nicely explain why we are 
entitled to pose the C-challenge after the K-challenge: that is, given that objective 
certainty is a stronger epistemic state than knowledge is, demanding the former by 
198 See the following section for the analysis of Turri’s argument.  
199 Unfortunately, Stanley provides no details as to how the C-challenge should be actually 




the C-challenge is regarded as a stronger challenge. Yet, this is not the only 
explanation: as I have outlined in broad strokes above, we can describe the 
difference between the K– and C– challenges without imposing such a hierarchy.    
  The reason why a proponent of KA should abandon Turri’s strategy is because it 
is not obvious that there are independent resources that KA can appeal to in 
accounting for the objective certainty challenge. More importantly, it can be shown 
that, contra Turri and Stanley, the C-challenge is not about objective certainty at all. 
First, objective certainty is typically ascribed to propositions. We say, for instance, 
that mathematical or logical truths are certain. That being said, the challenge from 
objective certainty would be phrased in the third person singular, as in: “Is it certain 
that the Sun will rise tomorrow?”. The positive reply would entail that the Sun will 
rise tomorrow, as this type of certainty is factive. But the C–challenge is never 
posed in this form: instead of asking “Is it certain that p?” one typically asks “Are you 
certain that p?”, “Are you absolutely sure that p?”, and the like. So, if objective 
certainty can be phrased only in the third person singular, and if the C–challenge is 
generally posed in the second person singular, then the C–challenge does not seem 
to demand objective certainty.200     
Secondly, the notion of certainty in the C–challenge does not assume factivity, 
either. The speaker is rarely required to demonstrate that her statement cannot turn 
out to be false and will rarely be blamed if the evidence she gives in support of the 
C–challenged assertion eventually proves to be false. On the other hand, this 
doesn’t hold for the K-challenge, which is why the C-challenge cannot require the 
epistemic state higher than knowledge. We can, thus, agree that when the C-
challenge demands certainty from the asserter, it is subjective, rather than objective 
certainty.   
As argued above, we shouldn’t lose out of sight that the C-challenge typically 
requires some kind of justification from the asserter. Yet, cases when the C-




challenge demands the speaker’s confidence also exist. These two subclasses of C-
challenges should be made clearly distinct. The contrast between the two cases is 
that when asking about the speaker’s confidence, we are not demanding from the 
speaker further justification. Instead, a satisfactory reply could simply consist in 
claiming that one indeed is confident. This subclass of the C-challenge would fall 
short of being a true challenge, being more appropriately viewed as a request for 
assurance. I now turn to examine two such scenarios.    
6.2.1 Two cases 
Imagine Andy is trying to deactivate a bomb and has only 30 seconds left. His claim 
that “The red wire needs to be cut” may be replied to with a K–challenge of the 
form, “How do you know?”. On the face of it, the challenge is less likely to arise in 
circumstances like these, as it would be too mild. But if posed, it seems that Andy’s 
assertion could be further challenged with “Are you certain?” or “Are you absolutely 
sure?”. The challenger may accept that Andy is an expert on bombs and yet demand 
from him the highest level of credence in his judgment.    
In another case, Rodrigo is giving evidence in court and is being asked to describe 
the person who committed the crime. Contrary to all other witnesses testifying 
before him, Rodrigo says that the culprit did not wear a cap. The lawyer asks him if 
he is certain. Unlike the previous case, we would now be more inclined to treat the 
K–challenge as inadequate, rather than too mild. If the assertion was K–challenged, 
Rodrigo would simply stress that he saw the culprit, just as he did when giving 
evidence in the first place. To this extent, asking the witness about her confidence 
seems more appropriate in the given context.     
In both cases, the C-challenge appears to demand subjective certainty, rather 
than mere justification. The point is not that Andy and Rodrigo cannot justify their 




judgments. We can understand the reports of their confidence as adding the further 
information we would not necessarily have if a mere justification was provided. 
Oftentimes, a report about the justification of an assertion can be enriched by 
adding that one is “100% sure”, that one “can’t be wrong about this”, and so on.  
6.2.2 Unger’s argument 
A classical account of the C-challenge is offered by Peter Unger (1975). In his 
discussion, Unger starts by claiming that the K-challenge has three features: (i) it is 
an appropriate response to an assertion; (ii) its central notion is knowledge; and (iii) 
a failure to reply adequately ensues in modifying or retracting the assertion 
altogether  (Unger, 1975: 263–264). The same three features, with appropriate 
changes to the condition (ii), apply to the C-challenge.        
To explain (i)–(iii) stated in terms of the K-challenge, Unger goes on to offer an 
inference to the best explanation.201 He proposes that, once we understand asserting 
that p as representing oneself as knowing that p, we can straightforwardly explain 
otherwise puzzling features of the K–challenge.   
In tackling the analogous problem of the C-challenge data, Unger assumes that 
the C-challenge singles out subjective certainty. Unlike what we said above about the 
C-challenge, Unger seems to understand the challenge as always demanding 
subjective certainty, rather than justification. His proposal consists, among other 
things, in claiming that knowledge entails subjective certainty.202 Given this, the 
propriety of the C–challenge is explained by appealing to the propriety of the K–
201 Peter Pagin (2015) makes a related point in his discussion of the conversational 
challenges data.  
202  Following Moore, Unger (1975) argued that knowledge also entails objective or 
absolute certainty. However, as I will argue, the C–challenge demands subjective 
certainty, which Unger discusses appealing to a Moorean sentence: “It’s raining but I’m not 




challenge, understood in this way. A similar explanation applies to other challenges 
such as “Why do you believe that?” and so on.  
Unger’s solution was not well received in the literature. His central premiss that 
knowledge entails subjective certainty, is now commonly rejected. Initially invoked 
for the purposes of his skeptical position defended in Ignorance, it is sometimes 
described as “closely associated with detrimental conclusions” (Stanley, 2008: 
33).203 For this reason, in what follows, I will be reviewing alternative approaches 
that KA theorists have offered in addressing the K-challenge.  
It is worth noting that, despite the general reluctance among proponents of KA 
to accept Unger’s strategy to account for the appropriateness of the C-challenge, 
the theory does explain the data elegantly. As applied to the bomb case, the 
challenger demands subjective certainty as a component of knowledge that she is 
most interested in. In all such cases, Unger’s solution is uniform, stating that the C-
challenge always occurs as a component of the K-challenge.  
6.2.3 Turri’s argument 
On a different approach, Turri takes seriously the possibility that the C-challenge 
may be pointing to the fact that “something more than knowledge is required to 
authorize assertion” (Turri, 2010a: 457). If we understand that “something more 
than knowledge” should at least preserve factivity, Turri must have in mind 
objective certainty as the central notion of the C–challenge. In accordance with this, 
Turri intends to argue that KA is compatible with the C–challenge thus understood. 
In support, he offers the following analogy:    
203 Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) also consider cases when one may know that p despite 




Authorization to wed couples is one thing; it requires being licensed by the 
state. Being sure that you're authorized to wed couples is something else 
entirely; the state issues no license for that. The propriety of the stronger 
challenge here does not tend to show that being sure you’re authorized is 
what authorizes you. Being licensed is what authorizes you (Turri, 2010a: 
459). 
Having authority to assert that p, according to KA, amounts to knowing that p 
(Turri, 2010a: 457). Given that Turri doesn’t endorse Unger’s entailment thesis 
(i.e., that knowledge entails subjective certainty), this analogy helps us see how an 
assertion can be “authorized” without the speaker’s certainty of its content, merely 
on the grounds she knows it. The wedding analogy, hence, attempts to show that 
although the C-challenge can come across as natural, it is far from establishing 
certainty as the norm of assertion.   
6.2.4 Egan’s argument 
Another option in explaining the appropriateness of the C-challenge is to discard it 
as being a relevant datum. The central feature of the K-challenge is that it asks how 
one knows what one claims. Thus phrased, the question presupposes that there is, 
or should be, an answer to it. Hence, when we inquire how one knows what one 
asserted, we presuppose that one should know, which is in turn explained by 
claiming that knowledge is the norm.  
 The C-challenge, however, lacks this feature. Although it is sometimes felicitous 
to ask “How are you certain?” (Williamson, 2009:344), this can hardly generalize. 
On this approach, it follows that certainty is not fundamental to the act of asserting: 
it may be useful to know whether someone is certain of something, but this doesn’t 




 On this view, one can easily explain why other questions that cannot be phrased 
in the adequate “how” form fall short of being challenges. For instance, “Where did 
you read that?” or “Who told you that?” (call them W-questions) lack the adequate 
“how” form. Consequently, they do not challenge the normative character of 
asserting, but are used out of more practical interests about the source of the 
speaker’s information. The same conclusion, then, applies to the C-challenge: 
although we often pose it, its relevance is not normative in nature.   
 Note, again, that the peculiarity of challenges is that they are plausibly viewed as 
a type of demand: should one fail to answer them adequately, one could not continue 
asserting the same content. At this point, the argument has a weak link. It is simply 
false that the C-challenge behave in the same way as W-questions do. We can surely 
continue asserting correctly even if we acknowledge that we have not read or heard 
the given content. But the same cannot be true in the case of the C-challenge 
because it generates Moorean sentences, just as the K-challenge does in the same 
conditions. It would be inappropriate for Rodrigo to answer negatively to the C-
challenge and yet continue asserting the same proposition. After unsuccessful reply 
to both the K– and C– challenges, the speaker would either need to modify or 
retract her assertion. Egan’s prediction is, then, incorrect, as the two challenges 
behave in the same way.    
In comparison to this pragmatic feature, the mere syntactic form in which a 
conversational challenge is issued is clearly irrelevant. The fact that the latter 
doesn’t come in the “how” form shouldn’t worry us more than the fact that the 
former cannot be rephrased by using the verb “to be”.   
6.2.5 Final remarks 
Let us recap our discussion of the C-challenge. We started off by arguing that 




objective certainty. We first discussed Unger’s classical argument, showing that it 
explains the challenge with ease, although it doesn’t recommend itself, due to the 
controversial assumption that knowledge entails subjective certainty. We then 
turned to Turri’s argument, relying on the wedding analogy. The main worry with 
Turri’s strategy was that it depicts the conditions demanded by the C-challenge as 
too high. Finally, we addressed Egan’s proposal on which asking “Are you certain?” 
is not a challenge in its own right. However, the mere lack of syntactic features 
proved insufficient to ground such a strong conclusion and we concluded that the C-
challenge is on a par with other challenges.   
 Finally, it is left to see how KA and CK can explain the appropriateness of the 
C-challenge. In the majority of cases, the C-challenge demands justification. The 
asserter’s commitment to knowledge illuminates why it is natural to demand 
justification. In a smaller number of cases, we are inquiring into the speaker’s 
confidence. In these circumstances, justification need not be offered. To see this, let 
us revisit the scenario when the witness is being asked if he is sure about his 
assertion that the culprit did not wear a cap. By posing the C-challenge, one is 
asking for the degree of confidence that the witness has in making the statement. 
Typically, this confidence will match the illocutionary act one performs. Thus, if 
Rodrigo flat-out asserts that the culprit did not wear a cap, he did so because his 
memory of seeing him without a cap is sufficiently vivid. One is prepared to commit 
one to knowledge proportionally to one’s confidence about the given judgment.   






In the first part of the dissertation, I tried to set the stage by answering what I took 
to be the most fundamental question in the normative theory of assertion––what 
does it mean to say that an assertion is correct. In so doing, I distinguished between 
two approaches, the reasonabilist and objectivist, and proposed a way to think 
about the concepts I found to be central for either type of account: those of 
constitutive rule and commitment. This helped me develop one such objectivist 
proposal in Part II, labeled the commitment to knowing view (CK). After elaborating 
on CK, I tried to put this account to test. I have examined four sets of arguments: 
(i) against commitment views in general; (ii) against the knowledge account of 
assertion (KA); (iii) against speaker-centered norms; and (iv) against the thesis that 
KA and CK can accommodate the conversational challenges better than their rivals. 
 The aim of the third and last part is to investigate some more general issues 
about assertion. This chapter in particular discusses the phenomenon of performing 
a non-assertoric speech acts by means of making one of a specific class of assertions, 
which I will call “aesthetic assertions”. Although cases of indirect speech acts are 
204 This chapter is a version of the paper written with Javier González de Prado Salas. 





well studied, the present topic should be distinguished from more familiar cases of 
indirect speech acts. To give an example, consider how by using an assertion we 
can indirectly perform a non-assertoric speech act as in (1), or how by using a non-
assertoric speech act we may indirectly assert as in (2): 
(1) In this house, we take off our shoes.  
(2) Did you see he fell asleep during your talk? 
On one approach, these cases are captured by saying that by uttering (1), the 
speaker directly asserts and indirectly commands, while in uttering (2) she directly 
asks and indirectly asserts. Of course, it is a context-dependent matter whether by 
using (1) and (2) the speaker would perform a command and an assertion, 
respectively. In contrast, as Ridge argues, there are context-independent cases 
when an indirect speech act is performed:   
[T]o assert that p is not only to express the belief that p; it is also to exert a 
kind of conversational pressure on one’s interlocutor to adopt the belief that 
p…I can advise you to believe in God simply by asserting that God exists’ 
(Ridge 2013: 58).205  
If we can think of advice as a non-assertoric speech act, this would suggest that 
when we assert we rarely do only as much: exerting “a kind of conversational 
pressure”, we manage to perform a non-assertoric act. In what follows, I will argue 
that we could now have specific content which triggers the same phenomenon. 
205 Ridge quotes Gibbard who says that “conversation is full of implicit demands and 
pressures. Suppose I confidently expound astrology, and you give no credence. The result 
will be discomfort: in effect, I demand that what I say be accepted, and you will not 




That is, unlike Ridge’s general point, I will argue that when we attribute aesthetic 
predicates, we typically perform both assertoric and non-assertoric speech act.  
7.1 Taste predicates: a brief survey 
I start by introducing a related class of predicates of personal taste. For over a 
decade now, there has been an extensive, and still ongoing, debate on the 
semantics and pragmatics of such predicates including “tasty”, “delicious” or “fun”. 
Consider the utterance of the following sentence:   
(3) Brussels sprouts are tasty. 
There are four positions on the table as to what one manages to express by means 
of uttering (3)––objectivism, contextualism, relativism, and expressivism.206   
 For the objectivist,207 in asserting that Brussels sprouts are tasty one ascribes a 
property to Brussels sprouts which they objectively have. In this sense, tastiness is no 
different from roundness or greenness: two people disagreeing as to whether 
Brussels sprouts are tasty would be talking about the same property. The truth of 
(3), hence, does not depend on the speaker, or on any third party. Instead, there is an 
objective matter of fact whether Brussels sprouts are tasty, as there is one 
objectively true standard of taste.208      
206 For a useful survey, see: MacFarlane (2014, Ch. 1).  
207 Alternative names include “realism” (Schafer 2011, Zangwill 2005) and “absolutism”. 
The semantic view objectivism comes with is referred to as “invariantism”, according to 
which the semantic contribution of “tasty” does not vary across contexts.      
208 We may grant the plurality of standards for different areas of discourse, but as long as a 




 A more careful objectivist will not rule out indeterminacy in the sphere of taste 
(culinary, aesthetic, or otherwise): as Schafer writes, “there are cases in which 
there is no fact of the matter about whether one work of art is more beautiful than 
another or about whether one of two dishes is more delicious” (Schafer, 275–6). In 
fact, this is what all “sane forms of aesthetic realism” predict (ibid.). Yet, if no 
indeterminacy is present, and if A and B disagree whether Brussels sprouts are 
tasty, then “at least one of these beliefs must be false” (Schafer, 268). Again, this is 
because Brussels sprouts are tasty or not, due to a fact of the matter which 
determines whether A or B will be right (Schafer, ibid).    
 In contrast, contextualism allows that the contents of both A’s and B’s 
assertions can be true. This is due to the feature that the property of tastiness 
ascribed in (3) need not be one and the same across different contexts as the 
semantic content of “x is tasty” can vary between contexts of use.209 On some 
contextualist views, (3) contains a hidden argument place for the speaker. On 
other, “group-standard” accounts, “the salient standard might be the standard of 
some group, though that group will under most circumstances at least contain the 
speaker and other parties to the conversation” (Sundell, 2011: 282). In this case, 
A’s and B’s assertion can be true if they belonged to two different groups. On 
some other versions of the “group-standard” account, the speaker need not be 
included at all (DeRose, 1991). Further still, the predicates of personal taste are 
sometimes understood as triggering the presupposition of commonality, that the 
relevant standard is shared by the speaker and her interlocutor (López de Sa 2007, 
2008). 
 On the relativist approach, the semantic content remains the same but the 
proposition can vary in truth value relative to a further parameter, such as the 
judge’s standard of taste. Radical relativism makes a further step, relativizing 




the truth now to the context of assessment yielding the context of use insufficient to 
determine the truth-value of the sentence/utterance.   
 As I have already mentioned some misgivings I had about radical relativism in 
Chapter 4, criticizing the possibility that one is obliged to retract an assertion 
which was correct when made, I will not go into any further detail here.210     
 The expressivist, finally, maintains that by uttering (3) we are not making any 
assertion about Brussels sprouts whatsoever: instead, I would be “just expressing 
my liking of its flavor—something I could have done nonverbally by smiling and 
licking my lips. This is different from saying that I like its flavor” (MacFarlane, 
2014: 1). Recent expressivist attempts at accounting for predicates of personal 
taste can be found in Potts (2007) and Gutzman (2014).  
7.1.1 Aesthetic predicates 
In this chapter, I will be interested in the predicates of “aesthetic taste”211 and the 
conversational import of our use of them. Although I will examine the paradigm 
case of ascribing beauty,212 the discussion is meant at clarifying other aesthetic 
predicates, too: what speech acts do we perform, and with which content, when, 
210 Of course, this does not exhaust the criticism of the radically relativist position. Among 
the most convincing objections is Evans’ worry, addressed further by López de Sa (2007) 
and Marques (2014), and defended in Greenough (2011).  
211 I am using this syntagm in order to distinguish such predicates from taste predicates 
which latter further divide into those which are gustatory (such as “tasty”) and those which 
are not (such as “funny”).    




attributing aesthetic predicates in general, such as “elegant”, “graceful”, “pompous” or 
“kitsch”?213     
 It might be instructive to compare aesthetic predicates with taste predicates.214 
One of the earliest comparisons was made by Kant in his third Critique (5: 212–3). 
Consider:       
(4) Brussels sprouts are tasty for me/to me. 
(5) Van Gogh’s Starry night is beautiful for me/to me.  
In a somewhat contemporary-looking argument, Kant inspects the behavior of 
what is now called the experiencer parameter––the “for me”/”to me” clause––as 
attached to otherwise free-standing attributions of taste in (4) and beauty in (5). 
According to the intuition Kant subscribes to, the use of (4) is felicitous, while the 
use of (5) is not. On his view, whereas (4) concerns what is agreeable and is thus 
rightly relativized to a subjective standard of taste, (5) is odd-sounding due to the 
added parameter. In attributing beauty, the speaker does not assert “merely for 
himself”, as in (4), “but for everyone” (CPJ, 214). Accordingly, in a no less 
modern-day fashion of speech-act vocabulary, Kant held that agreement with one’s 
213 Note that, in certain domains, the demarcation between aesthetic and non-aesthetic 
predicates may be somewhat blurry. To use examples given by McNally & Stojanović 
(forthcoming), while we may describe a sculpture as provocative and a theater performance 
as astonishing, we would encounter a wide range of cases where these predicates could be 
applied equally well without any aesthetic connotation. Accordingly, McNally & 
Stojanović distinguish between “aesthetic predicates” and those that “happen to be used in 
making an aesthetic judgment.”   
214 To prevent a possible confusion, note that on my view, as it will become clear later, 
aesthetic predicates depend on personal taste, which is why they could be strictly speaking 
labeled “predicates of personal taste”. However, we are using the label as it is introduced 
in the literature, referring to a well-known class of predicates including “tasty”, “fun”, and 




aesthetic judgment/assertion is demanded, and if not obtained, the speaker denies 
them taste and rebukes them for judging otherwise.   
 However, Kant’s intuition doesn’t seem to be preserved in modern-day 
English.215 Both “to me” and “for me” phrases seem to be widely used in beauty 
attributions. As it would be costly to invoke any kind of “pragmatic blindness”, I 
will try to do justice to Kant’s claim that aesthetic assertions possess a normative, 
universal dimension in a different manner, and apply this idea within a larger 
framework.   
7.2 The objection from testimony 
Consider the following scenario. Having visited El Prado, I ask you to describe me 
the painting that left the biggest impression on you. You proceed by offering four 
propositions:  
(6) The painting depicts a lady with an ermine. 
(7) Its dimensions are 54 cm X 39 cm. 
(8) The frame is blue.  
(9) The painting is beautiful.    
Intuitively, there appears to be some kind of disanalogy between the statements (6)–
(8) on the one hand and (9) on the other. As a first shot at capturing such 
disanalogy, it seems obvious that one can learn (6)–(8) as a testimonial upshot, 
obtaining second-hand knowledge. In contrast, it is at least not that obvious that 
one can learn (9). For one thing, the hearer will typically be disinclined to reassert 
(9) if she did not observe the painting herself. Further, they may refuse to treat (9) 




as being true on their aesthetic standard, leaving the matter indeterminate for the 
time being. Finally, if they were to treat (9) as a piece of testimonial knowledge in 
reassessing it, their audience would be likely to regard their assertions as odd, 
provided that they know the speaker was not experientially acquainted with the 
painting. Indeed, they might regard (10) meant as a full, sincere report, as being 
absurd in the Moorean sense:  
(10) The painting is beautiful but I have never seen it. 
On the face of it, (10) might appear odd insofar as its first conjunct implies that the 
painting has been perceived, the same claim that the speaker goes on to deny by 
means of the second conjunct. The same feature is exhibited by Moorean sentences 
like “It is raining but I don’t believe that it is raining” – as the first conjunct implies 
precisely what is being denied in the next step.  
 In defense of invariantism, we cannot conclude much from these 
considerations. It is surely an unargued step to go on further and conclude that 
there is something distinctive about aesthetic discourse that makes knowledge 
transfer impossible. As a first shot, the invariantist may try to soften the blow, 
arguing that (10) is still different from a standard Moorean sentence. For, unlike 
the latter, we can actually make sense of (10) by adding a certain explanation. 
Think of two art fans sharing the same interest in a certain painter. For the sake of 
example, we can allow that they coincide in their aesthetic evaluation as far as 
possible: they have the exact same criteria for evaluation (with the same order of 
priority) and agree in how the previous paintings of this artist are to be ranked. 
Given this, it really is possible that one of them comes to learn that the new 
painting she has never seen is beautiful merely on the grounds that her peer said so, 




case, the semantic content of “x is beautiful” appears to be invariant between the 
contexts of use of the two enthusiasts.    
 Unfortunately, this is still far from enough. As we have seen, the invariantist 
urges that beauty is perspective-invariant property just as colors or tastes are. If so, 
both “beautiful” and “blue” would pick out perspective-invariant properties, and 
the testimonial practices involving these terms would work identically. And yet 
they don’t: going back to (8) above, it seems perfectly in order to reassert “The 
frame is blue” as a piece of second-hand knowledge. Further, when used to 
construct the analogue of (10) the result doesn’t necessitate any further 
explanation (provided that the source is reliable):   
(11) The frame is blue, but I have never seen it. 
The invariantist, thus, still fails to fully capture the disanalogy noted above between 
(8) and (9), or between (10) and (11) for that matter. We are still in need of an 
explanation why the two pairs exhibit dissimilarities if the properties they involve – 
“blueness” and “beauty”––are both perspective-invariant. Why is the experiential 
nature of aesthetic judgments (their “first-handness”, as we may call it) a pervasive 
phenomenon, in contrast to color judgments?  
 One way for the invariantist would be to bite the bullet, and deny the 
importance of first-handness in attributions of aesthetic predicates. Thus, on the 
invariantist proposal advocated by Schafer (2011), the testimony of an expert can 
still lead one to reassess her appraisal of a work of art. However, this reply does 
not seem to bring us any closer to ruling out first-handness – for, in order to 
reassess one’s original appraisal, there had to be assessment in the first place. What 
Schafer needs to show, hence, is that there was no first-handness involved in 




 A further option for the invariantist would be to explain our reluctance in 
wholeheartedly accepting others’ aesthetic judgments by stressing a great 
variability in such judgments. However, this approach is not without problems of 
its own. For, if the aesthetic judgments of others are so unreliable, why would 
anyone think they are in a better position with respect to such judgments? In order 
to avoid such aesthetic chauvinism, it seems one would have to become skeptical of 
one’s own reliability in being a judge of aesthetic matters. Both options seem 
undesirable.  
 In any case, if the invariantist chooses to keep her semantics intact, she might 
still be able to explain the data in some further way, by adding epicycles to the 
pragmatics of “beautiful”. However, the resulting picture would appear to be 
exceedingly complex. Accordingly, we leave invariantism aside, and proceed by 
examining an alternative option which suggests itself for its simplicity in accounting 
for these phenomena.  
7.3 Naïve contextualism 
In contrast to invariantism, the framework I wish to explore is perspective-
sensitive: by positing a hidden indexical parameter for the speaker’s standard of 
taste,216 one’s utterance of “x is beautiful” will convey that “x is beautiful according 
to the speaker’s aesthetic standards”. The view is sometimes called “naïve 
216 Of course, as suggested above, more flexible contextualist views can be pursued. 
Aesthetic predicates could make an indexical reference to a contextually salient standard 
which need not be the standard of the speaker (Sundell, 2011). The relevant standard may 
be that of a group, too, or the shared standard salient to the conversation (defended by 
DeRose as “a single scoreboard contextualism”) on which “x is beautiful” is close in 




contextualism” (alternatively, “individualized indexical contextualism”),217  as it 
provides only an argument place for the speaker.   
 First-handness seems congenial to naïve contextualism: if one correctly asserts 
that x is beautiful, then given that such an assertion amounts to saying that x is 
beautiful relative to the speaker’s standards of taste, the speaker will typically 
arrive at such knowledge upon experiencing x. 218 In other words, one normally 
learns that an object is beautiful for one upon observing it. Note, however, that 
naïve contextualism is able to explain a more important feature, the converse of 
first-handness, which we may call Authority: in virtue of having observed x, the 
speaker will typically be in a position to make a correct assertion that x is beautiful. 
That is, the naïve contextualist doesn’t need to introduce the additional recognition 
of what is correct according to the aesthetic standards of a group, let alone 
recognition of any objective matters of fact about beauty in order to allow the 
speaker to arrive at the correct judgment: the speaker can know everything she 
needs to know by experiencing.  
7.3.1 Two problems for naïve contextualism 
Two large problems that the defender of naïve contextualism faces concern 
normativity and disagreement. It is due to its difficulty in accommodating these 
features that naïve contextualism is sometimes characterized as the “simple-
minded” version of contextualism.  
217 See: Baker (2012). 
218  A further source of context-sensitivity concerns the gradability of the adjective 
“beautiful” and its dependence on relevant comparison classes: e.g., some painting may be 
beautiful-as-painted-by-a-child but not beautiful-as-painted-by-a-MOMA-artist. I will not 





If by sincerely uttering “x is beautiful” one thereby asserts something equivalent in 
meaning to “x is beautiful relative to my aesthetic standard”, the present account 
seems to run into some difficulties. For, under pretty much any norm of assertion, 
the illocutionary act will turn out to be correct in most cases. This has an odd ring 
to it: as Zangwill remarks, it is not the case that “anything goes”––there are some 
aesthetic judgments we ought to make and some that we ought not to make 
(Zangwill, 2005: 68).      
 The qualifier “in most cases” is added to account for those scenarios when the 
speaker may still be wrong in her judgment, even on the naïve contextualist 
picture; e.g., the attributor may misidentify the property in question, now judging the 
object to be beautiful when it would be more aptly viewed as “elegant”, say. 
Likewise, the speaker may fail to observe some of the relevant features of the 
object: thus, while identifying the property correctly, she could still fail to make 
the right judgment even relative to her own aesthetic standard (due to favorable or 
unfavorable lighting conditions, for instance). Also, the speaker may be wrong 
about her own aesthetic standards. Yet, these cases are rather rare and most of the 
time we will assert correctly. This brings into focus our problem – naïve 
contextualism legitimizes “bad taste” judgments as correct, contrary to our 
intuitions. To quote Egan:     
If I maintain that some tune I’ve just idly pinged out on a piano is a more 
beautiful piece of music than Mozart’s Requiem, … I have just got it wrong. 
There are a lot of cases in which the parties to the dispute should arrive at a 




both parties to the dispute ought to endorse (Egan, 2010, 248–9, italics 
added).   
Unlike the naïve contextualist, the realist has a rather easy way of accommodating 
the points made by Zangwill and Egan: as aesthetic assertions do not provide an 
argument place for the speaker, our aesthetic taste may easily fail the one true 
standard, allowing our aesthetic attributions to be more easily fallible.219  
7.3.1.2 Disagreement 
A further worry for the naïve contextualist comes from disagreement data. If the 
semantic content of “x is beautiful” is always indexed to the speaker’s aesthetic 
standards, how do we ever come to disagree with other agents? As it is frequently 
observed, the naïve contextualist seems forced to view clear cases of disagreement 
as mere cases of talking past each other.220 In MacFarlane’s words, it would turn 
out that “we are no more disagreeing with each other than we would be if I were to 
say:  “My name is John” and you were to say “My name is not John” (MacFarlane, 
2007: 18).    
 Once again, we shouldn’t forget that some other contextualist proposals do 
not face these proposals as dramatically as the naïve contextualist version does.221  
219 While the objectivist accommodates for the intuitions about normativity, she seems to 
fail in capturing the intuition that our attributions of aesthetic (and taste) predicates are 
typically correct.  
220 See Lasersohn (2005: 649), MacFarlane (2007), and Barker (2012).   
221 Björnsson and Almér (2009) argue that agreement and disagreement sometimes does 
not target the content literally asserted, but rather the satisfaction of some other condition 
made salient by the utterance. In their example, the claim “I was amazed how much 
healthier Bob looked” may be met with the reply “Yes, so was I.” In offering this reply, the 




7.4 Recanati’s analysis 
Before presenting our view, let us assess Recanati’s (2008) account and its success 
in capturing the desiderata of normativity and disagreement: 
REC:  “It is beautiful” means something like It is beautiful for us, that is, for the 
community to which the speaker and his audience belong. (58) 
The relevant aesthetic standard changes on Recanati’s approach: the aesthetic 
proposition is not evaluated merely in relation to the speaker, but against the 
standard of the relevant community. For the sake of clarity, this much does not 
entail that such an aesthetic standard will not precisely be the standard of a single 
individual (perhaps even the standard which only one person has and no one else 
does). Such an option is compatible with Recanati’s point that something is the 
standard because it represents or determines the relevant communal standard or 
standards.   
 Recanati’s manoeuver satisfies the desiderata of normativity and disagreement. 
As to the former, by introducing a more demanding standard, aesthetic claims are 
assessed as true or false in relative independence from the speaker’s personal taste, 
suspending the “anything goes” verdict which Zangwill rejects. Disagreement is 
addressed, too – aesthetic disputes are now on the same page, as it were, with all 
the parties trying to track the common standard. Clearly, such a disagreement is 
not faultless as, barring indeterminacy, one party will be simply wrong, insofar as 
they dissent from the communal standard.     





 An important concern is how such a standard is actually determined on 
communal views, such as Recanati’s. According to one line of thought, it could be 
established by the agreement of all of its members. But since such a consensus is 
rarely achieved, this would entail that most objects are neither beautiful nor ugly, 
marking this option as a non-starter. Alternatively, the standard could be 
determined by “counting”: depending on what the majority of agents judge or say, 
a given attribution will be deemed correct or not. This doesn’t seem to be an 
attractive option either. For, while the normative standard can emerge from mere 
counting, as it does in the case of jurying, our case is yet different: there does not 
seem to be any competent community (as in the case of jurying) which would lead 
to a number of counter-intuitive results: e.g., since Beethoven’s listeners would be 
outnumbered by fans of popular music, it would already follow that the latter has 
more aesthetic quality. It is thus instructive to abandon this position, too. Finally, 
the third option, which Recanati seems to be appealing to, identifies the relevant 
standard with that of privileged group of critics with the relevant expertise, 
particular training, and refined taste.    
7.4.1 A dilemma for Recanati’s view 
Although the strategy of introducing privileged members of the community is more 
satisfying than the first two options, it can be questioned, too. In particular, this 
view seems susceptible to the following dilemma––either (i) the speech act made 
by uttering “x is beautiful” is performed correctly, in which case it is often a guess 
rather than an assertion, or else (ii) the speech act is an assertion, but typically an 
incorrect one.222  
222 Here it is presupposed that one is typically uninformed about the experts’ judgment. 




To expand on this worry, it is useful to invoke the knowledge norm of assertion, 
although the weaker norms can deliver the point with similar cogency. If we need 
knowledge to epistemically warrant our aesthetic attributions, it would seem that 
“laymen” or anyone who is not an expert in aesthetic matters would typically make 
such statements incorrectly. For, the vast majority of non-experts (if not everyone) 
lack evidence about the experts’ opinion (more obviously so if the evaluated object 
is a new piece of art, and there was no way of learning about the experts’ opinion 
by reading their critiques, say). Of course, this is not to say that “laymen” will 
always lack epistemic warranty. However, their epistemic credentials would 
indeed not be significantly different from the credentials we have when offering 
educated, or even “wild”, guesses.   
Further, I wish to invoke another “article of faith”, the claim that attributions of 
beauty to an object (just like attributions of color or tastiness) are usually 
warranted.223 For, we attribute aesthetic predicates confidently, on a daily basis, 
and have the strong intuition that such judgments are well-grounded. But as we 
often lack knowledge (and perhaps even justification) about the experts’ opinions 
on aesthetic matters, such attributions would easily turn out to be incorrect.  
  Clearly, both options are unacceptable: we cannot insist that the resulting 
speech act is a guess as it misidentifies the nature of the illocutionary act we 
typically perform when attributing beauty; we should insist that we perform the 
assertion but do so incorrectly, either––if we conceive of our assertoric practice in 
normative terms, it is more natural to assume that we perform such acts correctly, 
lack such information for any new piece of art; further, the variety of beauty attributions 
they make will still be more widespread than their knowledge of experts’, often very 
specific, fields of interest. The same should hold for “laymen”, although to a greater 
extent.  
223 The assumption seems reasonable on the grounds that we make such judgments with 
certain conviction, frequency, and perhaps most importantly, autonomy, as we do not 




rather than incorrectly.224 In fact, we seem to be entitled to make aesthetic 
judgment even when we are aware that we disagree with the view prevalent among 
experts or relevant peers. It is thus not irrational or infelicitous to utter (12): 
(12) Despite being unanimously disliked by audience and critics, this painting is 
beautiful. 
Unfortunately, for Recanati, (12) is bound to be an unwarranted statement, as the 
propositional content of “x is beautiful” would still refer to the standard of the 
relevant experts.225 The mere fact that we disagree with the critics makes our 
judgment false.  
Furthermore, we often witness that well-trained experts disagree about 
aesthetic matters. Recanati’s account should offer a clear procedure to determine 
which of the two experts’ standard is the relevant one. Unfortunately, Recanati 
doesn’t say anything about this and it is not clear how he could devise such a 
procedure. All this suggests, I take it, that the assertoric content of “x is beautiful” 
does not refer to other people’s aesthetic standards (be it experts or laymen).   
 Recanati is aware of some of these difficulties. In particular, he acknowledges 
that cases like (12) present a problem for his account. His paper ends with a 
tentative suggestion that in these cases, speakers are perhaps not appealing to the 
standards of the community as they currently are, but rather to the way those 
communal standards should be developed.226 In what follows, such a normative 
twist will be explored in more detail.   
224 See the previous foot-note.  
225 One may claim that speakers may systematically be mistaken about the sort of speech 
act they are performing, but it is preferable to keep the level of “pragmatic blindness” of 
the speakers at a minimum (it is one of our desiderata to avoid an error theory).  




7.5 Beauty attributions as double-speech acts 
On the view to be defended here, by earnestly uttering “x is beautiful”, one is 
performing a double such act.227 Against the expressivist, we claim that one of 
these speech acts is an assertion, or more precisely a report228 relative to the 
speaker’s aesthetic standard. Another illocutionary act performed is that of a 
recommendation.     
 The role the assertion plays in the naïve contextualist framework is that it 
allows us to capture what was problematic about Recanati’s view: namely, that 
attributions of aesthetic predicates are performed by means of assertions, and that 
such assertions are typically correct ones. The latter can be explained by the fact that 
the assertion in question is a kind of a sophisticated report: namely, by reporting on 
her aesthetic taste, the speaker surely knows her standard as she is acquainted with 
it. Of course, as mentioned above, I do not wish to exclude the possibility that 
aesthetic assertions could be in principle made incorrectly––the agent may fail to 
correctly identify the property she attributes, fail to make a good inference due to 
perceiving the object in a different setting, while being in a peculiar psychological 
state, and so on. Leaving aside such a possibility, the naïve contextualist will 
generally be well-positioned to explain why ascriptions of beauty turn out to be 
227 The same goes for other aesthetic predicates and, more generally, all value terms 
(“brave”, “boring”, or what have you). An interesting view along these lines, but applied 
to epistemic modals, has been defended by Montminy (2012).    
228 The notion of “report” I have in mind here requires first-handness and thus aligns with 
Barker’s evaluation of it as being “the most straightforward kind of assertion” (Barker, 
2004: 9). It parts ways with Barker at other points––e.g., Barker contends that uttering 
“snow is white” counts as a report given that it can be “a stance-taking with respect to a 
commitment to representing how things are”, admittedly even by those who have never 




correct. And as “correctness” is conceived here in terms of KA/CK, the conclusion 
will a fortiori apply to any weaker conception.   
7.5.1 Recommendation 
Now, although naïve contextualism seems congenial to first-handness and able to 
cash out Authority easily (i.e., the claim that in virtue of having observed x, the 
speaker will typically be in a position to make a correct assertion that x is 
beautiful), she may face considerable difficulties in explaining both the normativity 
aspect as well as the intuitions about disagreement. At this stage, the second speech 
act of recommendation proves useful. As suggested above, by uttering “x is 
beautiful” one is typically doing more than merely reporting how a given object is 
evaluated against one’s own aesthetic standards: one also implicitly recommends the 
audience to accept that x is beautiful.  
 The content of a recommendation is not truth-evaluable: we are not 
describing things as being a certain way. Nor are we advising one to perceive the 
object, for that matter: the recommendation is, instead, conditional upon such a 
perception; we are inviting the addressee to do something, namely exercise a 
sensibility that would lead them to accept our appraisal. The recommendation is 
complied with once the addressee does what is recommended. The 
recommendation extends to how the addressee should be using the relevant 
predicates; in Plunkett and Sundell’s (2013) terminology, the recommendation is 
partly metalinguistic, insofar as it is “negotiating [the] appropriate use” (2013:15) 
of the aesthetic predicate in question.229      





A general motivation for interpreting utterances of “x is beautiful” as conveying a 
recommendation in addition to an assertion, is that there is a residuum of a sort that 
recommendation seems to explain nicely.  
 As a starting point, consider utterances of the type “x is rich”. Richard (2004) 
offers an interesting view along the lines I pursued above:     
Suppose that I assertively utter ‘Mary is rich’, when it is not antecedently 
settled for conversational purposes whether Mary is in the term’s extension. 
My statement, that Mary is rich, is as much an invitation to look at things in a 
certain way, as it is a representation of how things are. In saying that Mary is 
rich, I am inviting you to think of being rich in such a way that Mary counts as 
rich. If you accept my invitation – that is, if you don’t demur, and carry on the 
conversation – that sets the standards for wealth, for the purposes of the 
conversation, so as to make what I say true. (...) [A]n assertion can be as much 
an invitation to conceptualize things in a certain way, as a representation of 
how things are (...). (Richard 2004: 226, my emphasis). 
I do not wish to engage in the analysis of Richard’s text here, nor commit myself to 
any position with respect to the attributions of the predicate “rich”. The point of 
interest is that there is a non-assertoric act performed in attributing richness to an 
individual. The motivation to posit a similar non-assertoric act when speakers 
attribute aesthetic predicates seems even stronger. In aesthetic debates, we 
respond to disagreements by becoming more involved, both as speakers and as 
audience. Kant portrayed this kind of “involvement” by describing the opposing 
parties as often denying taste to each other and issuing rebukes. Regardless of 




perspective-dependent properties are less involved: when disagreeing about 
aesthetic attributions, 230  our disagreement defies being captured by a mere 
divergence in our reports on what we like. There’s something more to it.    
 To accommodate such data, Kant came up with the notion of demands, arguing 
that in offering an aesthetic claim, we are demanding from our audience to accept 
it. All three acts just mentioned – Richard’s invitation, my recommendation, and 
Kant’s demand, are directives231 in Searle’s taxonomy and are probably to be listed 
in this order if one is to start from the least strong to the strongest.   
 One might think that each of these directives might be performed when 
aesthetic attributions are made. If you venture to say that something is absolutely 
ugly you are hardly inviting someone to share your opinion, but are more obviously 
demanding that such an object be recognized as such. The cases to the contrary 
abound, too. But in order to pursue the simplest strategy, we will conceive of 
recommendations as being a middle ground, as it were: weak recommendations are 
tantamount to invitations, while strong recommendations can be seen as demands.  
b. The correctness conditions
Just like assertions, recommendations are a normative kind, or so I shall argue. It is 
not clear, however, that recommendations are normative in the same sense as 
assertions are. As far as assertions go, we have argued that from the point of view 
230 As mentioned, this feature is not necessarily confined to aesthetic values. Ethical 
statements, plausibly, should be accounted for in the similar manner. However, this 
would require much more space than I can allot to it here.   
231 An anonymous referee has suggested that the present account bears similarities to 
Hare’s prescriptivism, according to which evaluative statements involve a universalized 
prescription. However, as with “demands” and “invitations”, prescriptions likewise seem 
to differ from recommendations in “strength” (to use another Searle’s term), as 




of their norm, they are always and only assessed as correct or incorrect. Yet, while 
recommendations can also be assessed by such a pair of adjectives, it seems natural 
to resist that the normative assessment of recommendations mirrors that of 
assertions,  for at least two reasons.   
 First, when it comes to assertion, if asserting that Rope is a great movie is 
correct, then asserting the contradictory content is not, and vice versa. Unlike with 
assertions, we cannot judge that if a recommendation to watch Rope is correct, it 
automatically follows that recommending not to watch Rope in the same situation is 
thereby incorrect.232 Secondly, the normativity of recommendations adds a further 
layer to what we had with assertions. While assertions can be only correct and 
incorrect, it seems that a recommendation can be more correct than some other 
recommendation, rendering the normativity of this speech act also comparative233 in 
nature.  
 As regards the first of these points, imagine two people recommending to 
someone to watch Rope and not to watch it, respectively. What precludes both of 
these acts from being correct? In answering this question, note that in certain 
conditions a recommendation will be correct or not depending by and large on the 
addressee; e.g., if the addressee explicitly stated that she doesn’t want to see any of  
Hitchcock’s movies, the former recommendation would be incorrect. However, in 
normal conditions, when the assessment of recommendation does not depend to 
such a high extent on the addressee, the correctness of recommendations will more
232 As introduced above, I take it that the content of recommendation is not truth-
evaluable and does not take the form “I recommend that p”, which is why it cannot be 
contradicting the content of other recommendations.   
233  In addition to recommendations, analogies also seem to admit of both types of 
correctness: just as one analogy could be more correct than some other, another analogy can 




obviously depend on the speaker, 234 and more particularly, on her aesthetic 
standard. If so, the mere fact that two recommendations are clashing with one 
another seems irrelevant: so long as there is no contradiction or incoherence 
among each speaker’s set of beliefs about Rope, both of their recommendations may 
be correct.  
c. The relation to assertion
How is this double speech act supposed to work? Is a recommendation always made 
when aesthetic predicates are attributed? And how exactly is it conveyed? 
 Assertion should be understood as the first speech act, and recommendation 
the second. The connection between the two acts is that when the assertion is made, 
the content of the recommendation is typically conversationally implied.  
      Recommendations can be absent, however, even when an aesthetic assertion is 
clearly being made. This happens when one relativizes aesthetic assertions to the 
subject as in “x is beautiful for me”. Once such an argument is explicitly invoked, 
the recommendation is no longer made, as the original, free-standing assertion is 
being withdrawn.235 In so doing, I am only reporting my own evaluation, without 
getting across any other recommendation that this evaluation be shared with 
others.  
234 Of course, the criteria for a recommendation can exclusively concern the addressee: 
e.g., if I know you suffer from photosensitive epilepsy it would be incorrect to
recommend to you watching a movie with many flashing lights. 




d. Accepting the recommendation
The correctness conditions of a recommendation (or any other illocutionary act, 
for that matter) should not depend on a perlocutionary effect, such as that of 
accepting the recommendation. Instead, the acceptance is a point of 
recommendation, to use Searle’s terminology. 
 That being said, we still need to show that such a perlocutionary effect could 
take place, for otherwise it would not be clear that we have described the act 
correctly as a recommendation. A related worry one may raise is that unlike other 
recommendations, the addressee is not obviously in a position to accept or fulfill it. 
Indeed, we do not seem to have control over our aesthetic standards, especially not 
if we have already perceived the salient object and formed a different opinion. 
Could we say, then, that just as there is no sense in recommending someone to 
stop being allergic to dogs, say, there is no reason to think we could be 
recommending matters of aesthetic taste, either?  
      To prevent confusion, we need to explicate what effects recommendations are 
supposed to produce. Imagine that your addressee openly belittles the value of x 
but that, after your recommending x to another person, she immediately changes her 
mind. Normally, we would find this reaction unnatural and inappropriate. For, 
accepting another’s aesthetic opinion (especially when it is at odds with one’s own) 
cannot be achieved automatically, as it were. Instead, it is a process, involving more 
or less complex behavior exhibited over time: getting to know the object more 
closely, focusing on its details, trying to develop the sensibility for its positive 
assessment, etc. Ideally, the audience would be disposed to appreciate the object in 
the way the recommender does, thus coming to share the aesthetic appreciation. In 




-ommendations, although one has to be careful how to flesh out the conditions 
under which such a directive is accepted.  
e. The scope of recommendation
As a rule of thumb, recommendations address the actual interlocutors, but also 
anyone who can be reached by a testimonial chain.    
    This does not seem to be always the case, however. To use Prinz’s (2014) 
example, the dissimilarity between two musical genres, and between their 
followers, oftentimes can be so great that the two parties are plausibly excluded 
from each others’ recommendations. When punk fans recommend (on the present 
view) London Calling, are they addressing everyone, including those who openly 
deny any artistic value to punk?  
 There are two ways to go from here. One is to say that such a 
recommendation is in fact constrained: in claiming that London Calling is a 
masterpiece, the punker is not addressing anyone outside of the punk clique. On 
another approach, the scope of recommendation is universal whenever the 
aesthetic assertion is unqualified (i.e., whenever one does not introduce the 
experiencer argument “for me”/”to me”).   
 I don’t wish to choose between the two options, although I would like to 
notice that there are two further ways to proceed from the first point. On one 
approach, since punkers form a close-knit community, a punker would actually 
detest if someone from the “outside” were to praise The Clash: their songs are to be 
valued and understood only by a specific community, not by everyone. But to 
capture this type of attitude, we don’t necessarily need to have the scope 
restricted: the attitudes described could be behavioral in a more crude sense, 
without being reflected in any illocutionary force. On another approach, the 




This line of thought is more taxing, as it presupposes that our intentions play a role 
for which speech act is being conveyed. As such, it owes an explanation as to how 
it could be that merely in virtue of one’s intention one manages to convey an 
additional speech act.  
f. Recommending a lost object
One of the tasks for the present account is to explain why it would be plausible to 
recommend beauty to objects which have been lost or irreparably destroyed. For, 
although we attribute beauty to such objects, it is not clear why it would make 
sense to recommend appreciation of an object that the audience will never have a 
chance of encountering.236     
 One way of accounting for this worry would be to insist that 
recommendations are implicitly issued with respect to most, but still not all 
attributions of beauty. When attributing beauty to lost objects, it might be that we 
are only making an assertion without the additional recommendation.  
  Similarly, in uttering a relativized sentence “x is beautiful to me”, the 
recommendation is also lacking. Such an utterance makes explicit that the speaker 
is making a claim exclusively about her own aesthetic standard, without making 
recommendations of any sort. On another, perhaps more sensible approach, the 
key point is that the relevant recommendation is conditional in nature: if the 
audience were to encounter the relevant object, they should develop certain 
dispositions outlined above, to appreciate the object in the way recommended by 
the attributor. If the antecedent is not satisfied, then no such dispositions need to 
be developed.  




g. The correctness conditions, revisited
What is the rule of asserting “x is beautiful”? By plugging in CK, one would thereby 
commit oneself to knowing that x is beautiful for oneself (and knowledge would be 
secured by having access to one’s own standard of taste). As suggested, one can still 
fail to comply with one’s own standards of correctness by misidentifying the 
property or not fulfilling some preparatory conditions (such as observing all 
relevant lower-level properties of the object, and so on).  
 On the present account, whenever an aesthetic assertion is made correctly, 
the speaker will thereby make correctly the recommendation, too. That is, as long 
as one fulfills the standards for knowing that x is beautiful according to one’s own 
aesthetic standards, one will thereby satisfy the conditions for a recommendation to 
be successful. Once again, this depends on whether the speaker’s standards are 
salient for the assessment of a given recommendation, and the hearer’s relevance 
are not made more salient by a certain contextual feature.237   
7.5.2 Normativity and disagreement 
We have seen how Recanati’s account tries to satisfy the desiderata of 
normativity and disagreement. On the present account, these requirements 
could be handled primarily by means of the second speech act, recommendation. 
As far as normativity goes, we have mentioned above that the content of 
recommendation is that the addressee, and anyone who can be reached by the 
testimonial chain, adopts the speaker’s aesthetic judgment. Accordingly, we have 
avoided embedding any “should” claim within the content. But justifiedly so: the 
237 As when in the example with Rope (7.5.1 b) the hearer makes clear she doesn’t want to 




“should” claim seems to be present in the very act of recommending. When 
recommending to someone to accept a given judgment, we see ourselves as 
insisting that they ought to do so. In this sense, among others, recommendation 
differs from assertions. Kant’s insistence on the universal nature of aesthetic 
judgment is thus captured by the default, universal scope of aesthetic 
recommendations: in principle, any two individuals making aesthetic 
recommendations which clash with one another will be seen as being in a 
normative conflict. This solution avoids invoking any realist commitments, such as 
introducing aesthetic facts, as urged by one of our desiderata mentioned above. 
 Disagreement is being accounted for at the level of recommendations, too. 
What we disagree about (again, for the most part) is whether the given object 
should be viewed by others as beautiful (i.e., as mentioned above, this should 
follow even if the content does not contain the “should” phrase). Our proposal, 
thus, echoes the traditional expressivist strategy of accounting for disagreement as 
disagreement in (non-doxastic) attitudes, rather than in the descriptive content 
asserted. On the present account, two recommendations will be incompatible in 
the relevant sense when they cannot be both followed by the same individual. This 
will occur whenever their satisfaction requires the audience to appreciate an object 
in incompatible ways recommended or underwritten by incompatible standards or 
sensibilities.  
7.5.2.1 The argument from disagreement 
If the naïve contextualist is right and the semantic content of “x is beautiful” ought 
to be identified with “x is beautiful according to my aesthetic standard”, then a 




(13) Barcelona is beautiful. 
(14) Barcelona is beautiful relative to my aesthetic standard. 
If so, how could (13) and (14) have the same semantic content? I think here we 
should reply along the following lines: according to the account developed here, 
we could say that when we reject (13) we are rejecting what its speaker recommends, 
while, in accepting (14), we deem as true merely the speaker’s report. By granting 
this, the initial worry seems to disappear.     
7.5.2.2 Ways of disagreeing 
Finally, let me briefly remark how aesthetic disagreements can be resolved.  
(i) Perhaps the most intuitive way of resolving a disagreement is by (mutual) 
appeal to the common-ground. For example, one can try and justify the quality of a 
painting by emphasizing it has a good perspective, symmetrical balance, uses 
vibrant colors, and so on.  The opponent will typically either claim that the object 
lacks the mentioned features (at least to a significant degree), or that the object 
lacks other, more salient qualities. In either case, it is common to appeal to 
whichever common-ground features are accepted in the culture and education to 
which the participants of the discussion belong.    
(ii) If the parties to the debate belong to different cultures (or the dispute is 
not resolved for whichever other reason) the speakers might find themselves in the 
business of “aesthetic persuasion” – the agents now try to present the artwork in 
the most favorable light, hoping that their interlocutors will pick up on these 




 (iii) And if no agreement seems forthcoming despite such attempts, the 
conflicting parties may simply retreat to a qualified assertion of the form “Well, I 
(don’t) find it beautiful”. These explicit speaker-relative reports signal the end of 
the debate, as they make clear that we are issuing almost a personal statement 
rather than offering a directive to the relevant audience.  
7.6 Final remarks 
Initially, the idea behind this chapter was to explore how the knowledge account 
applies to particular types of assertions, such as those attributing aesthetic 
predicates. One of the starting points was that these assertions are typically made 
correctly––as we so often seem to be convinced in their truth, and unshaken by the 
judgments of others. Unsurprisingly, KA fit seamlessly with naïve contextualism: 
in asserting that “x is beautiful”, the agent reports that x is beautiful relative to her 
aesthetic standard, which she has knowledge of. Further, as I argued, naïve 
contextualism should be combined with the view that aesthetic attributions express 
recommendations, which allows one to account easily for the desiderata of 
normativity and disagreement.  
8 
Non-Linguistic Assertions 
In Chapter 4, I have defined asserting as committing oneself to knowing the 
proposition expressed. In so doing, I have explained the property of “being 
expressed” linguistically––a proposition that p is expressed by a sentence s iff there is 
a sentence s of which the speaker makes a free-standing use such that p is, or is part 
of, the truth condition of s. Now, this invites the question whether a proposition can 
be also expressed non-linguistically and, further, whether we can commit ourselves to 
knowing it and thus assert it. In what follows, I discuss the possibility of such non-
linguistic assertions.        
There is an important ambiguity in the term “non-linguistic assertion”. Most of 
us would allow for what might be called partly non-linguistic assertions; for example, 
when asked whether Jack Nicholson plays Torrance in The Shining, you may reply 
only by nodding your head (as you are having a breakfast, say). Arguably, your 
nodding would suffice for you to assert an affirmative answer to the question. For, the 
gesture you use in the given circumstance is relevantly linked to an explicitly 
formulated proposition in the question.238 We may also point out that this gesture is 
238 See: Fricker (2012: 74, 81). 
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likewise a conventional means of conveying assent, although this is not necessary to 
make the act have such assertoric force. For, even if one introduced a completely 
new gesture, an assertion could be performed by using it: it is only required that it 
becomes common ground which explicitly formulated proposition is attached to such 
a gesture as its meaning. 239  The key feature, thus, is the explicitness, not the 
conventionality of the gesture.      
A philosophically more interesting problem is that of a wholly non-linguistic 
assertion: can one make an assertion if the act one performs does not rely on the 
explicit, linguistic expression of the propositional content at all? Call this condition 
“the linguistic criterion”. The problem I will be tackling in this chapter, thus, is 
whether the linguistic criterion is necessary in order to perform an assertion.  
Although this problem has been raised and discussed to some extent in the 
works by Schiffer (1972), Sperber and Wilson (1986), Rigotti & Greco (2009), and 
MacFarlane (2011), it was not until Elizabeth Fricker’s (2012) “Stating and 
Insinuating”, that a strong position on the topic has been defended. In particular, 
Fricker argued that a wholly non-linguistic act––labeled “one-off Grice” in her 
terminology––cannot count as an assertion. The example Fricker uses to introduce a 
class of one-off Grice is as follows:  
CAR KEYS. “Suppose you and I have been to a concert together, but arrived 
in our separate cars. As we leave, I am unable to find my car keys—if I can’t 
find them you will have to drive me home. I go to my car, you remain distant. 
Then—having found the keys in my bag—I wave at you, and make a thumbs-
up sign to you, being sure you see me do so. By this act I enable you to know 
that I have found my keys, and hence that you can set off home without more 
ado.” (Fricker, 2012: 72)  
239 In addition, certain contextual clues ought to be present so as to make it clear that the 
sign is used with assertoric, as opposed to some other force. 
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Although CAR KEYS clearly fails the linguistic criterion, and thus counts as an one-
off Grice, one may wonder whether other uses of waving or showing a thumbs-up 
sign might be allowed the status of assertions more easily. That being said, although I 
will try to argue that even CAR KEYS contains an assertion, a significant part of the 
chapter will discuss more simple cases, which also appear to satisfy the linguistic 
criterion and yet more obviously fall under the heading of assertion.  
In what follows, I try to argue against Fricker’s view, maintaining that some 
instances of one-off Grice (“OOG” for short) can be viewed as genuine assertions. In 
this sense, OOGs can be viewed as being capable of transmitting testimony240 as well 
as being instances of telling.241 On its own, these claims do not exclude the possibility 
that other, non-assertoric acts can be performed by OOGs. For example, when a 
police officer holds her hand vertically while on the road, she is undoubtedly 
commanding you to stop your vehicle. On the other hand, this does not entail that 
every OOG will automatically count as some illocutionary act, assertion or 
otherwise. Instead, as I will argue, there are reasons to consider some OOGs as 
falling short of communicating any content at all.          
I start out by making some general remarks about OOGs. In sections 8.2 and 
8.3, I deal with Fricker’s (2012) two arguments. I then proceed to outline some 
240 It should be observed that Fricker oscillates between making a more guarded claim, 
pinpointing that OOGs do not amount to “explicit testifying” (65) or “full-strength 
testifying” (83), and stronger claims such as “one-off Gricean communication does not 
amount to testifying to any content so conveyed” (84). Although Fricker’s argument slides 
between these two claims, she goes on to make the stronger claim after having made the 
guarded one.  
241 As mentioned in Chapter 4, telling is considered to be a species of assertion, the 
successful performance of which always has an addressee. For further discussion and 
examples see: Fricker (2006), Owens (2006), Lackey (2008), and Pelling (2014). Note, 
however, that on some accounts, telling cannot be a non-linguistic act by definition: in 
Fricker’s words, telling is “linguistically explicit communication” (2012: 64).    
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positive considerations in 8.4, and explain how to draw a line between assertion and 
cases of non-assertoric OOGs in 8.5.     
8.1 One-off Grice 
Fricker characterizes “One-off Grice” (OOG) as an “entirely non-conventionally 
mediated act” (2012: 72) of Gricean non-natural meaning. According to Fricker, this 
means that an OOG cannot be taken to convey a unique propositional content. For 
instance, showing a thumbs-up on pretty much any occasion would give rise to at 
least a few equally good interpretations. Accordingly, the thumbs-up, and almost any 
other gesture, is deemed “non-conventional”, no matter how commonly it is being 
used in a given community. In what follows, I will employ the adjective 
“conventional” and the adverb “conventionally” in a more standard way than Fricker 
does, as referring to what is commonly employed in a certain community to convey a 
certain meaning. (On this usage, showing thumbs up would clearly count as 
conventional).   
OOGs come in many flavors. As I have already remarked, arguing that they can 
be used as assertions does not entail that they will always amount to asserting. The 
following OOG offered by Schiffer (1972) can be viewed precisely as an act of 
communication which does not amount to being a genuine instance of the assertoric 
act:      
WIGGLING EARS. Suppose that at a not very lively party Mr. Smith manages 
to communicate to his wife that he is bored by wiggling his ears, and that neither 
Mr. nor Mrs. Smith know of any other occasion on which someone meant 
something by wiggling his ears (Schiffer 1972: 126).   
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Schiffer’s WIGGLING EARS scenario is peculiar not only insofar as it does not rely 
on an explicitly formulated propositional content but also for its lack of a 
conventional gesture. Indeed, not even the Smiths recognize wiggling one’s ears as a 
common way of communicating the mentioned content: it is something Mr. Smith 
comes up spontaneously while at the party. The fact that Mrs. Smith manages to 
understand her husband’s message still doesn’t prove that the informant asserted it, 
but only a platitude that the communication was successful. As far as this goes, I am 
inclined to agree with Fricker that no assertion takes place in WIGGLING EARS 
although, as I will expand on shortly, this is so for different reasons than the ones 
Fricker gives.        
One of my primary goals in this chapter is to argue against Fricker’s thesis that 
explicitly formulated propositions are necessary for an act to count as an assertion. To 
show that such a claim is too strong I will be interested in seeing how Fricker’s 
reasoning sits with the type of gestures sometimes called “emblems” (McNeill 1992: 
299),242 such as a “thumbs-up” sign or a “ring”243 sign to which a certain kind of 
content is being attached depending on the context.  Throughout most of the chapter, 
I will rely on the following two tokens of OOG, arguing that in the circumstances 
described assertions are actually being made.        
TWO POINTS. A basketball player steps on the three-point line while shooting 
a ball. The referee who is standing nearby observing the player shows a two-
fingers sign to the other referee.    
242 McNeill (1992) taxonomizes gestures in the following manner: (i) gesticulation – a 
movement synchronized with and embodying the meaning of the speech; (ii) speech-framed 
gestures – a movement that is a part of the sentence itself, used instead of the words; (iii) 
emblems or conventional signs; (iv) pantomime, and (v) signs as those typically found in a sign 
language.   
243 The sign one performs by putting together the first finger with a thumb thus forming a 
circle, with the meaning of approval.  
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GOLF PLAYER. A golf player hits the ball, while his audience stands on the 
other side of the lake. Given that the spectators cannot hear the player, nor see 
the ball, the golfer shows thumbs up after the strike.    
At least prima facie, one may find TWO POINTS and GOLF PLAYER to be closer to 
cases of assertion and telling than the gesture from WIGGLING EARS. Yet, Fricker 
denies that these OOGs are instances of telling, insofar as the messaging is achieved 
by non-explicit means. In order to recover the message, the recipient of these OOGs 
would need to explore what Fricker calls the “knowledge-context”––“non-linguistic”, 
“mutually known relevant features of context plus other background knowledge” 
(73). Although OOGs are not the only cases where the knowledge-context needs to 
be deployed, it is “at its maximum” when interpreting OOGs. In sum, not only are 
OOGs never tellings, but these two classes ought to be described as “opposing limits” 
(72).   
 In employing such a knowledge-context with regard to OOGs, Fricker claims, 
the aim is to arrive at “a specific” or “the intended” message. However, we are left in 
the dark as to why one should think that there is such a specific message as well as 
how we determine that it exists. Interestingly, at other points, Fricker allows that 
there could be cases when “the utterer herself does not have a specific message in 
mind, but only something fuzzy in a general area” (80). I will interpret Fricker as not 
requiring there to be such an intended message, as her argument would seem less 
demanding.      
8.2 Argument from the singularity of content 
I now turn to Fricker’s two arguments against the possibility of OOGs being cases of 
genuine assertion, and in particular, of telling. Both of these arguments have the 
following form: there is a feature F which assertions have and OOGs lack, or else, a 
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feature G which assertions lack and OOGs possess. Such a difference, the argument 
goes, draws the line between the two classes and makes them genuinely distinct.   
  Fricker’s first argument brings into focus the lack of resources to fix the message 
conveyed by OOG in a unique way. Her reasoning can be reconstructed as follows: 
(i) in any given OOG, there are “several variant messages” with “approximate 
significance” which “could be equivalently stated, as the content of the intended 
message” (79–80). This entails that (ii) “the recipient can achieve at best conjecture 
that a specific message is what was intended” (80, my italics). Accordingly, Fricker 
argues, neither can the speaker (iii) assume “unambiguous responsibility for the truth 
of any particular message” nor can the recipient (iv) come to have knowledge244 of the 
truth of the message. Finally, the act does not amount to an assertion, because no 
commitment to truth takes place, nor does the speaker render herself liable to 
criticism (80). It is better to view the act performed as an indication instead (79).    
a. “Several variant messages”
We have already mentioned above that OOGs are surrounded by “several variant 
messages”, each of which may serve as the right interpretation. What’s more, not 
only can a message be ambiguous as far as its content is concerned (e.g., one may 
work out the WIGGLING EARS gesture equally plausibly as “I am bored” just as “I 
want to go home”) but also with regard to its force (Mr. Smith’s OOG might easily 
be construed as a suggestion to go home, say). Unsurprisingly, Fricker finds this 
feature inconsistent with the genuine illocutionary act of assertions.     
244 Fricker’s 2012 paper makes a number of qualified claims, making her overall position 
more difficult to assess. In this particular case, her reservation is that “in most, if not all, 
cases of OOG, a specific message cannot be known by the recipient to have been intended at 
all” (2012: 79).  
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We are thus faced with the following problem, at least prima facie––if we grant 
that a sender of OOG is asserting and is not doing anything else, how can we 
demonstrate that she asserts only one content, rather than a plurality of them or, as 
Fricker has it, a “fuzzy equivalence class of messages”?   
Fricker is certainly right that there is a “plurality” of contents expressed by 
means of using an OOG. Granted that this is so, we can still get such “fuzzy sets” 
with linguistic assertions. Think of Stainton’s non-sentential assertions:    
(1)  (A letter arrives. The recipient looks at the envelope, and says) From Spain.245 
I take it that (1) does not deliver “a single message”, but instead “several variant 
messages” with “approximate significance” which “could be equivalently stated, as the 
content of the intended message” (79–80). Thus, the assertor may be expressing a 
number of contents, such as that “The letter arrived from Spain”, “I got a letter from 
Spain”, “Someone from Spain wrote to me” and so on. Hence, just like OOGs, (1) is 
offering us “a fuzzy set of similar messages”, although we wouldn’t be inclined to 
deny that the assertion is being made by uttering (1).246   
 This much shows, I take it, that the fact OOGs express a set of closely related 
propositions does not yet show that they are not assertions.   
245 See Stainton (1997: 61) 
246 At this point, it might be argued that these contents (“The letter arrived from Spain”, “I 
got a letter from Spain”) do not actually differ, unless we are ready to adopt a fine-tuned 
theory of propositions, which can be resisted. In turn, there is a single content expressed 
and we are left with no real counterexample. To this worry, I reply in 8.4 when examining 
Fricker’s own CAR KEYS example.  
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b. Conjecture only
Fricker (2006) conceives of a speech act of telling as a “paradigm case”247 of how 
knowledge is transmitted from the speaker to her audience. In arguing that OOGs 
are not instances of telling, Fricker makes two general points, one about the speaker, 
another about the audience. When performing an OOG, we do not take 
responsibility in an “overt and undeniable” way (63) of what we put forward.248 
Granted that OOGs do not convey a single proposition (but a whole multitude of 
them instead), the hearer “can achieve at best conjecture that a specific message is what 
was intended” (80). This is why the hearer cannot have knowledge of the truth of this 
message, the argument goes, and OOG cannot be viewed as a case of assertion, or 
more specifically, telling.249  
A little reflection should bring out two problems with this claim. First, as I 
mentioned above, the presupposition that there is such an “intended”, “specific 
message” when we make OOG seems questionable. By Fricker’s lights, “specific” 
seems to designate a unique propositional content, and it is far from clear that we ever 
intend to convey a fixed content when using OOG. Instead, there might be a vague 
cloud of interrelated propositions we mean to convey250 (“something fuzzy in a 
general area”). Or else we might not have a single message “in mind” when issuing 
OOG. To motivate these options, observe that we typically use gestures in a more 
immediate fashion, as when expressing ourselves linguistically: it is not that we first 
247 “When one person tells something to another in face-to-face communication, by means 
of a speech act made in a sentence of a shared language, used with its literal meaning” (2006: 
593).   
248 This point is explored in Fricker’s second argument, which is discussed below.  
249 This presumes the knowledge account Fricker subscribes too. I develop this point in 
section 8.3.  
250 I don’t wish to suggest that an OOG could still not be regarded as a complex proposition, 
a conjunction unifying such interrelated contents. I am only denying that there is “a fixed 




come up with the content we wish to express and then try to come up with an 
appropriate gesture to “translate” it with. Instead, the process is more immediate. I 
take this is what Fricker means when she says, about the language-use: “it is my 
brain, not me, that selects my utterance-type”, (f. 16, p. 67). Fricker’s claim above, 
thus, might perhaps work for sign-language, but as we have seen, OOGs are not 
exhausted by such gestures.   
  Secondly, Fricker insists that the recipient cannot have knowledge of the message. 
Before moving on, there surely is a trivial sense in which this is true – since there is 
no single message conveyed, there can be no knowledge thereof, either. But this 
won’t take us far. As Fricker writes: “it can at best only be conjectured what exactly 
the utterer intended to convey by her act”. Notice that this ignores the other option 
(mentioned above) that one need not intend anything precise, and as such, commits 
Fricker to a presupposition that there is indeed such a proposition “exactly intended”. 
But the premiss is mistaken, or at best very questionable. Once we allow that there is 
no fixed message one intends to transmit, the golf player could come across as the 
informant of a set of closely related propositions, not the single proposition the 
interlocutor is supposed to decipher. What is important is that this whole “set of 
closely related propositions” can be known by the recipient – no matter how many 
propositions are actually contained in such a set, the spectators can come to know all 
of them. (In fact, most propositions in this set would be elliptical forms of each 
other, or paraphrases in terms of synonyms, although by all means this need not 
exhaust the set, as I discuss in the CAR KEYS scenario in 8.4). That being said, there 
is something suspicious in Fricker’s claim that an OOG “requires more cognitively of 
the recipient” (73). On the one hand, the fact that the recipient does employ more 
cognitive resources does not prevent the act from being viewed as an assertion. On 
the other hand, if we grant that this condition puts a constraint on assertion, the 
claim still unnecessarily generalizes: while OOGs might be more requiring, they need 
not be. As a class, OOGs are far from being uniform in this respect.  
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 More specifically, Fricker’s argument fails for the following reason: the fact that 
there are “several variant messages” does not yet secure that the recipient cannot 
recover all of them at once. To see this, let us go back to the WIGGLING EARS case, 
and try to show that it is not just the mere presence of “several variant messages” that 
prevents Mr. Smith from asserting. Namely, among a number of possible 
interpretations of his gesture, here are two interpretations Mrs. Smith might come 
up with: 
(2) Mr. Smith wants to go home. 
(3) Mr. Smith is bored.   
Fricker’s point can be raised in the following manner: despite the fact that Mrs. 
Smith actually grasped the intended message, she does so by a mere conjecture that 
(2) is conveyed. She could have, instead, assumed that Mr. Smith tried to convey (3). 
Either way, whichever of the two contents she rightly takes to be correct, it does not 
follow that the other content is true. (One may want to go home for reasons other 
than being bored, and one can be bored without wanting to go home). This should 
make us see that there is something more going on in WIGGLING EARS than the 
existence of “several variant messages”, as Fricker reports. The point is that (2) and 
(3) do not share certain epistemological relational properties, which I’ll try to make 
clear by contrasting this case with that of TWO POINTS. As to the latter, some 
plausible readings of the referee’s signal might be:  
(4) He scored two points.  
(5) It was two, not three points. 
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Note that in virtue of knowing either one of these messages, the audience will 
thereby know the other. This relation––that from “A knows that P” it follows that “A 
knows that Q” as long as Q is an element of the set S of plausible interpretations, just as 
P is––holds in the case of TWO POINTS and many other OOGs (although not in 
WIGGLING EARS). Accordingly, I believe, the audience does not seem to merely 
conjecture a part of or the whole message: they know it. No matter how many 
plausible interpretations there are, the audience can recover all of them, and obtain 
testimonial knowledge.        
There is, however, a stronger claim Fricker makes. She invites us to consider an 
example where an agent is in the desert, and puts up a placard drawing on it “a happy 
face with an arrow pointing north”251 (81). These two symbols underdetermine two 
readings––that “there is definitely water that way” and that “there may perhaps be 
water that way”. Unlike (4) and (5), these two propositions do not form a set of 
closely related propositions (at least, not if we define closely-relatedness in terms of 
whether an agent can know all the propositions within the set merely in virtue of 
knowing one of them). Indeed, facing the indeterminacy between interpreting an 
OOG as saying that p and as saying that possibly p is a more pressing worry.252    
It is fair to agree with Fricker that the possibility the speaker conveyed both “P” 
and “possibly, P” is out of the picture. That notwithstanding, I am not convinced that 
Fricker’s example is suitable for the purpose at hand. Her other attempt, where by 
means of nodding to the question “Has the lecture been cancelled?” one’s message 
can be interpreted as “the lecture is cancelled” as well as “the lecture may have been 
cancelled” is similarly dubious.   
To argue against Fricker that only one of these contents has been conveyed 
(either “P” or “Possibly P”) let us introduce the following “criterion of criticism”: if it 
251 Although this is not a gesture anymore, it can be still considered as an intentional 
“configuration of objects” and as such an utterance: in addition to oral utterances and 
gestures, Pagin (2014) classifies such configurations and inscriptions as utterances.   
252 See Hawthorne 2012: 104.  
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turns out that the speaker meant to convey the content A, and the audience is prone 
to criticize the speaker for misleading the audience, then the given OOG is used 
incorrectly to convey A. I believe this rules out both of Fricker’s examples. For, if it 
turns out that the speaker only wanted to convey that the water is perhaps in the 
designated direction, she would be criticized for misleading the audience. The same 
applies, I believe rather obviously, to Fricker’s other example. (Later on, I will 
provide further criticism criteria, though this one serves the purpose at the moment). 
Even if Fricker could come up with an example, where by sending an OOG one 
could equally interpret the content as “P” and “possibly P”, this possibility won’t take 
us too far. For, the defender of “assertoric OOGs” doesn’t need to demonstrate that 
every OOG is assertoric. As I will argue in section 8.5, an OOG can still be used in 
in way that does not amount to an illocutionary act. Yet, if an OOG is used in an 
appropriate fashion, i.e., correctly, we can make a strong claim there is a certain 
illocutionary act involved, be it assertion or otherwise.  
c. Indication
Finally, Fricker contends that since the audience cannot have knowledge of the OOG 
message, the speech act cannot be that of assertion, but indication instead. I hope to 
have shown that the premiss according to which the audience cannot have knowledge 
is a non-starter. But regardless of this, I am here interested in making a small point 
about this alternative speech act of indication.    
Fricker herself doesn’t flesh out what such “indication” involves, although she 
offers some instances. “I may indicate to you that I am happy by deliberately smiling 
at you” (81). A more helpful example is given below:      
Suppose you and I have been to a concert together, but arrived in our separate 
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cars. As we leave, I am unable to find my car keys—if I can’t find them you will 
have to drive me home. I go to my car, you remain distant. Then—having found 
the keys in my bag—I wave at you, and make a thumbs-up sign to you, being 
sure you see me do so. By this act I enable you to know that I have found my 
keys, and hence that you can set off home without more ado (ibid, 72). 
In this case, the “recipient concludes that it is being indicated that it is fine for him to 
drive home” (ibid, 79). The indication qua speech act, in Fricker’s usage, is 
contrasted with testimony.253 Hence, while testimony can be achieved only by means 
of a statement (82), indication is something the recipient infers (81); e.g., “I have 
found the keys”, “They were in a bag”, and so on.    
 One worry with Fricker’s hypothesis is that there is nothing incompatible with 
one and the same act being both an indication and an assertion. To show this, note 
that an indication is not an illocutionary act in the orthodox sense of the word (as 
assertions, commands, or questions are). Instead, we should understand indication as 
a sort of a “relational” illocutionary force: such speech act is parsed always as an 
indication of another, “genuine” illocutionary act. 254 For instance, one may indicate a 
warning, directive, pleading, or assertion. A similar, relational act is that of 
insinuation (see: Camp, MS), for these very same reasons. In conclusion, claiming that 
an act is not an assertion because it is an indication is thus misguided, and possibly a 
category mistake.    
253 Following Owens’ (2006) characterization of indication, we may say that by indicating, 
we “provide evidence for” as in “the wet side-walk indicates that it has rained” (2006: 106). 
This seems to be on the right track, albeit too broad – we are still interested in what kind of 
speech act indication amounts to 
254 This is why classifying indication among assertives, as proposed by Bach and Harnish 
(1979), seems likewise inadequate.      
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8.3 Argument from deniability 
Turning to Fricker’s second argument, it is crucial to note that she adopts some sort 
of the commitment-based view of telling (although not assertion, 2002:62, fn. 4) 
according to which in telling one that p the speaker incurs the commitment that one 
knows that p is true.    
There are two broad ways one can deny having such a commitment: (i) we may 
emphasize that we did not tell anything in the first place (but instead voiced a 
“probable belief, conjecture or wish”255); in this event, one denies that one ever 
incurred such responsibility; (ii) alternatively, we can insist that, while we did assert, 
we asserted a different proposition than the one attributed to us. Either way, Fricker 
argues that insisting we have been misunderstood won’t work for assertions in most 
cases. For, we typically recognize assertions and contents asserted pretty easily. For 
this reason, such attempts will be marked by “scant credibility” (83, f.27) and would 
be unconvincing (75).  
 One can deny OOGs in the same ways, by denying either the force or the 
content. In contrast, such denials would not be incredible as they were in the case of 
assertions. In the case of OOGs, we could say credibly that we did not intend to 
assert the given message, but instead only put it forward in terms of a guess. Or, that 
we were misunderstood as regards the precise content of our message. Given that 
these denials can be made credibly, in Fricker’s mind, such a disanalogy shows that 
performing an OOG cannot amount to asserting (83).      
     As with the previous argument, I think Fricker assumes that the gap between 
assertion and OOG is bigger than it actually is. She argues that such denials do not 
apply to OOGs because “the identity of a precise message is not fixed” in their case 
(71) which is why they are “less unsuited to deniable messaging”. But why should this 
255 Note that “telling” here refers to a subset of assertion, rather than a blanket term for 
unspecific speech act.   
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bother us? Think of the golfer case again: although the precise propositional content 
is not fixed (because there is a plurality of them) this hardly means that the golfer can 
credibly deny she wanted to convey either of these messages. If the golfer were to 
insist that she only meant to convey “I scored” but not that the ball is in, there are few 
available options: (a) the recipient can reply that the two messages are, in effect, the 
same (in the sense that one cannot score unless the ball is in or vice versa); (b) it might 
be suggested that the signal used is too unspecified, it actually conveys more than one 
message, which is why the sender must have in mind that no such deniability of any 
specific message (such as “the ball is in” as opposed to a more favorable “I scored”) 
would be credible. By sending such a signal, one cannot be favoring one of the 
possible interpretations over the others.  
 One might report having different intuitions. To prevent such a problem, we 
can look for a different criterion. For instance, imagine that the golfer used the 
thumbs up OOG in order to convey a different message, say, that he missed the hole. 
The test we put in front of ourselves is: would the recipient be authorized to criticize 
the sender of the message once they realize what message she intended to convey? 
The affirmative answer is in place here, the explanation for which is that there is a 
convention, shared by both the sender and the recipient, which is not respected in this 
case: the signal is used improperly or incorrectly. Consequently, Fricker is wrong when 
she says that OOGs are “not regarded by participants as subject to the K-norm” (81). 
The mere fact OOGs are made by a non-linguistic vehicle shouldn’t prevent them 
from being governed by knowledge, as I tried to argue.  
8.4 Positive considerations 
It might be objected that both TWO POINTS and GOLF PLAYER contain an 
explicitly formulated proposition and fall short of being genuine OOGs. Indeed, 
even if the signs were never officially introduced in the games, they do not seem to 
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be “one-off” in any strict sense of the word: over time, these signs might have 
become conventional (especially in the former case) and it is not that the referee who 
is the recipient of the message employs anew any knowledge-context. Be that as it 
may, I am still far from confident that Fricker’s considerations actually rule out these 
gestures from being OOGs, but I am happy to concede this point so as to see 
whether we make our case by employing more remote examples. Let us reintroduce 
Fricker’s example of OOG mentioned in the first section: 
CAR KEYS. “Suppose you and I have been to a concert together, but arrived 
in our separate cars. As we leave, I am unable to find my car keys—if I can’t 
find them you will have to drive me home. I go to my car, you remain distant. 
Then—having found the keys in my bag—I wave at you, and make a thumbs-
up sign to you, being sure you see me do so. By this act I enable you to know 
that I have found my keys, and hence that you can set off home without more 
ado.” (Fricker, 2012: 72)  
As opposed to TWO POINTS and GOLF PLAYER, the set of plausible 
interpretations appears to be wider in the case of CAR KEYS. The sender might be 
interpreted as conveying both “I found the keys” as well as “You can go home now”. 
But how does the mere fact these interpretations are possible rule out the act from 
being an assertion? Note that the speaker is committing herself to knowing both 
contents, in addition to perhaps some other contents. First, this makes the issuance 
of conversational challenges appropriate; the receiver can ask if the sender is certain 
that these are the right keys. Secondly, although a receiver’s interpretation may 
deliver only part of such content, they can learn each and every of these 
interpretations, accordingly attaining testimonial knowledge. Thirdly, if it turned out 
that these were indeed the wrong keys, the sender would be liable to criticism. Even 
though the sign is used in “one-off” manner, they are nonetheless conventional (in our 
8. Non-Linguistic Assertions
        ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
228	  
sense) and this makes a criticism of the sender appropriate. It is also due to this trait 
that the sender can commit herself to a message (or set of closely related messages) in 
the first place as well as that the audience can view her as being thus committed. 
Similarly, the conventionality of the signs used in the OOGs puts the audience in a 
position to work out the intended meaning and criticize the sender should the 
message turn out false.     
 Contra Fricker, I argued that the linguistic criterion (i.e., there being an explicit, 
linguistically formulated proposition the sender of OOG relies upon) is not a 
necessary condition for an act to be characterized as an assertion. Instead, it is both 
sufficient and necessary that there be the commitment to knowledge the sender 
undertakes and the receiver recognizes and can interpret its content. For this, indeed, 
no explicitly formulated proposition is really needed. As argued, in order for a 
receiver to reach the right interpretation we do not stand in need of any “single-
proposition” requirement Fricker repeatedly imposes. It is enough that the audience 
can be epistemically positioned to know all the plausible interpretations of the 
message. As argued to this end, these interpretations should be similar to a certain 
extent.    
8.5 Final remarks 
Why is it the case that some OOGs which are made with the “assertoric meaning” are 
not assertions? Going back to Stainton’s example (1), “From Spain”, I have 
contended above that the utterance counts as an assertion because of the context 
where it is common ground that the speaker received the salient letter. Imagine now 
that there was no letter to begin with – we can construe an example where such an 
utterance does not amount to an assertion.  
 It can be argued that similar things happen with OOGs in general. As regards 
WIGGLING EARS, neither is the gesture conventional nor does the context give 
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sufficient clues as to how the gesture is to be interpreted.256 In this case, the audience 
is not able to “work out” the meaning in the relevant context as the sender is either 
less than fully cooperative or less than fully competent. For, the sign Mr. Smith uses 
in the given context cannot be interpreted so as to reach the class of interrelated 
propositions such that from the fact that A knows that P it follows that A knows that Q as 
long as Q is an element of the set S of plausible interpretations. Due to too much 
guesswork involved, Smith may easily fail to communicate. Of course, all this may 
be due to limitations of the context, our resources in the pool of gestures, and so on.  
 In conclusion, propositions can be expressed non-linguistically by a gesture in an 
appropriate context. Whenever a subject commits oneself to knowing such a 
proposition, one thereby makes a non-linguistic assertion.     
256 I don’t wish to exclude a possibility that an assertion can be made without using a 
conventional device, as in the BOTTLE OF PILLS scenario, as long as the context provides 




After the introductory chapter, I set out to answer what I took to be the most 
fundamental question for normative accounts of assertion––what does it mean to say 
that an assertion is correct?––a question that has received, quite surprisingly, very little 
to none attention in the literature. My first proposal was that there are only two 
types of intuition, two essentially distinct ways of thinking about “correct assertion”, 
which I labeled reasonabilist and objectivist, respectively.     
There are three distinctive features of the reasonabilist program: (i) it considers 
the lack of the speaker’s liability to criticism to be both a necessary and a sufficient 
condition for correct assertion; (ii) it posits a non-factive norm of assertion, and (iii) 
it discards the notion of “secondary correctness” as spurious or at best redundant. 
Due to the first of these features, the reasonabilist’s framework aligns well with the 
game analogy, the heuristic typically adopted by normativist approaches to assertion, 
by putting the speech act on a par with moves in a games. This is whence it derives 
its initial appeal, in fact: if a move in a game is correct as long as the agent is not 
liable to criticism, why should an assertion be any different on this score?      
The next task was precisely to challenge such a picture. Thus, in Chapter 3, I 
introduced the strategy of identifying “normative consequences”––i.e. types of acts 
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that normally take place as a result of one’s making an assertion incorrectly. While 
the accusation of the speaker’s liability to criticism is one such consequence, I argued 
that it is not the only one. On the one hand, I maintained that (demands for) 
retractions in the light of recognized falsity should be viewed as another normative 
consequence. Under the assumption that the latter normative consequence signals 
the incorrectness of false assertions, it thereby favors objectivism over reasonabilism. 
On the other hand, I introduced a further normative consequence, labeled disavowal 
of knowledge, and argued that it can be expected to occur in a Gettier-type of case 
once the agent learns that she was “gettiered”. These data, I insisted, support not 
only objectivism but more specifically the knowledge norm as the necessary 
condition for correct assertion.         
At this point, it was crucial to weigh these results in the light of two problems 
which the knowledge account seems to face. First, and more generally, I argued that 
its underlying theory of constitutive rules, as outlined by Williamson (1996), is too 
narrow. According to this approach, a failure to conform to the constitutive rule will 
always result in an incorrect act of the very type in question. However, this cannot 
generalize: by not following the rule of checkmate, say, one does not manage to 
checkmate incorrectly. Instead, one makes no move at all. Secondly, the knowledge 
norm cannot be individuating of the speech act, either, as it governs the act of 
presupposition, as convincingly argued by García-Carpintero (MS1). The knowledge 
norm, thus, could at best serve as part of the whole approach. Accordingly, I 
preserved the claim that knowledge is a necessary condition for correct assertion, but 
rejected the individuation feature, proposing instead a “definitive” rule on which 
committing oneself to knowing the proposition expressed counts as an assertion of 
that proposition (CK for short).   
Subsequently, in Part II, I went on to defend such a combined view from four 
sets of objections. As to KA, it was most important to examine objections focusing 
on assertions made in “the evil demon world” and Gettier-type cases. Strangely 
enough, in treating these cases, no genuine explanation was offered as to why they 
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are incorrect (apart from mere contentions that KA rules them to be so). Instead, 
authors such as Williamson (2000) and DeRose (2002) have only tried to capture the 
intuition why they seem to be correct, by insisting that they are correct in the secondary 
sense. But for the reasonabilist who, as mentioned above, dispels with the notion of 
secondary correctness altogether and likewise deems these speech acts to be correct, 
this story could not be satisfactory. Thus, in defense of objectivism, I proposed the 
strategy relying on normative consequences: given that the subject will normally 
retract her assertion once she learns that she was in the evil demon world, and given 
that a “gettiered subject” will typically disavow her knowledge once she learns about 
the unfavorable environmental conditions, both assertions turn out to be incorrect, 
once we properly understand the normative character of these consequences.       
 As CK is a novel view, the extant literature does not contain any objection 
targeting it in particular. However, I discussed two important, general problems for 
such an approach. First, contra Pagin’s (2004), I tried to show that by uttering “I 
hereby committing myself to knowing that p” in normal circumstances one does 
indeed assert that p. This was a key argument to be addressed in defending the CK 
biconditional as many theorists (including non-normativists, such as Pagin) do allow 
that by asserting that p one expresses a certain type of commitment to p. Secondly, I 
addressed a worry as to how to cash out the property of “being expressed” at work in 
CK, which has been discussed by Alston (2000) in relation to his own account. I held 
that a proposition p is expressed iff there is a sentence s of which the speaker makes a 
free-standing use such that p is, or is part of, the truth condition of s. Although not 
the most elegant proposal, it seemed to avoid difficulties which alternative proposals 
faced. In particular, García-Carpintero’s (2004) account, which appeared to be 
tailor-made to capture the intuitive difference between assertion and presupposition, 
held the transfer of knowledge to be a norm rather than, what I took to be more 
plausible, the aim of assertion. 
Chapter 5 was devoted to a class of arguments sometimes advertised as “the 
strongest type of counterexample” to KA (Lackey 2007: 598), which attempt to 
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establish that the speaker’s belief is not necessary for an assertion to be correct. I 
have examined two such arguments, proposed by Pelling (2013a, 2013b) and Lackey 
(2007, 2008), and offered two pairs of solutions in reply, exploring the possibility 
that the illocutionary acts in question are not assertions but other assertives which I 
named proffering and presenting, respectively. Still, for those who prefer “desert 
landscapes” in speech act theory, alternative, more orthodox solutions were also put 
forward.     
The goal of Chapter 6 was to explain how KA and CK can account for 
conversational challenges, and indeed, do the job better than rival accounts. While a 
lot of work has been done over the years on the so-called K-challenge, comparatively 
less has been said on the C-challenge, and that not very convincingly, in my view. 
Accordingly, I tried to argue that the C-challenge does not pose a threat to KA: it 
either really challenges the speaker’s justification (rather than certainty) in which case 
it enters the conditions for knowledge, or else, when it is about subjective certainty, 
it merely invites the speaker to share information about whether she is confident 
about the act, rather than actually challenging her. Consequently, KA and CK seem 
to be in a good position to account for such data.    
Part III examined broader issues. In Chapter 7, I had two goals: to portray the 
knowledge norm “at work” in application as applied to aesthetic attributions of the 
form “x is beautiful”. In making this statement, I argued, one asserts correctly only if 
one knows that relative to one’s own aesthetic standards, x is indeed beautiful. But 
this led to yet broader topics. For, the resulting naïve contextualism, as the name 
might already suggest, is not as sophisticated an account as would be needed in order 
to satisfy the desiderata of normativity and disagreement. Yet, it proved to be 
compatible with another inviting proposal, viz. that in making a report about x 
according to my aesthetic standards, I am thereby also recommending that the 
audience accept that x is beautiful. In conclusion, this turned out to be a case for the 
claim that by making an assertion with a particular content, we thereby also perform 
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a non-assertoric speech act of recommendation, which might seem intriguing on its 
own.    
Finally, Chapter 8 discussed the possibility of non-linguistic assertions. One of 
the reasons to pursue this topic was the fact that we defined the property of “being 
expressed” within CK only in linguistic terms, clarifying what it means to say that a 
proposition is expressed by a sentence. But this might have presupposed, contrary to my 
intentions, that a proposition cannot be expressed by employing a non-linguistic 
vehicle. By arguing for such a possibility, in terms of a gesture performed in 
appropriate contexts, I examined cases where we can assert strictly speaking non-
linguistically. In addition, the motivation also came from the fact that, apart from a 
few points made in passing, it was never argued that non-linguistic assertions are 
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